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BREXIT AND THE “NEW” TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS: POTENTIAL REFLECTIONS ON THE STRATEGIC RE-POSITIONING AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

Mirza Smajić – Veldin Kadić*

Europe will be forged in crises, and will be
the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises (Jean Monnet, 1978)

ABSTRACT

This article analyses emergence and development of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union and the role of key countries (Berlin-Paris-London axis) in that process. The aim of the paper is to detect the internal and external obstacles and challenges to the integration of this policy with specific focus on the Brexit and “new” transatlantic relations. In this regard, the authors aim to explore how withdrawal of the United Kingdom of the Great Britain and Northern Ireland, as Europe’s strongest military country, from the European Union will reflect on the future development and integration of the Common Security and Defence Policy of European Union and “new” transatlantic partnership that had begun by Donald Trump’s election for the President of the United States of America. Authors hold that these two challenges set the future integration of the Common Security and Defence Policy into the limbo and further consider that French-German partnership and relationships with the countries of the “New Europe” will be crucial to the new strategic positioning of this policy and in eliminating negative implications of the aforementioned challenges.

Key words: Brexit, European Union, Common Security and Defence Policy, NATO, Transatlantic cooperation

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Introduction

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) of the European Union (EU) represents one of the most dynamic and ambitious areas of the EU's development subsequent to the Maastricht Treaty's signing and coming into effect. The policy is integrated into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU and its outlines¹ can be found in the Treaty of EU, which was signed in Maastricht on February 7, 1992. The Treaty of Amsterdam (signed in 1997) affirmed the foundational principles of the Maastricht Treaty with one discrepancy – reflected in a fact that it proposes *progressive* shaping process of a common defence policy creation instead of the *eventual* shaping of the policy as proposed by the Maastricht Treaty. Despite the fact that the Treaty of Amsterdam represents the focal legal basis for establishing the European security and defence policy, specific initiative for its further development took place at the Franco-British summit in Saint-Malo on December 4, 1998. In a joint declaration, two of the EU's most powerful military states (France and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland² – hereinafter referred to as the UK) agreed that: “European Union (EU) [needs to be given] the capacity for autonomous decision-making and action, backed up by credible military forces, in order to respond to international crises when the *Atlantic Alliance* is not involved.”(Joint Declaration on European Defence, 1998). It is considered that origins of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)³ come from the Franco-British summit held in Saint-Malo, since both the UK and France

¹ Chapter V of the Treaty on the EU, Article J. 4 states: “The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence [...] the progressive framing [...] might lead to a common defence [...] should the European Council so decide.” (The Treaty on European Union, 1992). By amendments to the Treaty on European Union, made based on the Treaty of Amsterdam, decree “eventually framing” was replaced by provision of “progressive framing”, while the concluding part of the decree “could lead to the common defence” supplemented by “when the European Council so decides” (Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, 1997).

² When it comes to the *Brexit*, authors note that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland is the correct political term to be used, due to the fact that Great Britain is geographical term for the territory of the Scotland, Wales, and England, along with the associated islands, except for the Northern Ireland. Since these two terms are used as synonyms in practice and in a variety of written works, for sake of original referencing of citations and literature sources, this article retains the mentioned synonyms in order to preserve the authenticity of the references used.

³ This name was changed into the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) by the Treaty of Lisbon.

confirmed that they will jointly act towards the realization of specific goals in the given area – specifically the development of rapidly deployable European forces and development of the European defence industry and technology. The mentioned integration act between France and the UK affirms the Jean Monnet’s thesis that “Europe will be forged in crises and will be the sum of the solutions adopted for those crises.” (Nissen, 2017, pp. 8) taking into consideration that the joint declaration on European defence resulted as a response to the Balkan wars, foremost on Kosovo where it turned out that the EU is not capable to manage the crises in *its backyard*.⁴ According to the many authors⁵ theoretical interpretations, even though it stands that the UK holds the most merits in establishment of the ESDP, its subsequent activities within the EU – especially in regard to defence, considered from the historical stance of 20 years later – are described as ambivalent and are attributed explicit *Atlantic* course of action. This ambivalence reached its peak at a referendum held on June 23, 2016, when the citizens of the UK, after several decades of the integration, decided to leave the EU with 51.9% voting majority at a total 71.8% voters’ turnout.

1 Brexit in Figures – United Kingdom vs. European Union

The results of referendum on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU caused a lot of uncertainty to the political, economic, diplomatic and security-defence plan, by bringing about many issues that need to be solved at the bilateral level as well as the need for eventual modalities for the future cooperation. According to the analysis of the rhetoric and debates that preceded the referendum, issues of security and defence did not play dominant role in public and therefore cannot be accounted for as *drivers* of the referendum’s outcome. In fact, the issues that did dominate before the referendum took place were focused on economics, sovereignty, and migration crisis. Actually, the *Leave Campaign* endorsed “a

⁴ During the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina (B&H) and Kosovo, the EU did not have the capacity for meaningful involvement in conflicts, so it followed that the NATO alliance gave in the most efforts towards ending the war. In the aftermath, the USA demanded from the EU to develop more intensive defence mechanisms in order to be able of dissolving the smaller-scale crises in which the NATO would not take the role.

⁵ See in particular, Wyn, Rees: America, Brexit and security of Europe, Dunne, Tim: When the shooting starts: atlanticism in British security strategy, Heisbourg, Francois: Brexit and european security, Christine, Nissen: Forged in Crisis, the EU’s common security and defence policy after Brexit, Besch, Sophia: EU defence, Brexit and Trump, The good, the bad and the ugly, Paul, Sarah Lain, Veerle Nouvens: The consequences of Brexit for european defence and security.

vision of a globally oriented, sovereign Britain free to ‘take back control’ of borders, trade policy and domestic legislation.” (Black, Hall, Cox, Kepe, Silfversten, 2017, pp. 15). On the other hand, the *Remain Camp* considered “that any British withdrawal – or ‘Brexit’ – would threaten jobs, stability and the UK’s influence in an increasingly interconnected world.” (ibid). If we take into account that the UK⁶ is the strongest military country within the EU and the only one alongside the France capable of projecting its power outside its borders (due to owning the overseas military bases) with the defence budget second largest within the NATO – after the United States of America (USA) – and the fifth largest in the world, it is easily recognized that its role in the development of CSDP of the EU cannot be relativized. Ever since the operationalization⁷ of the then present European Security and Defence Policy has begun, the EU participated and is still participating in 35 military and civilian missions – 6 of which (military) and 10 of which (civilian) are still ongoing (in March, 2019) (European Union External Action, 2019). The UK’s contribution to these missions is least to say quite modest – considering that the UK alongside with France is strongest military country within the EU. When it comes to contributions made to the EU’s military and civilian missions, the UK is ranked as the fifth (after France, Italy, Germany, and Spain) by holding only 4.19% of the total staff that the EU has been given from the member countries for the purpose of these missions. According to the report of House of Lords, delivered to the EU Committee, covering period 2005-2016 “the UK share in EU’s military operations amounts to 14.82% of total EU costs, while share in for civilian operations amounts to 16%” (House of Lords European Committee, 2016). Even though the axis London-Paris played the most important role during the initial development and operationalization of the CSDP of the EU, displayed through several initiatives – such as aforementioned Summit at Saint-Malo – the development of the European Defence Agency (EDA) and development of concept of European combat groups of the EU, these two countries held diametrically opposite attitudes regarding the type of European defence. France

⁶ According to the IISS Military Balance database from 2016, the UK’s share in the total EU’s military-defence system, listed by categories amounts to: aircraft carriers – 50%, nuclear submarines – 50%, ground-based radar systems – 37%, naval surface combatants -16%, armoured reconnaissance forces – 15%, transport helicopters – 11%, combat aircrafts – 11%, and armoured combat vehicles – 11%. For more information, check: Black, Hall, Cox, Kepe, Silfversten, 2017, p.67.

⁷ By starting civilian police operation in B&H on January 1, 2003.

strived for the concept of *strategic autonomy* and therefore supported an independent European defence policy – the one that could serve as a replacement for the NATO – while the UK strived towards the common European defence – only as a complementary to the NATO alliance. If one takes a look at the structure and the contents of former and current missions within the CSDP of the EU, it is easy to conclude that this policy was mainly shaped in accordance to the British preferences. More so, any attempts of shaping the policy in a manner opposite to the British preferences, such as establishment of the *EU permanent military headquarters* for purpose of military and civilian missions and approval of granting more money to the EDA, have been followed by a British veto. Therefore, Thierry Tardy of the European Union Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) made a right point by defining the EU's military and civilian missions within crisis management as sub-strategic, referring to the observation that theirs total contribution rarely makes a significant changes within countries or regions (Tardy, 2015), because they are “often small in scale and focused on limited capacity-building, not large-scale peacekeeping or peace-enforcement missions like those deployed by NATO or the UN” (Nissen, 2017, pp.16). While on the one hand the given data shows quite modest contribution of the UK to the EU's civilian and military missions – given its military and political power – on the other hand its contributions still hold for 25-30% out of the total EU's military capabilities and capacities. So, when observing these percentages separately in the strategic sense they seem too low for the UK in order to gain more serious role in a world order, whilst they seem too high for the EU and its global ambition if it were to lose these resources in the future. Loss of resources coming from the UK could have its major effect in the aspect of crisis management, since the majority of the British contributions were of a civilian character, judged by their nature and contents. When taking into the account statements given by the senior EU and UK leaders, it comes to our attention that each of these sides became well aware of the eventual risks that could be brought about by a complete breakdown of relations within the area of CSDP. Therefore, it is implied that *post-Brexit era* will be accompanied by establishment of the new type of *Channel* partnership.

2 Brexit and Further Development of the Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union – The Possibility of the Impossible?

Given that issues of the trade, economics, and possible future arrangements in these directions have been dominating the public discourses of the EU and the UK, the security-defence area lacks in number of released documents that could clearly indicate the direction of future cooperation in this context. The guidelines set by the Council of the EU regarding the *Brexit* state that “the EU ‘stands ready to consider’ establishing a security and defence partnership, but provide no guidance on what such a partnership could look like” (Bakker, Drent, Zandee, 2017, pp.10). Many theoretical interpretations that analyse modalities of the future EU-UK partnership in the area of security and defence, provide three to five the most potential scenarios according to the authors. In this context, according to the authors of this article, Anne Bakker, Margriet Drent and Dick Zandee in their study *European Defence: How to Engage UK After Brexit* provided the most comprehensive overview of possible future security-defence partnership between the EU and the UK, based on the five possible arrangements:

1. **The Common Security and Defence Policy *opt-in*** – This model would imply the highest possible degree of the participation without the EU membership. In this way the UK would keep possibility of influencing the agenda and *decision-making process* in this area. However, this model “is highly unlikely as it is difficult to imagine that the EU-27 would allow a non-member to participate in decision-making and that the UK would be willing to commit to the whole of the CSDP after Brexit” (ibid, pp.13) as if it remained the EU member, especially if we take into account irreconcilable impact of the *Eurosceptics* in this country regarding the issue of European defence.
2. **Concluding the Framework Participation Agreement** – In this case, by signing the Agreement, the EU allows non-member countries to participate in its civilian and military missions of their choice, but withholding them the rights to participate in *decision-making process* and to exert any influence on the flow of missions. The EU has already signed these types of agreements with Canada, Norway, Ukraine, Turkey, Montenegro, and the USA. It is important to note that the agreement with the USA covers only the USA’s participation in the

civilian missions. This type of partnership seems unlikely to be accepted in London, since it would give the UK quite an inferior influence and position equal to the aforementioned countries, which seems unlikely for them to accept given their military and political powers.

3. **Concluding a new type of a partnership agreement** – Basically, this arrangement implies privileged partnership with non-member countries in the area of CSDP, due to their` strategic, military, and political importance in the world. This model is a lot alike to the second one, with a difference that it would also be opened for the countries that have already signed *Framework Participation Agreement* and countries` influence on the *decision-making process* would be determined by theirs` contribution to the specific operations. An aggravating circumstance would be the difficulty implied by setting the gradating criteria (of contributions) for countries to fulfil in order to obtain a prominent status in the Europe`s defence.
4. **Berlin Plus** – This type of an arrangement would imply the UK`s participation in the EU`s civilian and military missions as a NATO member, based on the existing Berlin Plus Agreement (BPA) which is in the effect. If it were to be realised, this arrangement would result, for one example, in continued exploitation of the UK`s Northwood operational military headquarters as the NATO`s asset for the EU-sponsored missions. However, this option seems unlikely given that application of the BPA in the practice is encountering the difficulties because of the Turkey-Cyprus conflict, as well as because of the other structural shortcomings – which makes it necessary to reform the Agreement.
5. **No formal association with the CSDP of the EU** – This type of the arrangement in a nutshell would imply the concept *everyone for themselves* – the UK would sign an agreement for participation within specific type of missions without any formal legal influence on the *decision-making process*. Basically, such an arrangement would be based on case-by-case principle, which would eventually further weaken its influence – therefore it is unlikely that the UK`s political system will take this course of action. (ibid, 2017)

After the brief overview of possible arrangements between the UK and the EU, it is necessary to look into the issue of which one of these would be the

most beneficial for both sides. Crispin Blunt, the president of the Subcommittee for Foreign Affairs of the House of Commons in the British Parliament, presented the key intention of the UK's possible aspirations when it comes to the modelling of their future partnership with the EU in the area of security and defence, at the EU's inter-parliamentary conference held at Malta on April 26, 2017. He pleaded for an intensive and special partnership between the two sides in the context of the security cooperation. However, Blunt's plan is quite an ambitious one and the closest one to the aforementioned third arrangement – arranging a new special type of partnership that would be out of the scope of the standard *Framework Participation Agreement* that the EU signed with the *third states*. To sum things up, this would imply the conclusion of the *Enhanced Framework Participation Agreement* which in the context of civilian and military EU missions would “allow London to be a stakeholder in the political decision-making and strategic planning of the operations in which it wishes to participate.” (Santopinto, Ilou Villafranca, 2018, pp.12). Regarding his status at the Political Security Committee (PSC) – key coordinating body for CSDP – Blunt suggested observer-status for the UK, which would allow it to exert the influence in the scope of shaping the agenda without the rights in the *decision-making processes* – meaning that it would be basically allowed “to shape, but not make decisions” (ibid). It is also suggested for regular high-level summits to be held between the EU and the UK at the level of the foreign ministers, which would allow mutual understanding of foreign policy positions. Although the final expected results of these summits are not specified, it is hard even to think that the EU would agree for its foreign policy decision to depend on the UK's position. Previous Blunt's report suggests that the UK as a non-member country of the EU keeps its influence on the *decision-making processes* within the organization (ibid). In May, 2018 London released a new official document summarizing a series of their negotiation team's discussions with the EU entitled *Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership*⁸. Obviously, this

⁸ The key UK's requirements within this document are the following:

- regular and structured consultations at all levels, with no specified frequency or nature of the dialogue's structure;
- to establish a programme for the exchange of officials (this is the only real novelty);
- to adopt an agreement on the exchange of sensitive information (a prerequisite for any form of cooperation);
- to be able to participate in CSDP missions;
- to remain involved in the political and strategic planning of the European Defence Agency;

document does not bring about many alterations when it comes to the UK's official position, even though analysis provided by political department for the EU's foreign affairs states that "[w]hile Theresa May's government finally seems to admit that it can no longer be directly involved in decision-making, it still hopes to be able to access and influence it" (Ibid, pp.10). The privileged status for the UK, forged by the London, is based on its influence on the international relations as the permanent member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, as one of the leading actors in the NATO alliance, as a major contributor in developmental international assistance, and as a force with the ability of globally displaying its military and political power. Despite the unquestionable importance of the UK in the international relations, a lot of creativity and inventiveness is required in order to overcome rigorous Brussels bureaucratic institutionalism for it to create the special partnership for the UK in the *post-Brexit era*. On the other hand, official EU documents that consider the future security-defence partnership with the UK do not display considerate enthusiasm to assign this country the status of a special partner in this organization. The document titled *Internal preparatory discussions on framework for future relationship: Security, Defence and Foreign policy* outlines the framework positions that will be considered within the EU institutions as a part of the future negotiation process. "[P]reservation of the autonomy regarding the decision-making process" (European Commission, 2018) stands for the basic EU principle and clearly indicates that non-member countries regardless of their military and political power are not allowed participation in *decision-making process* in any form nor at any level. Regarding the implementation of civilian and military missions it is stated that the "*third states* cannot provide for operational headquarters⁹ during the missions, nor hold command or other higher functions in certain mission" (Ibid). Although there is a willingness to establish the "specific type of the future partnership" (Ibid), there is no outline of specific concept of that partnership, so obviously the EU's position regarding the establishment of the future partnership is extremely ambiguous. For example, regarding the framework of the future partnership, one of the outlined possibilities is specific dialogue and consultation mechanism with the UK

- to participate in programmes and projects carried out within the framework of PESCO, EDF and Galileo. For more information, check: Framework for the UK-EU Security Partnership, 2018.

⁹ In this context a need is stated for emergent displacement of Operation headquarters for *Atlanta Operation* (placed at the coasts of Somalia) from the Northwood to the Italy or Spain, most likely (European Commission, 2018).

(considering its permanent member status in the UN Security Council), while regarding the participation in CSDP's missions three possible models are outlined: "Framework Participation Agreement (FPA) based on the model approved by the Council in 2008; [a]d hoc agreements; [d]eveloping a new and more ambitious framework applicable for third countries" (ibid). The last model offers possibility of a more integrated partnership, but it is notable that it is not mentioned specifically for the UK but for all *third states* that are non-members, which might imply the EU's readiness for a kind of tenacious partnership with the *third states* related to their military power and political influence that goes out of the scope of existing *Framework Participation Agreement* – demonstrating that "EU recognises that special dialogue needs to be set in place with the United Kingdom, but goes on to stress that this should not discriminate against other third countries" (Santopinto, Ilou Villafranca, 2018, pp.17). Therefore, it can be argued that ambitions and desires of the UK and feasibility and readiness of the EU for their realization are found in the mild collision and conceivable compromise is likely to depend on the tacit concessions from the both sides, so that eventual possibilities would not turn into impossibilities because "[t]he UK will not want to accept the subordinate role that the EU currently assigns to the non-EU troop-contributing countries. [...] The EU will not want to set a precedent by giving the UK more voice in decisions than other non-member have." (Besch, 2016, pp.8).

3 Brexit and the EU – What Happens Next?

On November 14, 2018, a draft agreement on the UK's withdrawal from the EU, regarding the *Atomic Energy* was signed. It resulted from the comprehensive efforts of negotiation teams from both sides and covers a range of issues and policies with the objective of reducing the undesirable consequences of the *Brexit*, with implementation period set by the December 31, 2020. With reference to CSDP's provisions, it is stated that "[i]n the event that the Union and the United Kingdom reach an agreement governing their future relationship [...] Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU and the acts adopted on the basis of those provisions shall cease to apply to the United Kingdom from the date of application of that agreement" (European Commission, 2018, pp.197), while with respect to the activities conducted within the CSDP it is stated that "[u]ntil 31 December 2020, the United Kingdom shall contribute to the financing of the European Defence Agency, the European Union Institute for

Security Studies, and the European Union Satellite Centre, as well as to the costs of Common Security and Defence Policy operations, on the basis of the contribution keys.“ (ibid, pp. 266) according to the European regulations¹⁰. Granting that this document could have come into effect only if it were followed by its adoption in the British Parliament (during the development period of the study – April, 2019), it is important to note that this agreement was rejected three times, as well as four other options – through the *indicative votes* – that were supposed to indicate toward what options do representatives from Westminster tend in order to overcome the parliamentary blockade. Apparently, still there is no any progress – and the last in the series of events that confirms this argument is agreement of the EU’s leaders to extend the deadline for the UK’s withdrawal to the October 31, 2019. Until the specified date the UK has three options at its disposal: adoption of the aforementioned agreement about withdrawal in the *Parliament*, the recall of the *Article 50*, and termination of the *Brexit* and change of their current strategy. While at the first the UK’s withdrawal would suggest wider range of possible options for the future European defence integration, authors of the article suggest it is necessary to be aware of the fact that along the UK there are other *Atlantic countries* in EU – such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, as well as Netherlands and others – which was best manifested through proposal for establishment of the *European Army* given by the French president in November, 2018. Now that the UK withdraws from the EU, these countries will not have the luxury of keeping the *background positioning* and will have to give in their *veto* to the greater European defence integration independently. Therefore, French-German relations with these countries are going to be crucially significant for the upcoming CSDP development. In the report *Brexit: Strategic Consequences for Europe* provided by the *Netherlands Institute of International Relations (Clingendael Institute)*, written by Peter van Ham it is asserted that: “Brexit will neither help nor harm the EU’s CSDP. Without the UK, the CSDP may become less burdened by London’s anxieties over sovereignty, opening up vistas for federal solutions to the EU’s defence challenges. At the same time, without the UK’s major military capabilities and global geostrategic perspective, the CSDP is bound to become less ambitious

¹⁰ Point (a) of Article 14(9) of Council Decision (EU) 2016/13531, in Article 10(3) of Council Decision 2014/75/CFSP2, in Article 10(3) of Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP3 and in the second subparagraph of Article 41(2) of the Treaty on European Union, respectively, and in accordance with Article 5 of this Agreement. For more information, check: European Commission, 2018.

and even more ‘sub-strategic’ (that is, with marginal effect)” (Van Ham, 2016, pp. 4-5). Such an assertion is eligible to the extent to which the aforementioned thesis – that there are other countries along the UK that are not willing to accept greater European defence integration out of the NATO’s scope – is confirmed. Therefore, while the UK’s withdrawal represents a problem, at the same time the same problems regarding the European defence integration remain, so it is logical to conclude that the outcome of the CSDP’s future development holds the *status quo*. However, there still remain indications for CSDP’s positive prospects. The current *status quo* does not have to be of a lasting character in case that the EU in the future instead of *characters* who manage the governments, gets the “leaders to lead the nations” (Angelov, 2018, pp. 12) – in that instance, on the one hand, fundamental structural shortcomings of the EU’s integration as well as of its defensive dimensions could be eliminated, while on the other hand “[f]or a medium-sized, post imperial power [Great Britain], there is no escaping the fact that geography is destiny” (Heisbourg, 2016, pp. 19).

4 NATO and the EU After the Brexit – The Joint Action or New Repositioning

From the historic perspective, Europe is recognized as the most important political, security and geographical area of the NATO’s existence in the last 70 years of its existence. In this regard it is necessary on one hand to give credit to the role of the USA in the creation of the European security architecture through the NATO, but on the other hand also to the European’s attempts to build its security-defence system. Therefore, objective of the American Post-Cold War liberal framework was establishment of the *Atlantic order* with Western European countries characterized by “overlapping values, converging interests, and common goals” (Rees, 2017, pp. 560). The main objective of the *Atlantic order* was to maintain the balance of powers and common security interests between the USA and Europe. Nevertheless, certain differences in perception of the USA’s and European policies were evident in the mid-1990s with regard to dissolving the Post-Cold War crises and the USA’s foreign policy objectives – apparent in the statement of the then USA’s president Bill Clinton, who said: “[t]ogether with another when we can, and alone to ourselves when we have to”. In this context it is worthwhile mentioning that an interesting thesis on issues of force can be found with an American theoretical author Robert Kagan in the book *Of Paradise and Power*. Precisely, issues regarding the exertion of force

are what differentiate American and European views of the world. Kagan emphasizes European practice of abandoning the force principle – or overcoming it – by “withdrawing into its closed world of laws and regulations, international negotiations and cooperation” (Kagan, 2003, pp. 7). Furthermore, he addresses it as a post-historical paradise of peace and prosperity, thereby attaining Immanuel Kant’s eternal peace, while the USA remain captured in the history and keep implementing the force in anarchic “*Hobbes*” world in which international laws and regulations are unreliable, and rights for security, defence and ground for the liberal order remain dependant on possession and exercise of the military force. (Kagan, 2003, pp. 7-8). The aforementioned are precisely the reasons upon which the author points out the American superiority (power) and the European post-historical course (paradise). However, according to some American theorists this scenario was due to the extreme focus of the USA onto the *Atlanticism* and their efforts put into encouraging further European political and economic integrations. Furthermore, improper understanding of *paradise and power* led to “the danger that European integration, while initially dependent on the security provided by *Atlanticism*, could evolve into an institutional framework antagonistic towards the United States” (Rees, 2017, p.560). The very first attempt to establish European autonomous institutional defence framework is related to the year 1999 and ESDP. However, even though this concept lived up to the declarative support of the EU member states, there have been specific ethical implications, primarily with non-member states of the NATO – Sweden and Finland – about the “the implied ‘militarizing’ of the Union’s nature” (Bailes, 2008, pp. 115).

Interactive relations between *Atlantic partners* at the beginning of the 21st Century reached a certain stage of political vacuum as the result of intervention by the USA and coalition partners in Iraq on one hand and continuity of the European politics of (in)capability and (un)equality with regard to crisis management and compromising attitudes of member states towards the Union’s common foreign and security policies on the other hand. Basically, it was the right time to reconsider the NATO relations and activities toward specific global issues or for the attempt of “transforming the Eurocentric NATO into the global NATO” (Plevnik, 2010, pp. 7). Accordingly, it can be assumed that the NATO will remain its main role in the process of designing the international and global security – which is confirmed in the *New Strategic Concept for 2020* (NATO New Strategic Concept 2020: Active Engagement, Modern Defence, 2010). So, based on this document it is certain that the NATO


is going to develop its capabilities outside of its territory. However, to what degree this will take place is going to depend on the actual solution of specific issues that are about to dominate in the relation Washington-Brussels, particularly regarding the consensus on implementation of force and the NATO's engagement, that was already demonstrated in the case of Iraq crisis and the search for *exit strategy* in Afghanistan.

In addition to the *Brexit*, which substantially deepened the European discrepancies with regard to the political and security issues, the election of Donald Trump for the president of the USA in 2017 set probably the greatest challenge for the CSDP of the EU. During the same period in which the UK was beginning the preparations for the *Brexit* and negotiations with the EU concerning the *exit strategy*, the USA in the time of Obama administration confirmed the special ties with the UK and thereby exerted substantial effect on interaction within the Union and foremost on the future of the CFSP (Rees, 2017, pp. 568). When president Trump, just before the NATO summit in Brussels in 2018, focused on the members' contributions to defence, warned of leaving the NATO if Europe does not double its contributions for defence to 4%, the already disturbed political idyll within the Union just got further complicated (Walshe, 2018). However, analysis of the data from 2018 shows considerable discrepancies among the member countries of the NATO and EU with regard to the allocation of funds to the NATO defence. The Graph 1 given below shows the percentages of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) that respective member states allocate to the NATO defence.

As the data from Graph 1 shows, only a few of member countries reach the NATO's threshold of allocating 2% of GDP for defence. Also, it is unlikely that all member states will reach the contribution to defence quote of 2% of GDP until the 2024. Furthermore, there are significant differences in the values of allocations of GDP per capita to the defence, which are not to be analysed in details. The leading countries in this respect – alongside the USA, the UK, and Greece – are *New European countries* that became members of the NATO (Estonia, Latvia, Poland, and Lithuania). Considering the current geopolitical scene in the Baltic it seems expected that these countries allocate amounts higher than the set threshold and that they strive to approach the USA and the UK – that is, strive to rely on the NATO capacities in political and security contexts. Furthermore, although the Berlin-Paris relations are considered as a backbone of future development of the European defence architecture, several researches show that 69% of German population consider that defence budget

needs to increase and 19% absolutely agree that the budget needs to increase in order to reach the 2% threshold by 2024. (Taylor, 2017, pp. 212-214). These indicators certainly do not serve in the favour of Trump’s vision of the NATO, nor in the favour of future defence cooperation in the EU after the *Brexit*. Moreover, it is evident that the UK is going to continue its support to the USA and the NATO regardless of the *Brexit*, while the EU (27) is going to continue its search for common defence interests and focus on *soft power* strategy due to nonexistence of members’ institutional coherence.

Graph 1: Contributions to the NATO defence (%) in March, 2018



Source: Schulte von Drach, 2018

On the other side, analytics find that due to the current security challenges in Europe – such as terrorism, cyber-attacks, migrations, Russia’s hybrid threats, and other global challenges – existing contractual relationship between the NATO and the EU (Berlin Plus) needs to be redefined (Bakker, Dunt, Zende, 2017). So, considering the historical partnership between the USA and EU especially in military terms, it can be concluded that it is necessary to seek for common and coherent cooperation principles in order to achieve synchronized political and security attitudes to the global and regional movements. It can be assumed that *post-Brexit era* could result in stronger cooperation between Washington and Brussels, because regardless of tendencies and intentions of European allies, the NATO is going to remain the crucial variable in global and

regional security. Accordingly, depending on the development of a new geopolitical cartography on regional and global level, the EU and the NATO are going to have to strengthen their cooperation, since both sides are in need of each other. When it comes to security-defence role of the UK after the *Brexit* and its relations with the EU, two possible directions are certain. One direction would encourage disintegrative factors within the Union, resulting in further weakening of *Euro-Atlanticism* in general and of the NATO in particular. The other direction would be more likely to result in repositioning of the roles of the NATO and EU (27) followed by the equal treatment within the NATO and by level of cooperation between the two organizations on the principle *one for all and all for one*.

Conclusion

This paper elaborated eventual implications that the *Brexit* could pose to the future development of CSDP of the EU. The authors advocated the thesis that the UK's withdrawal from the EU is going to influence the development of CSDP – either positively or negatively, depending on the circumstances. It is important to note that the UK certainly is the strongest military country in the EU, one of the pioneers in the initiative for creation of the CSDP, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council, so the absence of its further involvement in this policy (in political and military regard) represents a great impairment for the EU. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the UK's contributions to the civilian and military missions of the EU within CSDP framework were not proportional to its military capabilities. Therefore, it is very challenging to assess the development of CSDP after the *Brexit*; is it going to take a direction of further integration under the French and German leadership or a direction of stagnation as a result of differing attitudes of the EU member states towards CSDP concept. The UK at first had a significant role in creation and initial development of CSDP, but later on blocked many of the suggestions for the autonomy of European defence and thereby earned the reputation of the main opponent of a more progressive development of European defence, according to the experts in this area. Considering the unique relationships between the UK and the EU, this article presents certain modalities of the future cooperation in the area of CSDP. Basically, in order to reach a consensus for a common future activities both sides are required to establish at least one common denominator between the UK's ambitions for privileged status as a non-member of the EU (one that is not

granted to the other EU partner countries) and the EU's willingness to do so. The focus of the second part of the article is set on the *transatlantic partnership* that turned into serious defensive mode with election of Donald Trump for president of the USA, which leads to a crucial issue of whether France and Germany – two countries with differing political and military cultures – are able to overcome a rigid Brussels's institutionalism and create conditions for further integration of European defence from the point of impaired *transatlantic relations*. Their success in this issue is going to depend largely on French readiness to accept benefits and dismiss shortcomings of German concept of multilateralism, as well as on German readiness to accept benefits and dismiss shortcomings of the French ambitious *l'Europe de la défense* project.

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