Understand the European Identity through the Institutional Embeddedness Theory: The Case of the Crisis of Migrants/ Refugees

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UNDERSTAND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY THROUGH THE INSTITUTIONAL EMBEDDEDNESS THEORY: THE CASE OF THE CRISIS OF MIGRANTS / REFUGEES

Louis Caleb Remanda*

ABSTRACT
The present article aligns itself to numerous questions related to the effects of the 2015’s identity crisis bursting from side to side within the European Union. As the homogenous block is facing one of its biggest challenges in a form of a “migrants/refugees” crisis, an issue that is still difficult to control, the essay focuses on the role of European institutions as “value inhibitors” and crisis corporate managers”. As such, the available literature emphasized the institutional embeddedness theory to understand how European identity is already integrated (Granovetter, 1985) in the spirit of its members, particularly since the formation of the continental project since the 1990s. However, theoretical findings coming from three major research areas allow us to understand the construction of a socialized European Union. These areas are International relations (IR), Public Administration (PA) and Organizational Theory (OT). Research then processes on thematic and chronological analysis of secondary data (press articles, press releases from institutions, survey results) dealing with the issue of migration movement. Major findings highlight the lack of symbolisms inside institutions to raise their standards and place European Union as identity superpower, even though they take significant initiatives to use the refugees/migrants crisis, with one and only purpose: Strengthening social relations between the state-members of the Union.

Key words: European Union, institutions, migrants/refugees’ crisis, identity, embeddedness

Introduction
European Union (EU) is facing an extraordinary influx of migrants and refugees as 500,000 people knocked on their doors since spring 2015. Far from slowing down, that massive influx of exiles keeps worsening. The latest figures

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from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) published on September 11; nearly 430,000 migrants and refugees have crossed the Mediterranean since January 2015, over 330,000 of them arrived in Europe, and at least 2,643 of them died trying to cross the borders of Europe, mainly by the Mediterranean Sea. The European area, through its institutions and its country-members tried to remedy this confusion between "immigrants" and "refugees"; a confusion that has already shaken their controversial migration policy, complicated to be pursued. However, as disastrous as it sounds, not all migrants are refugees. A migrant is usually defined as someone moving from one country to another, for economic, climatic or political reasons: meaning that a migrant is not necessarily a refugee. In addition, if it is difficult to make the distinction on the human level, both notions are not considered in the same way for the 28 States-members (now 27 since July 24, 2016 with the Brexit).

Reacting to this crisis pushed EU to the edge, as they have increased numerous measures through new strategies, relocation plans, and recently, agreements between Turkey and the EU. Measures, sometimes criticized because of the negative effects they bring to inner principles of the construction of the area: free movements for all people across the continent. “Can Europe find a solution to the migration crisis?” That is the challenge presented to its institutions. Yet, their structure is not always easy to understand: In general, they govern the European area, and because it became a political, economic and monetary figure, the need of institutions whose are able to defend their values, to work through cooperation with other governments and administrations, has grown. Therefore, facing this major challenge, what is the role of institutions on managing this crisis and, given the gravity, are we heading towards possible failures of European administrators? This migration crisis is so deep that it is questioning the foundations of Europe but it is also jeopardizing the relationships forged between its members.

To conduct the research, the available literature concerning institutional construction of the European Union was studied. The research was conducted through a thematic analysis of a press file with diversified data, such as research articles; survey results, press releases, and this because of the legitimacy of the information they gathered. For research articles, we have just launched queries on search engines like Google Scholar and scientific databases (Business Source Premier, JSTOR, Elsevier, etc.). For the journal articles, because of the updating process, we selected those related to the case study that is migrants’ crisis. Creating a press file out of them was interesting to
evaluate if aspects we mentioned in the theoretical approaches, have been applied or not. This ongoing review was thus a first lead to evaluate the value of institutions in difficult times, and then to update institutionalism construct. Embeddedness theory gave us more incentives on the relations built between countries-members and Europe, thanks to presence of a “certain” identity.

The methodology was supposed to focus on the institutions as crisis managers, but studying more detailed issues with the use of empirical data, and lack of political sciences background did not allow us to give coherent opinions, only to express a managerial standpoints and thoughts in the discussion part.

1 Theoretical approaches

Sociological approaches to the European Union (EU) based their origins on two assumptions of the new institutionalism theories: The first one rallies that many institutionalists were studying the implementation of formal rules and standards, at the time, rules produced within the respective EU members’ institutions. The second assumption confirmed the depth of the theoretical block related to the construction of the European project. Despite 25 years of comprehensive constructs, Europe has always been seen as a case study, either because of its position on integration or the role of its “elites and lobbies in the production of a so-called supranational order”.

European studies wide a large range of topics, from the legitimacy of institutions to the democratic deficit, integration on its differentiated natures, Europeanisation on its different forms, and governance policies, etc. (Murdoch, 2015). However, regarding social relations and institutional development of this homogeneous block, only researches around integration, governance (Sandholtz & Sweet, 1998), social policy’s development demonstrate the influence of constraint sources and path dependency, actions produced following the context. Studies also focus on more normative theories, like “what are the challenges of the legitimacy of European integration”, but often ignore the foundations of socialization like “what is happening inside the institutions”. These aspects have been neglected since because it did not matter at the time when the debate surrounded the “institutional reproduction of mechanics” (Pierson, 1996).

Yet, three major research areas allow us to understand the construction of the European Union in the socialisation: International relations (IR), Public Administration (PA) and Organisational Theory (OT). While lawyers tend to
focus on the establishment, the mandate and the functions of the EU institutions, IR is more concerned about the role and power played by them in the political world, what motivates their set up and how to nurture them. PA remains a fertile ground because it wows to study behaviours of bureaucratic staff, representativeness and socialisation of international officials. However, OT will respond to the approaches mentioned above by pointing the institution as an organisation, structure that is “either complex or formal” (Murdoch, 2015). It will also focus its attention on how and why members behave the way they do, and what are the consequences. This approach is the one we choose to highlight.

1.1 European institutions as organisations

By positioning EU as an organisation, we can describe a public and heterodox structure in which mandates and functions are the key projects. Defining it requires that the structure need objectives, rules and states which specific goal are to guide interaction and activities of individuals within. However, the final outcome of these interactions and activities remains agnostic, because identity of an organisation can be created as soon as its institutions are formed. In addition, given the fact that institutions are the values of conductive pillars, they establish, through rules and standards, interaction between the individuals of a community, hence to assume that if the main and responsible values a united Europe are difficult to process, it might be difficult then to define “European identity”.

From the political standpoint, E.U stands more as an international organisation, and not as a federal state managed by institutionalism on the aspect of development and functioning. These aspects establish them as a historical agent less frozen, in which citizens and businesses can invoke laws against other individuals and governments. This definition leads to a confrontation between intergovernmentalists and neo-functionalists (Jönsson & Tallberg, 2001). For intergovernmentalists, governments are the ultimate decision-makers in the community and define integration process and its limitations; which is the opposite for neo-functionalists, who believe that integration process and its effects should be the responsibility of a more independent and supranational agent, in this case the European institution.

For Fligstein (2008), “European social relations are Europe”, and these relationships are powerful enough to be institutionalized by the state-member, in
its public policies and symbolic representations. They contribute to the transformation of the legal field and move the economic and political aspects between companies, thanks to massive expansion of community law. Paying attention to social relations regardless of formal institutional developments, give us more insights on what is “institutional embeddedness”, sociological construct referring to the total immersion of a society in its links contextually shaped by its institutions (Granovetter, 1985).

1.2 Deciphering the role through institutional embeddedness

Although the term appears for the first time in Karl Polanyi’s “Great Transformation” (1944), embeddedness describes how deep the economy is immersed in its social relations. In that sense, we cannot distinguish an autonomous sphere from society, which is a whole. In social science research, the term evolved, giving a dependency of phenomenon – whether it is on the economy, the market, relationships, organisation or an individual, or an environment – that is alternatively defined by institutional, social, cognitive, or cultural. Institutional embeddedness takes shape into three forms: One formal, a contingent and economic action prompted by rules and formal tools used in the market; one informal that is a logical integration of economic relations providing sustainable; and the application of the social relations from an individual to another; and one that is structural.

Formal embeddedness (Le Velly, 2002) refers to the contingent nature of economic action against the rules that formally existed under the law, and evident. We are used to see those on the market regulation: entry obligations, establishment of a mode of price, sales contracts, competition rules, etc. In addition to those rules, a second component will be produced as a tool in order to promote commercial exchange; the most evident case relies through the currency. The informal nature might be the oldest and most notorious embeddedness studied in social sciences. Following Polanyi footsteps, Mark Granovetter (1985) will highlight the influence of a sustainable system on the economic relations. Those relations are not other than bonds that tie individuals in “networks”. Being convinced that people on the market are not "fragmented", he thinks personal relationships weave enough friendship and loyalty, which will facilitate the construction of the network. Finally, the structural nature leads to the accurate analysis of concrete models of social relations determining the type
of structure and behaviours that will emerge in organisations; organisations in this case referred as institutions.

Those three forms appear both from the most basic to the most global scale.

The institutions also consist of cognitive, normative and regulated contexts that provide both stability and meaning to social behaviour. They are conducted by different drivers - cultures, structures and routines - and work in multiple skill levels - of the company to an organisational group. (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). The existence of rules requires both an informal specifically built for each organisation, and a legal framework formalized by laws, regulations, constitutions, as shown in Table 1. They will allow good cohesion of the organisation as a whole, while assuming reduce uncertainty and establish stability composed of values and symbols that help regulate human interaction.

**Table 1: The influence of regulate, normative and cognitive contexts in an organization**

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Regulated contexts</th>
<th>Normative contexts</th>
<th>Cognitive contexts</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Law Regulations</td>
<td>Values Expectations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Governance Power</td>
<td>Regime Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Governance Power</td>
<td>Regime Authority</td>
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<td>Routines</td>
<td>Protocols</td>
<td>Compliance Duty to perform</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Standard procedures</td>
<td>Performance programs Scripts</td>
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Is it then possible to transpose this model on the European Union framework, framework that truly embodies values and principles of a common ideology?

Investing on values such as self-esteem and positive collective and confidence in the economic prosperity, political stability and continuity pushed EU on being a community that primarily fulfils the prerequisites of a powerful being spendthrift supranational identity. The formation of this supranational, or safe to say European, should be drawn from the mere fact of being a "member" and thus should facilitate the appropriation of the first European symbol that are the euro currency (Meier-Pesti & Kirchler, 2003) and the European flag. If we had to explain how the Euro currency could be seen as a symbol, it is clear that those who believe in the economic and political well-being will perceive the euro
as a symbol of Europe, while some will fear the tool because it seems to prophesize the loss of national governance on economy and politics.

To explain the impact of the institutional framework in Europe, two of the three components has been predominant in the study of the embedded union (Jönsson & Tallberg, 2001; Jenson & Merand, 2010): the institutionalism of rational choice, which focuses on the rational conception of formal institutions and the historical institutionalism that embodies both constructivism in which standards and speeches influence Europe, and formalism which includes an analytical perspective that focus on how legal and political organisations impact and operate in Europe.

Institutionalism of rational choice introduces the analysis of the P.A hypothesis in which governments should allow supranational institutions such as the European Commission (EC) or the European Court of Justice (ECJ) for margining independent action, but in strict and defined areas. It was shown that the European legal system is compatible with the interests of member governments, particularly in the resolution of monitoring issues and contract between them. Therefore, the only manoeuvre that each institution can control will be the performance of certain functions, and they will depend on incentives from governments to limit supranational autonomy but also their ability to monitor and sanction supranational agents in case of abuse.

Since that requirement has proven to be applied, historical institutionalism supposed that governments may be strong enough to look for interests, but they do not share ideas of rational choice when consequences of their actions tend to be out of their power. The case of the migrants’ crisis that will be treated in the empirical part will prove that some states refused to be practically involved despite their approval on solving this negative expansion.

According to Pierson (1996), many obstacles justify such large differences between the institutions and governments. The first argument is that supranational agents such as the EC and ECJ prove to be sufficiently autonomous to act on their own, without consensus of national governments. Second, policy makers such as governments, always follow their electoral ideology despite their counterparts, which makes consensus decisions, reduced and contradictory. Third, the unintended consequences are likely to be widespread based on the “high density of the consensus problem”. The scope of EU issues and decisions, combined with actions in areas that have unintended consequences, limit the ability of member states to control the development of their policy. Fourth, changes in the political preferences of the
member states, due to changes in government or learning process between leaders, result in arrangements that deviate from the original intentions. Fifth, reforms from European institutions are been characterised as "cumbersome" because they were designed to inhibit modest changes.

Institutional framework of the European area is unique because it has felt many changes during its evolution: each treaty endows the institution of a distinct community and differentiated by the legitimacy of the existing powers (White, 2006). Treat the European institutions at the first glance also allows to distinguish between those policies, decision making managers in space; and those listeners, guarantors of Community law. Nevertheless, these distinctions have to consider two aspects: The first aspect is about the bureaucratic structure that influences identities, the role of the actors and the behaviours in decision-making process. The second aspect is about the different ways of integration following the members, which also explains why the decisions are taken differently. European institutions have succeeded to create a distinctive profile: We can distinguish those who exercise pressure on members, but that still serve as common references for the European people. They are categorised as structured according to the “occupied territory” (e.g. the European Council), to the principle of “non-territorial and specialisation of sector or function” (European Commission), or to the “combination of party and political function” (European Parliament). They are more than “reward matrices” (Stone Sweet & al, 2001) because they not only affect the behaviour of the actors; they also offer them the opportunity to shape the behaviour of other actors. This shared capacity is also rooted on the construction of the European block. Since there is no historical narratives on which Europe can base its common identity, institutions will carry that role, pushing themselves as myth. Their influence is also based on two perspectives of compliance: One perspective that implies that the system involves in both as a centralised and monitoring “police” that is actively and directly conducted by institutions, and the second perspective supposed an alerted and decentralised supervision that is reactively and indirectly composed of individuals, guaranteeing their rights against manoeuvres from national courts and “society’s watchdogs”. (Tallberg, 2002)

On both levels, the EU’s compliance system works by using a combination of mechanisms “enforcement and management”. If “enforcement” deals with coercive strategies of monitoring and sanctions, “management” adopted an approach to solve problems based on capacity reinforcement, interpretation of rules and transparency. Enforcement mechanism is firmly rooted in the tradition
of political economy, game theory and the theory of collective action. As the states are conceived as rational actors who weigh the costs and benefits of alternative behavioural choices, they make compliance decisions in cooperative situations. This approach usually emphasizes the probability of intentional evasion, conditioned by the structure of the particular problem of cooperation context. Management mechanism however presents a perspective that contradicts claims imposed, because there is a general propensity to comply with international rules, thanks to efficient considerations, interests and standards. The disrespect of compliance, when it occurs, is not the result of deliberate decisions to violate the treaties, but is due to the limited capacity for the rule to be ambiguous. Therefore, the best way to deal with non-compliance, rather than enforcing rules is to manage them with strategies willing to resolve problems on reinforcing capacities, better interpretation of the rule, and transparency.

The distinctive characteristics of European institutionalism show us the capabilities, competences and functions possessed by the institutions: capabilities to federate decision, competences to pressure and lobby on any member who considers itself part of the European Union and functions both as managers and as guarantors. Justifying the role of these institutions in this context of crisis, crisis described as “chaos reigning on communitarian union” is an opportunity to update institutionalism theories, based on current economical, geographical and historical contexts. This will be, as we developing, the second part of our essay, our empirical analysis.

2 Empirical Methodology and Results

According to the daily Le Monde, the migration wave has expanded significantly since 2015: with more than 500,000 people joining the coasts of the Mediterranean, mainly from the Middle East war zones (Syria, Libya, and Afghanistan) and Africa; it goes without saying that Europe has been unable to handle this increase. Moreover, the problem remains because it is subjected to constraints that are unknown until now. As for European countries interested in contributing to solving the problem of refugees, the lack of emphasizing constraints prevent them from participating as they would like, thus are insufficient to unify the community that is Europe. Such assumptions lead us to conduct a thematic and chronological analysis of secondary data such as press articles, survey results dealing with the issue of migration movement, as well as press releases from some institutions.
The use of press articles and survey results reinforce the legitimacy of the information collected. They are updated and deal with the magnitude of the event on a daily basis. Press releases, however, reinforce the legitimacy of the institutions, not only by their presence and their actions taken on the field, but also by their decisions proposed at the consensus platform between states members. These also involve the responsibility of institutions as “saviours” in circumstance.

As preliminary steps, we have launched multiple queries on general search engines (such as Google) and on scientific databases (Google Scholar, Business Source Premier, JSTOR, Elsevier, etc.) with following key words: European Union - institutions - crisis - migrants – refugees. Collecting these data should help us to answer the main problem that is "the role of the EU institutions in the management of the migrants/refugees crisis". Understanding the problem simply goes with the following scheme of questions (Table 2).

**Table 2: “Press file” Case study questions**

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<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>How this crisis has been evolving?</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Why managing this crisis has gone chaotic during the years 2015 and 2016?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>What was countries members (pro and against) in the management of this crisis?</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>What is the position of the institutions affected by this issue?</td>
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We were able to collect and conduct a “press file” of sixteen (16) documents containing four (4) surveys results in which two (2) were made by the European Parliament; six (6) press releases mostly published from the European Commission; five (5) newspapers articles and one (1) visual coverage made by LeMonde.fr. We hoped, according to the plan of this essay, to provide answers on theoretical issues surrounding the European institutional paradigm. In particular, we focused on the contribution from the embeddedness theory; to answer the questions both from a journalistic and scientific standpoint and finally to discuss and give some perspectives on how we should understand the value of the institutions in our society.

Several factors appear to be responsible for this massive expansion. Among them, the non-resolution of the problem of free movement (borders factor especially in connection with the Schengen area, the controversy in the EU asylum policy) and the lack of strong symbolism putting a common identity on notice.
The responsibility of the Schengen area is attributed to its lack of barriers and border security. Therefore, some affected states have tightened their borders inexplicably, particularly in Italy, Austria and the Balkans countries. According to Agence France Presse (AFP, 2016), more than 50,000 migrants are stranded on the Greek-Macedonian border. Macedonia, for example, is not an EU member, but had to increase its control measures to limit the influx of migrants and refugees. This also proves that the situation is not that of the European spring but any country that would be affected from near and far by this crisis.

The other fact is based on the asylum policy advocated by the “controversial” Dublin agreements of 2013. Indeed, countries that have been involved used asylums process that are not only different but also beyond their expectations of resources, which hence the request for aids from the European decision makers. In May 2015, the European Commission initiated a distribution of asylum seekers with “established quota” following several criteria; this initiative will be qualified by some countries as discriminatory and unfair. The non-resolution of the problem of free movement remains one of the sampling points of the European foundation (Fattori, Bleachers & Clarouin, 2015 Migrants - the European crisis explained in cards: The Monde.fr). In addition, because of that problem, the crisis puts itself as the test that could threaten the “identity and unity of Europe” because none of the 27 countries that form the Union wishes to bear hospitality, another value associated with this logic of proximity.

Europe has no “Statue of Liberty” (Vick, 2015) or other strong symbol that would show, unlike United States of America, the strength of a community. On the contrary, for many the European Union is seen mainly with non-immigrants, where citizens can trace their histories somewhere in the continent, but from distant peoples. This embarrassing pride sometimes associated with the consequences from old wars, is the reason why the EU has spent its early decades trying to develop a unifying identity that blur the boundaries and that collapse shared and acquired cultural heritages. The sharing of cultural wealth was tested in recent years with the economic collapse of Greece, one of the poorest and southern members that sought helps from the richest and northern members of Europe, with precarious results. But when Giscard d'Estaing recalled about his “dream of Europe” (in Europa, the last chance of Europe, 2014) where a common constitution would be in place for all countries, constitution as a path the reconciliation of historical and geographical barriers; it
seems that will not be possible if this project keeps on giving results of a divided European Union.

As from today, there are “two conception of Europe”: The first one is home in whomever is subjected to believe in common political values and shared expenses for an ever-closer community. The second is for those who see only constant conflict between their national values and European values, and believe that each nation must solve its own problems, whatever the cost of what should be a Europe that is “one and free”. This division has grown by the rising wave of migration, one of the most dangerous challenges that EU would have faced (Bremmen, 2015). This time, pledges of financial aids issued by the European Central Bank or treasury of a country will not solve this problem, but only concrete actions and clear results will do, as evidenced by the EU Commissioner for migration, Dimitris Avramopoulos:

“We need clear and tangible results on the ground. Otherwise, there is a risk that the system collapses completely. The unity of the EU and human lives are at stake” (Interview by Henri Michel for Libération.fr, 2016)

In September 2015, through a press release, the European Commission undertook a project containing a set of proposals for solving the problem of migratory influx. It was also proposed because migration issues and policies were actually part of the priority challenges of the European people. The Eurobarometer survey EB / EP 84.1 (2015) conducted in October and requested by the European Parliament, unveiled that unemployment (49%) and immigration (47%) are the main issues that should be dealt with. However, two thirds of the respondents believe that these decisions should be taken at the supranational level and 78% of them believe that the asylum responsibility should be distributed to all member countries and not only to Slavic and Balkan states.

In response, the Commission has decided to apply a timetable of concrete measures for year 2015 - 2016 with focus on the following: A proposal for an emergency relocation of 120,000 people with a demonstrated need for protection from Greece, Hungary and Italy; permanent relocation mechanism to all Member States in crisis; a common European list of safe countries of origin; measures to make the policy more effective return with a “manual on going back” which is common and a joint plan; a communication on public procurement rules for external market in charge of refugees; a communication on the external dimension of the refugee crisis; an emergency trust fund for Africa. It has requested the participation of member states in the preparation of
this trust fund and some had confirmed their participation, including Spain (Bertaud, Petrovic & McPhie, 2015).

In the same month, a poll conducted by the IFOP for the Jean Jaures Foundation and the Foundation for European Progressive Studies (Fourquet, Marchal & Simon, 2015), has questioned about the perception of Europeans to the migration crisis. It was conducted on a sample of over 7,000 European nationals in seven countries (France, Germany, UK, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Denmark), founding countries of the European Union. It covers the following statements: To respond the crisis on the collective and individual level, the acceptance on receiving migrants, the perception of migrants profile, their number in the country, and the longer-term prospects. What emerges from this survey is this:

- Collectively and individually: On the collective level, for the majority of the countries, the most effective action to resolve the refugee crisis must be by developing aids and stabilizing southern countries from Mediterranean region of Europe. Yet, those programs on financial assistance and hospitality in European countries has been cited as second for all countries outside of France. Indeed, the French are looking for every possible scenarios, except receiving migrants on their territory, while the Germans and the British are in favour. Spanish, Dutch, Italians and Danes prefer to focus on developing aid and host programs. On the individual level, the participation of each European is limited to donations towards NGOs that assist migrants.

- On the acceptance of receiving migrants in their territories: Only Spain, Italy, Germany and Denmark are favourable to more than 50%, while France, the Netherlands, and the UK are unfavourable to over 50%.

- On the perception of migrants’ profile, their number in the country: In most countries, migrants are mostly perceived as having no professional background. As signs of vagueness, response rates are high on this question (31% on average) and almost all believe that the perceived level of qualification of migrants is highly correlated with the propensity to foster them. In five of seven countries, this perception came from asylum seekers of France and the UK, which is contradictory, considering their denial to foster migrants. What also makes the judgment on the foster effort relevant compared to other European countries is clear. The Germans and the Italians are clearly aware that their country welcomes a large number of migrants and the British that they receive
less, and even more, the sympathizers from the national-populist parties are convinced that their country welcomes more migrants but it does generate chaos.

- On the long-term prospects: 56% of Europeans think that migrants will make their life in Europe and settle in the host country. In most countries (except in France and Great Britain) socialist or social and democratic supporters largely believe that migrants will not stay a few months or years in the country but an overwhelming majority of Europeans would like the migrants to return to their country in a few months or years.

During the year 2015, the unprecedented rise of people seeking for international protection in Europe was a serious testing for the common asylum system and the Schengen area. The European Commission reacted quickly to the crisis and continues to work with member states as well as third countries partners to manage the influx of migrants, to protect the borders of Europe, and to address the main causes of these migratory pressures. The executive European Commission insists that decisions to get out of this crisis should be taken together (Ernst & Lammert, 2016). A number of actions have been completed in the meantime: An agenda on relocating and resettling more than 60,000 people inside and outside Europe, fighting against migrant smuggling and tripling the budget and resources for these actions, in addition to those taken by the Commission at the meeting in September 2015. The estimated budget spent on these actions has been approved by the European Parliament and the Council of Europe at nearly €10 billion.

In order to manage migration flows and spontaneous arrivals in Europe, the Commission has taken a number of measures in partnership with Balkans countries. In October 2015, it conveyed a joint-action plan with Turkey, plan activated at the EU-Turkey Summit of November 29th, 2014. This action plan is part of an extensive program of cooperation based on shared responsibility, mutual commitments and their implementation. For the EU, commitments concern about mobilizing concrete and substantial funds to help Turkey in relation to the temporary presence of Syrian refugees in their territories; providing humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs) present in the field; participating in the restoration of development aids set by the country members. Commitments for Turkey, however, meant strengthening its ability to fight against migrants' smuggling, to support financially the combination of criteria for a dialogue between liberalisation of
visas in Europe and Turkey. The following month, European Commission presented the “Borders package”, a broad set of measures composed to secure external borders of the EU, to manage migration more effectively and to protect the freedom of internal movement within Schengen, by establishing European corps of border guards and coast guards.

In a second survey, this time conducted by BVA Opinion for the Orange Group and French News channel iTélé, 63% of French respondents think that European countries should do more to show solidarity towards each other and to balance refugees on their territory in friendly manner. All claim (80%) than the current migration crisis endangers the future of the European Union. However, 58% of them believe that France should not receive more refugees than it does today (Craplet, 2016), making their opinion contradictive.

3 Discussion

3.1 European institutions as crisis managers

European Union is increasingly engaged in crisis management within and outside of Europe. They intensified their capacity and reorganised its tools that allow them to respond to complex crises. This new role for EU as crisis manager involves a dynamic process on reorganising mechanisms to respond to threats across different institutions. These processes were partly initiated by the Lisbon Treaty, which called for a joint management abroad crisis and cross-border response mechanisms.

The evolution of this crisis allowed us to see that existing institutions have considerable decision-making powers within the community, which is summarized in the following political skills: (1) formulating long-term objectives for the Community, legitimized by reference a common European interest that can mobilize supporters and neutralize the opposition; (2) identifying problems to be solved through coordinated actions and build coalitions with customer groups and national bureaucracies; (3) maximizing national contacts, technical expertise and policy experience in the organisation; (4) satisfying customer groups and governments in the need for new policies, new tasks and new powers for the communitarian institutions; and (5) playing an active role in intergovernmental negotiations. This allowed them to design action plans and measurement tools that were applied without particular difficulty within the member countries, and that, beyond the denial of belonging.
3.2 European institutions as guarantors of European identity

For the late Tzvetan Todorov, “European Union is a necessity” and he suggested that the construction of this space acquires a spiritual culture, an identity that would help overcome many disappointments and strengthen links between citizens and Europe. He said the growing dissatisfaction of the population regarding EU was a predicted response because of the lack of vision of policy makers on the project. That is why it led to a divided Europe that have been strongly intensified by the migration wave. European institutions were placed to ensure the implementation of a “unified and European ideology” (Todorov, 2014).

At first glance, it seems that EU institutions have done their best to remain detached from any expression of a unique identity. However, from a social point of view, they still have issues to ensure impregnation of an organisational identity under cognitive and sociological contexts. Their role within the European community was merely on political and legal fields, applicable only in agreement with a number of rules that the cohesion of a stable, coordinated, and united Europe. National and European identities are interdependent constructions since the individuals who live there belong to both entities, of course their nation is seen as a subgroup and Europe as superordinate group. Identification with these European institutions is not directly linked to national attachment, but it emphasized the beginning of self-identification with them.

Other aspects of identity are strongly linked to strengthen European integration process. Let us try to develop two of these aspects that could bring symbolic institutions: history and culture.

Regarding history, if we based our opinions on the fact that “identities are predestined”, it will be difficult to argue that European identity exists, because the only determinants on which we can solely rely are geographical and historical (Mayer & Palmowski, 2004). Alternatively, each identity, despite being constructed on the individual level, is collectively integrated into the European context. Identity is determined by a set of cultural, religious, economic and ideological its own, certainly, but it is true that these are not necessarily distinguished as European. Examples of capitalism, nationalism, Christianity or humanism show that these are strands of thought are known beyond Europe, and are better applied elsewhere. However, they all have unique historical and cultural specificity. Although Europe is distinguished by a common historical experience in the example image of “the Allied victory in World War II”, that
historical experience remains divided. Nowadays, there is no sign that shows EU created a historic identity and process it among its country members. In other words, European integration has a weak perceptible relation to historical and divergent memories prevailing over European countries. Concerning culture, the absence of this historical identity affects the existence of a cultural identity. Due to differences in the historical and cultural traditions of each country members, it is not surprising that constructing European institutions was inspired by a futuristic modernism; due to the fact that it has had a poor success in creating common symbols and on its inability to respond to the cultural challenges of globalisation and social atomisation (Mayer & Palmowski, 2004).

In the absence of a narrowly defined narrative, in which national context was often exclusive and divided from a communitarian understanding, Europe’s cultural diversity cannot be synonymous with the formulation of a European identity, especially if this diversity does not consider itself as European. It will be difficult to see heterogeneity advocated by a Europe that can provide for a positive cultural identification. Therefore, cultural identities will hardly provide popular and substantial identification in favour of a closer political integration.

**Conclusion**

The institutional paradigm is heavily rooted in the nature of the European geography. That paradigm is present in its history, its culture and its institutions, and solely based on that we might think that it seems to be sufficient to designate EU as a united bloc. However, the current crisis hindered all these foundations and jeopardized this idea of a space where free circulation, cultural diversity, and democracy can coexist. Institutional embeddedness as basis of social relations between agents (country members, populations, organisations) in this space weakens European institutions as crisis managers on their structure but not on their nature. Whenever the “common identity” is targeted, and since that identity is not established enough on solid values and symbols, we are witnessing the scenario where most country members retreat to their national interests in order to protect themselves. No need to mention that up to now the position of the institutions as conflicts’ managers has not been clarified, even judging the gravity of the current crisis. The lack of symbolisms is real, and grooming some would be additional weapons for institutions to raise their standards and place European Union as identity superpower. Nevertheless, they have played their part because they take initiatives to deal with the
refugees/migrants crisis and their only objective is to strengthen the social relations between the country members of the Union is respected.

Unfortunately, the Union had to pay for that weakness: United Kingdom has left EU on June 2016 and more threats and pressures coming from some founding countries raise this issues of European identity: countries like the Netherlands, which keeps organizing potential referendums related to the communitarian space. Late referendum on the approval on associating Ukraine with the European Union was held by the kingdom on April 6th 2016. It was rejected by 61.59% of the voters and the signature of the agreement is suspended as long as the Dutch Parliament does not adopt a new law either to cancel the ratification or to maintain it. Another country, France, with promises to leave from the extremist republic party, which keeps gaining popularity with their discourse based on “protecting French history and identity”. Using the results of the Brexit situation as a campaign fund, far-right political parties did not hesitate to hang on the French people a possible referendum on its membership with the EU. It is without counting on the failure of its representative, Mrs Marine Le Pen in the last presidential elections of May 2017, that this idea was very quickly buried.

Still, the question of the migrants/refugees has not been solved, yet: Behind migratory "flows", we witness more human dramas, as late report from the International Organization for Migrants figures on the number of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea. Nearly 14,000 migrants have died or disappeared in the last four years, including 1,800 since January 2017. In 2016, more than 300,000 people were subject of an administrative or judicial decision to return to their country of origin and approximately 176,000 people were effectively dismissed (mostly Albanians, Moroccans and Kosovars) in 2016, including 79,608 in a forced way, according to Frontex. Some relocation plans are slowing down, others not at all, which has encouraged most potential candidates to continue on their way to northern Europe.

References:


