

# POLITICKÉ VEDY / POLITICAL SCIENCES

Časopis pre politológiu, najnovšie dejiny, medzinárodné vzťahy, bezpečnostné štúdiá / Journal for Political Sciences, Modern History, International Relations, security studies

URL časopisu / URL of the journal: <http://www.politickevedy.fpvmv.umb.sk>

Autor(i) / Author(s): Igor Kosír - Ivana Slobodníková - Jana Orlická  
Článok / Article: The Most Important Factors of Efficiency of Flexible Exogenous Integration to the EU on Ukrainian Example  
Vydavateľ / Publisher: Fakulta politických vied a medzinárodných vzťahov – UMB Banská Bystrica / Faculty of Political Sciences and International Relations – UMB Banská Bystrica

Odporúčaná forma citácie článku / Recommended form for quotation of the article:

KOSÍR, I. - SLOBODNÍKOVÁ, I. - ORLICKÁ, J. 2016. The Most Important Factors of Efficiency of Flexible Exogenous Integration to the EU on Ukrainian Example. In *Politické vedy*. [online]. Roč. 19, č. 2, 2016. ISSN 1335 – 2741, s. 177-207. Dostupné na internete: <http://www.politickevedy.fpvmv.umb.sk/archiv-vydani/2016/2-2016/igor-kosir-ivana-slobodnikova-jana-orlicka.html>.

Poskytnutím svojho príspevku autor(i) súhlasil(i) so zverejnením článku na internetovej stránke časopisu *Politické vedy*. Vydavateľ získal súhlas autora / autorov s publikovaním a distribúciou príspevku v tlačenej i online verzii. V prípade záujmu publikovať článok alebo jeho časť v online i tlačenej podobe, kontaktujte redakčnú radu časopisu: [politicke.vedy@umb.sk](mailto:politicke.vedy@umb.sk).

By submitting their contribution the author(s) agreed with the publication of the article on the online page of the journal. The publisher was given the author's / authors' permission to publish and distribute the contribution both in printed and online form. Regarding the interest to publish the article or its part in online or printed form, please contact the editorial board of the journal: [politicke.vedy@umb.sk](mailto:politicke.vedy@umb.sk).

## THE MOST IMPORTANT FACTORS OF EFFICIENCY OF FLEXIBLE EXOGENOUS INTEGRATION TO THE EU ON UKRAINIAN EXAMPLE

Igor Kosír - Ivana Slobodníková - Jana Orlická\*

### ABSTRACT

Ukraine has a special more than 3 years' experience of free trade regime with the CIS countries, being only CIS associate member. Ukraine joined CISFTA in 2011. Efficiency of this flexible exogenous integration was low, mainly due to complicated bilateral relations with Russia. Aiming to reach a successful development of a flexible exogenous integration in the EU Eastern neighbourhood the new EU initiative was launched in May 2009: *EU Eastern Partnership*, and Ukraine (UA) became then one of EU strategic partners among six ex-Soviet republics. EU successfully negotiated and finally signed the Association Agreements including DCFTA part on a creation of a free trade regime between the partners with 3 of them: Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in 2014. The article aims to analyse Ukrainian flexible exogenous integration to the EU, with focus on economic environment, trade and key elements for future efficiency, as well as impact on economy and society of the country. Although, *de iure* Ukrainian flexible exogenous integration to the EU started in 2014, *de facto* the process started on 1 January 2016. Taking into account following decision, Ukrainians chose their orientations towards the EU integration, leaving bilateral relations with Russia in question. In conclusion, for Ukraine to retain the highest possible efficiency in building flexible exogenous integration, it will have to implement EU *acquis communautaire* legal system and build its institutions using EU rules.

---

\* Prof. Ing. Igor Kosír, PhD. is a Professor at the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Kuzmányho 1, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, Slovak Republic, e-mail: igor.kosir@umb.sk.

Mgr. Ivana Slobodníková is a PhD. student of the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Kuzmányho 1, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, Slovak Republic, e-mail: ivana.slobodnikova@umb.sk.

RNDr. Jana Orlická is a PhD. student of the Department of International Relations and Diplomacy, Faculty of Political Science and International Relations, Matej Bel University in Banská Bystrica, Kuzmányho 1, 974 01 Banská Bystrica, Slovak Republic, e-mail: jana2013@gmail.com.

**Key words:** flexible exogenous integration, deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, free trade area, the higher order integration, economic growth, competitiveness, EU, DCFTA

## Introduction

The beginning of the year 2016 plays a very important role for a new Ukraine's conventional instrument, which strategically affected the country's relationship to the EU. The Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement<sup>1</sup> is an important component of the Association Agreement between the EU and UA, one of the EU's most ambitious bilateral agreements yet. Since the end of June 2014 there were many discussions on its comprehensive content, trade policy conditions as well as reality of implementation of it into the EU-UA bilateral economic relations practice: in UA itself, in EU member countries, in Russia, and in other countries, too. The DCFTA will offer Ukraine a framework for modernising its trade relations and for economic development by the opening of markets via the progressive removal of customs tariffs and quotas, and by a gradual harmonisation of laws, norms and regulations with EU standards. At the beginning of the year 2016, this agreement came into force. The article aims to analyse the continental trade and economic environment development as well as the most important elements of a future efficiency of this new stage of Ukraine's cooperation with the mainstream unit of European integration including the impact on economy and society of the country.

## 1 Process of international economic integration in Europe and phenomenon of flexible exogenous integration

The process of *international economic integration* is strongly linked with enormous development of the post-war international trading based on the creation of efficient *multilateral trading system* (MTS) of internationally negotiated, accepted and valid set of principles and rules of international trading, permanently being enlarged (Vinter, 1950; Tinbergen, 1953; Balassa, 1966). An ideal benchmark of MTS was a *free trade regime* in international trading.

---

<sup>1</sup> Realising all components (articles, paragraphs...) goals of this agreement the both parties will build bilateral Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area in real trade and investment practice as well as in broader economic one of bilateral relations.

The most valuable and long-term positive gains in the post-war international economic relations' progressive development was impacted by the successful negotiating and finally signing the *General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade* in Geneva in 1947. 23 trade policy expert teams of the participating countries decided by this new approach in international trade policy<sup>2</sup> to create a new internationally important and perspective globally functioning system of principles and rules of international trading. It was a very important step, truly historical. More than 40 thousand customs concessions were reached during these first multilateral negotiations (GATT Geneva round) in 1947. (See also Beneš, 1988 as well as Fiftieth Anniversary..., 1996) Among the temporary MTS (GATT) 23 founders, there were several EEC (later ECs or nowadays EU<sup>3</sup>) founders or later full EU members: Great Britain, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Czechia and Slovakia (then Czecho-Slovakia ... 1918 - 1992). These nations took active part in relatively separated 123 Geneva negotiations that resulted in 20 identified trade policy areas. In all these areas the important reducing of customs duties was reached. It was a final basis for the content of the future text as well as appendixes of GATT – until now the *most recognised multilateral trade treaty* in the history of international trading and developing of foreign commercial policies of nations. Then traditional trading powers contributed to the impressive result of these negotiations of the first Geneva GATT round (April – October 1947): approximately 45 thousand tariff concessions of total value of 10 billion USD were reached.<sup>4</sup>

The MTS was created and valid as well as functioning from 1948. It was not an institutionalised MTS as was predicted by the U.S. original project of

---

<sup>2</sup> This new approach was identified with using the *trade policy method of multilateralism* (not more bilateralism as priority No. 1 method in the past) combined by a *freetradingism* as a new progressive *trade policy principle* (implemented internally and promoted strongly internationally by **Cordell Hull**, U.S. Secretary of State 1933 - 1944).

<sup>3</sup> The first European complex integration unit was the *European Economic Community*, established in Rome on 25 March 1957, followed by *European Communities* (Brussels *Merger Treaty* came into force on 1 July 1967) and nowadays *European Union* (*Maastricht treaty* or officially *Treaty on European Union* came into force on 1 November 1993 and since 1 December 2009 the *EU* is the sole symbol of the mainstream wave of European integration. This day the *Lisbon treaty* of 2007 came into force, modifying this *Treaty on European Union* as well as presenting the *Treaty on functioning of European Union*).

<sup>4</sup> The building of the third institutional pillar of the world economy was started in parallel to the existing two Bretton-Woods institutions: World Bank (originally only International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now the larger World Bank Group) and International Monetary Fund.

*International Trade Organization* from the beginning but was a temporary system.<sup>5</sup> The GATT played this role during a period of more than four decades - since 1948 until 1994. The 3<sup>rd</sup> pillar of the world economy – *World Trade Organization* – was established and functioning as a result of 1994 Marrakesh GATT conference ending the last – 8<sup>th</sup> (Uruguay) GATT round of trade policy negotiations in Morocco. WTO – new institutionalised MTS is functioning since the beginning of 1995.

Naturally, the first post-war year's increase of the world trade value (in export as well as in import) was impressive: 50%, followed by other interesting increasing of the world trade value in 1947 by 22%. The MTS orientation to trade facilitation and liberalisation influenced positively an increasing of the world trade value as well as volume during following years, too. During 55 years until 2000 – the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century as well as of the second millennium – the world trade development was impacted only by two more important crisis<sup>6</sup> but not comparable with the Great Depression of the 1930s. This positive development was sustainably impacted by the new phenomena in international relations: a key foreign trade policy priority - *free trade* as well as an *international economic integration* (IEI), too. **Balassa** linked this process with an elimination of existing customs tariffs and the other trade barriers and obstacles, describing firstly two stages of *trade integration* – *free trade area* and *customs union*.<sup>7</sup> The IEI process contributed a lot to a creating of much stronger and deeper interdependence in international relations of the post-war period. Within the integration groupings there was and still is the most intensive and the deepest reached level of an *economic liberalisation* process. The economic relations between the companies of two members of integration unit were developing in the framework of the same system of economic policy conditions as there had within one national economy system.

---

<sup>5</sup> U.S. administration rejected the results of 1948 Havana U.N. conference on trade and employment and then agreed *ITO Havana Charter*, which was modified in comparison with original U.S. draft of its text...

<sup>6</sup> The world trade development was impacted for the first time since 1945 by important crisis only during the first petroleum shock (1973 - 1975). It led to a creation of a global coordination group G6 (1975 – USA, Japan, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy) in Paris, being transformed to G7 in 1976 (an accession of Canada) and to G8 in 1997 (an accession of Russia). The second petroleum shock (1979 – 1981/82) influenced negatively the development of the world trade, too.

<sup>7</sup> The definitions of a *free trade area* as well as a *customs union* were presented in the basic text of the new temporary MTS: in the GATT Article XXIV in 1947 (as well as in the GATT'94 Article XXIV).

However, the existing integration groupings did not represent the closed economic systems. They wanted to be stronger and stronger, larger and larger, relatively open and parallel with the processes of *deepening* and *widening* integration. The *enlargement* process of these integration units as well as a *flexible exogenous integration*, aiming for and supporting a creation of a stable and cooperative neighbourhood, were realised, too.

The dominant centres of economic power (USA and European Communities<sup>8</sup>) tried to build influential and prospectively dominant *continental economic complexes*<sup>9</sup> step by step, enlargement by enlargement. The Russian Federation tried to reintegrate the disintegrated Soviet economy after 1991 and to create an important Euro-Asian economic complex: initially in the framework of 12 ex-Soviet economies and states being named the *Commonwealth of Independent States* (CIS), later in the framework of a new project of a customs union (CU). The first framework in the establishment of CU was created by EurAsEC (*Eurasian Economic Community*). The trilateral customs union of EurAsEC (Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan) was established in July 2010. At the end of May 2014, Astana trilateral summit of the EurAsEC approved

---

<sup>8</sup> The second largest national economy in the world economy system – Japan – was not involved in the process of creating system of IEI linkages for a long period of time. Nevertheless, Japan was very successful in concentration on national economy development including its results in international trading. The institutional symbol of it was the famous MITI – then Ministry of International Trade and Industry (now it is the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry - METI).

<sup>9</sup> EU realised during the four decades several enlargement waves: 1973 – Northern enlargement, 1981 – Hellenic enlargement, 1986 – Iberic enlargement, 1995 – EFTA enlargement, 2004 and 2007 – Central Eastern Europe and Mediterranean enlargement and 2013 – Croatian enlargement. Mainstream European integration unit initiated a creation of the higher order integration of two integration units (EU + EFTA) in European Economic Area 1992 – 1994. There are several examples of the EU flexible exogenous integrations on a customs union level (Turkey, Andorra, San Marino, Monaco) as well as on a free trade area level (Korea – functioning, Singapore and Vietnam – negotiations terminated, other ASEAN members, India, GCC, MERCOSUR – being negotiated). There is as well an ongoing negotiation process on a creation of the biggest free trade area within the world economy – EU-USA in the framework of the *Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership* (TTIP). USA signed firstly CUSFTA with Canada (1988), later NAFTA (included Mexico, too in 1992). It led to the project elaboration of FTAA (*Free Trade Area of the Americas* – a free trade project for 34 Western hemisphere countries) negotiated (1994 - 2005) and interrupted later. Now, during the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, the U.S. have intention to contribute to a creation of two globally important big free trade areas: one under the umbrella of TTIP, and the second in the framework of negotiated TPP (*Transpacific Partnership*) with 11 U.S. Asia-Pacific partners (Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore and Vietnam). *TPP agreement* was signed on 4 February 2016 in Auckland, New Zealand.

a transformation of this integration unit into a new one: *Eurasian Economic Union* (EEU).<sup>10</sup> The Astana Treaty establishing the EEU came into effect on 1 January 2015. EEU has now five full members (including Armenia and Kyrgyzstan).

IEI is a very dynamic process and namely during the 1990s and 2000s it achieved many successes, dynamic developments and inspirations. In the era of globalisation, IEI is representing the most intensive islands of *economic internationalisation* within the world economy and community. IEI became a part of our continental culture. Of course, this project experienced the negative periods of its development, too. They were linked namely with the artificial accelerations of this process, not supported and approved by the citizenship... According **Otília Zorkóciová**, the culture is „*all what people have (i. e. „material“), what they created, what they think (through this activity the ideas, values and positions are creating), what they do and what they deal with as the members of a certain concrete society (i. e. they act usually in the framework of some norms)*“ (Zorkóciová, 2007, p. 39). Namely European integration process in its mainstream wave (EU) as well as in its parallel wave (European Free Trade Association) contributed enormously to the European culture of globalisation.

## 1.1 EU flexible exogenous integration

The other factors supporting this tendency do exist and are developing in the framework of several different forms of the *EU flexible exogenous integration*. This one is representing an integration of EU non-member country (countries) with EU on one or two levels (stages) of IEI – now, *on a free trade area level* but there are the exemptions, too:

The *European Economic Area* functioning as *the higher order integration* of two existing European integration units (EU + EFTA) with a small modification (adopting the *special Swiss model of integration* after the negative result of the Swiss referendum on the Swiss EEA membership on 6 December 1992). *EEA now = EU + EFTA – CH* (Switzerland).<sup>11</sup> EFTA 3 (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein) as well as Switzerland are integrated with EU on the level of

---

<sup>10</sup> The *Astana Treaty* establishing the EEU was signed on 29 May 2014. On the second day of its existence in trade and economic practice (January 2, 2015) Armenia joined EEU and Kyrgyzstan membership was realised in May 2015.

<sup>11</sup> In 2016: EEA 31 = EU28 + EFTA 4 – CH...

a free trade area and a common market (See: Figure 1, EU and EFTA column).

Integrating the *Turkish economy* with EU by implementing the *Customs Union Agreement* (CUA) since the end of 1995 / beginning of 1996. The similar form of the flexible exogeneous integration with EU is represented by the cases of *San Marino*, *Monaco* and *Andorra* integration. All these three European micro-states' national economies are integrated with the EU 28 economy on a customs union level.

A similar form of the flexible exogeneous integration, but on a free trade area level, is represented by EMFTA project (still not realised)<sup>12</sup> supporting the *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership* (EMP) in the framework of *Barcelona process* since the end of 1995 and currently in the framework of the *Union for the Mediterranean* (UFM 43/42) as well.<sup>13</sup> The conventional basis of this project is represented by the *Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement* (EMAA).

The project *CEFTA II* being linked with the South-Eastern region of our continent (namely with the Western Balkans countries) had the very similar aspects and aims, too. The most successful of former CEFTA II members (as well as of CEFTA I,<sup>14</sup> located in Central Europe) is Croatia, the newest full EU member since 1 July 2013. As a result of the developments in former Yugoslavian territory (civil war tragedies), the basic conventional instrument of this potential flexible exogeneous integration, elaborated by EU experts and aiming to assist a basic FTA integration with EU, is a *Stabilization and Association Agreement* (SAA). The last one was signed between EU and Kosovo in 2015.

---

<sup>12</sup> EMFTA – *Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area* – was presented as an economic pillar of *Barcelona process* since the end of 1995 and was planned to be realised until 2010. This project was not successful. Now, there are several MENA region countries of really, very high level of instability, namely Libya and Syria.

<sup>13</sup> *Union for the Mediterranean* (UFM) was established by the Paris conference of 43 countries' representatives on 13 July 2008. It was a result of the 2007 initiative of then French president **Nicolas Sarkozy** (firstly during his presidential campaign). In 2011, Syria decided to withdrawal from UFM membership... There are not only EU 27 (now 28) members in UFM but also the countries of Northern Africa including Mauretania, of the Middle East area, including Israel and Palestine, Turkey, as well as the Western Balkans countries and Monaco.


<sup>14</sup> CEFTA I (*Central European Free Trade Agreement*) was a result of the Central European summit of four Visegrád group countries (V4) in Krakow in Poland in 1992. After joining EU in May 2004 (V4 countries and Slovenia, all CEFTA parties), the other CEFTA parties as Bulgaria and Croatia continued under an umbrella of the new CEFTA II, being located in the Western Balkans region (including Kosovo) plus Moldova. The new CEFTA Secretariat was established. It is located in Brussels.



The similar project was linked with a launching the *EU Eastern Partnership* initiative (May 2009) aiming at the strengthening of trade and economic relations with several ex-Soviet republics (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan). The new *Association Agreements (AAs)* including *Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTAs)* were signed in Brussels on June 27, 2014 with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. The *Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs)* were launched at the beginning of 2016.

- There are still the *Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs)* of the end of 1990s valid for other ex-Soviet nations' trade and economic relations development with EU, including EU-Russia relations.

Figure 1. Forming European Economic Continental Complex



**Legend:** AAs – association agreements, AEEA – Agreement on European Economic Area, BSAs – bilateral sectoral agreements, CH – Confédération helvétique = Swiss Confederation, CIS – Commonwealth of Independent States, CM – common market, CU – customs union, CUA – customs union agreement, DCFTA – Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (in practice: Area), EaP – Eastern Partnership, ECs – European Communities, EEA – European Economic Area, EEU – Eurasian Economic Union, EFTA – European Free Trade Association, EMAAs – Euro-Mediterranean association agreements, EMFTA – Euro-Mediterranean Free Trade Area, EMU – economic and monetary union / European Monetary Union (eurozone), FTA protocole – protocole to the Free Trade Agreement, FTA – free trade area, GE – Georgia, IM – internal market, MD – Moldova, SAA – stabilization and association agreements, SM – single market, TR – Turkey, UA – Ukraine.

All these EU activities, European Economic Area as well as all mentioned forms of the *flexible exogenous integration*, are linked with:

- a deeper trade and economic *cooperation* of one non-member country with European Union,
- later with an *association*, a *mutual free trade regime* creation,
- later with a potential status of *EU candidate country*,
- later – officially *negotiating country* on future full membership
- *later* – *accession country* (after successfully terminating of the negotiation process on full membership)
- and, finally, the future *European Union member*.

An original mainstream European integration grouping – European Economic Community (EEC) – was a perfect example of a model of *homogeneous integration*. All member states were more or less on the same economic development level (the OECD members – an elite club of advanced or developed countries). There were able to reach all integration stages together – stage by stage – in the same moment. The situation in European mainstream IEI development has changed after the Hellenic enlargement of European Communities in January 1981.

This enlarged integration unit (ECs 10) became a model of *heterogeneous integration*. It became more and more heterogeneous (thanks to the next *Iberic enlargement* in 1986 – Portugal, former EFTA member, and Spain joined European Communities, as well as thanks to the *Central Eastern European and Mediterranean enlargement* (10+2 mostly former CMEA/COMECON members joined European Union in May 2004, and in January 2007, respectively), as well as the *Croatian enlargement* in July 2013).

A creation of the large *European Economic Continental Complex* became the priority No. 1 for European strategists, not a forming of an integration block as a homogeneous integration model in the practice. The key role in it was identified as *functioning single market*, fully, largely and deeply integrating many national economies – basic elements of heterogeneous integration unit, the elements of different economic situation, policy, potential, level and position in continental as well as world economy and, of course, of different perspectives.

In comparisons of national accounts data - *GDP per capita* - of the EU member countries, EU candidate countries, the potential EU candidate

countries as well as EFTA 3 members<sup>15</sup> (37 countries of the mainstream as well as parallel wave of European integration together), it is desirable not only to express the figures in a EU common currency (EUR), but also to adjust for differences in price levels in selected mentioned national economies. Failing to do so would result in an overestimation of GDP levels for countries with high price levels, relative to countries with low price levels. Concerning *heterogeneous mainstream European integration unit*, the distribution in GDP per capita across the EU 28 member countries is quite remarkable: Luxembourg has the top position within EU 28 (and logically among all mentioned 37 countries) and Bulgaria, despite some improvement over the last several years, is still the poorest.

*Luxembourg* has by far the highest GDP per capita (GDP per capita...) among all the 37 countries included in this comparison (IMF GDP/capita 2015: 103,187 USD), being more than two and a half times above the EU 28 average. One particular feature of Luxembourg's national economy, which to some extent explains the country's very high GDP per capita, is the fact that a large number of foreign residents are employed in the country and thus contribute to its GDP, while at the same time they are not included in the resident population. Luxembourg's global competitiveness index GCI 5,20 represents now (2015/2016) the 20<sup>th</sup> best position in the world economy (Schwab - Sala-i-Martin 2015, p. XV). Luxembourg is the country with the highest level of *Actual Individual Consumption* (AIC)<sup>16</sup> per capita in the EU, too, 41 % above the average of the mainstream European integration unit. However, while Luxembourg can be said to belong to "a division of its own" in terms of GDP, this is less so for AIC. One reason for this is that cross-border workers contribute to GDP in Luxembourg while their consumption expenditure is recorded in the national accounts of the country of their residence.

*Ireland* comes out second among the EU member countries (IMF GDP/capita 2015: 48,940 USD – the 12<sup>th</sup> global position), at 34 % above the EU 28 average followed by the *Netherlands* and *Austria* at around 30 % above that average. A competitiveness of these countries is very high, too: the Netherlands have the 5<sup>th</sup> best GCI (5,50) in the world, Austria's GCI is 5,12 (23<sup>rd</sup> best global

---

<sup>15</sup> EFTA 3 means without Liechtenstein... (EFTA has 4 members since EU *EFTA enlargement* being realised at the beginning of the year 1995, Austria, Sweden and Finland joined EU): Norway, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Iceland).

<sup>16</sup> While GDP is mainly an indicator of the level of economic activity, *Actual Individual Consumption* (AIC) is an alternative indicator better adapted to describe the material welfare of households.


position), and Ireland's GCI 5,11 is representing now the 24<sup>th</sup> global position. The EFTA member states *Switzerland* (IMF GDP/capita 2015: 82,178 USD – the 2<sup>nd</sup> best global position after Luxembourg) and *Norway* (IMF GDP/capita 2015: 76,266 USD – the 4<sup>th</sup> best global position after Qatar) have a higher level of GDP per capita, more than 60 % above the EU 28 average. *Switzerland is, in parallel, the most competitive national economic complex within the world economy since 2009.* Its GCI is 5,76 from maximum of 6,00. Norway's GCI is very high, too: 5,41 and is representing the 11<sup>th</sup> best global position.

Other EU member countries with a GDP per capita of more than 20 % above the EU 28 average are *Denmark, Germany* and *Sweden*. *Belgium* has a level of the GDP per capita at around 20 % above the average together with the EFTA member state *Iceland*. German GCI is the 4<sup>th</sup> best in the world economy: 5,53, Swedish GCI: 5,43 (9<sup>th</sup>), and Denmark's GCI is 5,33 (12<sup>th</sup> global position). *Finland, the United Kingdom* and *France* show GDP per capita levels of up to 10 % above the average. Concerning a competitiveness of these countries, the GCI is following: Finland reached the 8<sup>th</sup> best global competitiveness: GCI 5,45 in 2015. Great Britain's GDP: 5,43 (10<sup>th</sup> global position) and France: 22<sup>th</sup> position with GCI 5,13. *Italy* and *Spain* are at GDP per capita of less than 10 % below the EU 28 average followed by *Czechia, Malta, Slovenia* and *Cyprus* with the level between 15 % and 20 % below the EU 28 average. The GDP level per capita of *Portugal, Slovakia, Estonia, Lithuania* and the *Hellenic Republic* is less than 30 % below that average (Slovakian IMF GDP/capita 2015 was 15,893 USD – 44<sup>th</sup> global position, GCI of Slovakia: 4,22 – 67<sup>th</sup> global position). They are followed by *Hungary, Poland* and *Latvia* with GDP level less than 40 % below the average. The EU member countries *Croatia* and *Romania* followed by the EU candidate country *Turkey* have the GDP level less than 50 % below the EU 28 average while the EU member state *Bulgaria* is placed at 53 % below the EU average. *Bulgaria* records the lowest level of this indicator among all EU member states (IMF GDP/capita 2015: 6,582 USD, the 81<sup>st</sup> global position). Bulgarian global competitiveness is the lowest among EU 28 member countries, too: GCI 4,32 (54<sup>th</sup> global position, more or less the same as Romania, the 53<sup>th</sup>). Romanian IMF GDP/capita 2015 was 8,807 USD (68<sup>th</sup> global position).

The other EU candidate countries *Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia* and *Albania* are between 60 % and 70 % below the EU 28 average. The potential candidate country *Bosnia and Herzegovina* is placed at 71 % below the EU 28 average (Schwab - Sala-i-Martin, 2015, p. XV). (See also GDP per capita..., 2016)

Of course, this *heterogeneity of member economies* (it is still, first of all, an IEI... but with the strengthened political features adopted during several last decades) can have not permanently only positive or neutral impacts on the integration process development. The Hellenic crisis, lasting for several years now and still representing a very topical –daily issue, being mixed with the impacts of refugees crisis 2015-2016 is a very good example of it. The forming a large *economic continental complex* is a very comprehensive process. It is possible to monitor and assess the similar trends to take place in the practice of international economic relations in other continents, too.

**Figure 2 The Structure of the World Economy and Community**



Source: Kosir, I., 2010

**Legend:** Model was updated to the situation of February 2016: G40 is represented *advanced (developed) countries*, 34 OECD members, 5 members of global coordination group BRICS as well as Singapore, one of the most competitive national economies (Schwab – Sala-i-Martin, 2015, p. XV). G48 is representing a group of *the least developed countries* (LDCs) within the world economy identified by UNO permanently. They are the poorest *developing countries* (DCs). In the framework of all DCs there are *newly industrialised countries* (NICs), too. NICs represent the most successful DCs in industrialization process. A special group of dynamically growing national economies is known as the new global coordination group BRICS – *Brazil, Russia, India, China and*

*South Africa*. Namely China and India are considered as very perspective globally. During 2001 – 2008 period it was only a virtual quadrilateral group BRICs identified by **Jim O'Neill** of Goldman Sachs (O'Neill, 2001). EU represents now a developing model of heterogeneous international economic integration. EU7 – they are the new EU members (Malta, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Croatia) but not OECD members parallelly (not yet). From 28 EU members there are 21 OECD members parallelly (original EU15 before 2004 enlargement + Visegrád group + Slovenia + Estonia). There are now 5 EU candidate countries (EU CCs), the 6<sup>th</sup> Iceland resigned in 2014. Turkey is OECD member since the first year of its activities – 1961 (the former EU CC Iceland, too). Additional four EU CCs are located in Western Balkans (Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Albania). Among nations of top mini-pyramid there are all B4WT members (Big Four of the World Trade): China, European Union including its leader of foreign trade activities – Germany, USA and Japan (International trade statistics 2015, pp. 44-47). G40 including the second most competitive economy - Singapore and EU7 countries are building *knowledge society and economy*, the countries of the middle of the pyramid - the most of the DCs – are building *industrial society and economy*, the poorest DCs – LDCs – they are still living with a heritage of *agricultural society and economy*.

The biggest progress in *economic continental complex* creation was reached in Europe.<sup>17</sup> Building stable and cooperative relations with all countries of the EU Northern, Eastern, South-Eastern as well as Southern neighbourhood is a part of EU vision of a peaceful and competitive future. A creation of the large *European Economic Continental Complex* including its stable and cooperative neighbourhood allows and shall allow the integrated Europe to play a much more important role in the world economy and community. Of course, this vision was much real at the beginning of this new millennium. Now, EU is too much concentrated on its internal issues, structures, developments, problems and it has to be. It is in one of the deepest crisis of its long history starting by BELUX creation in 1921. EU is geographically far from the priority No.1 world region (Asia-Pacific, including USA, Japan, China, Russia, ASEAN countries, Australia).

*EU Customs Union* is functioning perfectly for 48 years (in 2016). Its *Common Commercial Policy* is an example for other European common

---

<sup>17</sup> There were several other projects supporting this long-term aim. For example, then President of European Commission **Romano Prodi** declared on May 17, 2001 on the occasion of the Moscow Russia-EU summit together with **Vladimir Putin**, President of the Russian Federation, that EU and Russia agreed on a setting up a Common European Economic Space (CEES) as well as a Joint High-Level Working group to develop together this concept.

policies. Its basic instrument – TARIC <sup>18</sup> - is a recognised and useful instrument of the transparent and very well-functioning European system of principles and rules of the external trade of European Union, being a strong pillar of EU internal market, too.

Now, it is still facing the impacts of the ongoing Hellenic crisis. In addition, it is complicating by impacts of refugees crisis. The EMU system is still under evolution, development and adaptation to the new trends of the international financial relations and the international monetary system existing within the world economy. The *Euro (EUR)*, a single European currency, is internationally as well as globally recognised and largely used in parallel with the global reserve currency – US dollar (*USD*).

## 1.2 Flexible exogenous integration as a permanent feature of European integration process

A special IEI form of *flexible exogenous integration* is a permanent feature of European integration process. Since the Hellenic enlargement of European Communities in 1981 it became to the existing dominant forms of IEI, in parallel with the higher order integration resulted in European Economic Area building in 1992-1994 period, in several waves of ECs (EU) enlargements resulted finally in the enlargement of the mainstream European integration unit from 6 members to contemporary 28 members. The flexible exogenous integration is needed in a new situation in which not a homogeneous integration, but geopolitical dimension of continental integration process is a priority. Since the Hellenic enlargement, (1 January 1981) European mainstream integration grouping is increasingly heterogeneous. If the differences are very big between the main existing integration unit and the national economy of the country being in the conventional state of flexible exogenous integration with this unit and there is not an evident progress in a long-time, the period of flexible exogenous integration is longer and longer.

The Turkish case is very interesting: the process of flexible exogenous integration of the national economy of *Turkey* and the mainstream wave of European integration (since November 1993 it is EU) started by signing the *1970 Protocol* to Ankara association agreement (signed in 1963) supporting a creation of mutual free trade area (FTA). This flexible exogenous integration

---

<sup>18</sup> TARIC = *EU Common External Tariff* – le TARif Intégré Communautaire (fr.)... – a key trade policy instrument of the Common Commercial Policy of European Union since July 1968.

level was improved by coming into force of the *EU-Turkey Customs Union Agreement* (CUA) at the end of 1995. Since 1999 EU December Helsinki summit, *Turkey is officially EU candidate country* (EU CC). The 2005 EU Vienna summit decided to open the official negotiations on future full membership of the country in the EU. The process is continuing, however, it is not very dynamic: 53 years passed since signing of the Ankara agreement (in 2016); 46 years passed since FTA common project development and 21 years passed since common CU project of flexible exogenous integration. There is another case: For *Slovakia*, the process of the flexible exogenous integration with European Union started on 16 December 1991 in the conventional framework of European Communities and the then Czech and Slovak Federative Republic (ČSFR). Then *Europe Agreement on Association* never came into effect. Czechoslovakia democratically disintegrated at the end of the year 1992. The Federal Assembly (Czecho-Slovak parliament) approved the dissolution of the Czecho-Slovak federation (and itself) in November 1992, and the two sides agreed on a civilised division of federal assets, and eventually also on the split of the monetary union later in 1993. ECs-ČSFR *Europe Agreement on Association* had to be renegotiated in two parts and one of them, the new *EU-Slovakia's Europe Agreement on Association* was signed on 4 October 1993 and came into force on 15 February 1995. Based on Copenhagen criteria approved in the Danish capital in 1993 Slovakia was preparing for a future EU membership. In 1997, Slovakia was classified as a member of the second group of EU candidate countries (with Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia and Lithuania), but after two years the country became a part of the „fregata“ of the countries officially negotiating on the future full EU membership. The mutual *EU-Slovak Free Trade Area* was established during this period until the end of the year 2000. A real flexible exogenous integration was functioning on FTA level during the period 2001 – 1 May 2004. It was the first day of Slovakian EU membership and the end of the stage of flexible exogenous integration. Slovakia became one of the 25 EU members, fully integrated from the beginning in the EU's customs union as well as EU's common (single) market. Slovakia reached the highest level of IEI in the framework of the mainstream wave of European integration on 1 January 2009 by joining the monetary part of EU's economic and monetary union (Eurozone). Since December 1991 to May 2004, it was more than 12 years.



## 2 Ukraine as a part of flexible exogeneous integration

Ukrainian SSR was one of the most important republics of the Soviet 15 republics' federation. The country was impacted enormously by all tragedies of the WWII and became one of 51 founders - original members of the United Nations Organization together with Soviet Union (USSR) and Byelorussian SSR (San Francisco 1945). After Russia, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic was the most important economic component of the former USSR, producing about four times the output of the next-ranking republic. Its fertile black soil generated more than one-fourth of Soviet agricultural output, and its farms provided substantial quantities of meat, milk, grain, and vegetables to other republics. Likewise, its diversified heavy industry supplied the unique equipment (for example, large diameter pipes) and raw materials to industrial and mining sites (vertical drilling apparatus) in other regions of the former Soviet Union (Bershidsky, 2016). The collapse of USSR was an integral part of the collapse of a bipolar post-war world system (the end of 1980s – the beginning of 1990s). Ukraine's independence was declared on 24 August 1991. The Act of Declaration of Independence of UA was adopted by the Ukrainian parliament. The Act established *Ukraine as an independent state*. This Act was adopted in the aftermath of the coup attempt on 19 August 1991, when conservative Communist leaders of the USSR tried to restore central Communist party control over the Soviet federation (Magocsi, 2010, pp. 722-723). The Act passed with 321 votes in favour, 2 votes against, and 6 abstentions (out of 360 attendants) (Lapychak, 1991). Ukrainian parliament called for a referendum on support for the *Declaration of Independence*, too (Magocsi, 2010, pp. 722-723, Lapychak 1991), voted for the creation of a national guard of UA and turned jurisdiction over all the armed forces located on Ukrainian territory over to itself. It was one of several important factors of a future splitting of the USSR.

A successor entity to it (the CIS) was founded only approximately three months later, on 8 December 1991 by three biggest Slavic Soviet republics - the Republic of Belarus, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine. The leaders of the three countries met in Viskuli, in the Belovezhskaya Pushcha Natural Reserve, about 50 km north of Brest in Belarus and signed the "*Agreement Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States*", known as the *Creation Agreement*, on the dissolution of the USSR and the creation of CIS. At the same time, three leaders announced that the new alliance would be open to all Soviet republics, and to other nations sharing the same goals. The *CIS Charter*, adopted on

January 22, 1993 at a session of the Council of Heads of States at Minsk, stated that all the members were sovereign and independent nations and thereby effectively abolished the Soviet Union. Several weeks later, a CIS representation took part for the first time (as well as for the last time) in the Olympic Winter Games (XVI OWG in Albertville, February 8–23, 1992). (Albertville..., 2016)

On 21 December 1991, the leaders of eight additional former Soviet Republics – Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan – signed the *Alma-Ata Protocol* which can either be interpreted as expanding the CIS to these states or the proper foundation or re-foundation date of the CIS (Ploky, 2014), thus bringing the number of participating countries to 11. Georgia joined two years later, in December 1993. At this point, 12 former Soviet Republics (all except the Baltic States, which joined NATO and the EU in 2004) participated in the CIS.

Between 2003 and 2005, three CIS member states experienced a change of government in a *series of colour revolutions*: president **Eduard Shevardnadze** (former **Gorbachev**'s USSR Foreign Minister) was overthrown in *Georgia*; new president **Viktor Yushchenko** was elected in *Ukraine*; and president **Askar Akayev** was toppled in *Kyrgyzstan*. *Turkmenistan* has not ratified the CIS charter and changed its CIS standing to associate member as of 26 August 2005 in order to be consistent with its UN-recognised international neutrality status. In February 2006, *Georgia* withdrew from the Council of Defense Ministers, with the statement that "*Georgia has taken a course to join NATO and it cannot be part of two military structures simultaneously*", (*Georgia opts out...*, 2006) but it remained a full member of the CIS until August 2009, one year after officially withdrawing in the immediate aftermath of the Russo-Georgian War. It was evident that CIS is not functioning efficiently. In March 2007, **Igor Ivanov**, the secretary of the Russian Security Council, expressed his doubts concerning the usefulness of the CIS, emphasising that the *Eurasian Economic Community* was becoming a more competent organisation to unify the largest countries of the CIS. (*Russia questions...*, 2007)

In May 2009, during the Czech presidency in EU Council, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine joined the EU *Eastern Partnership*, then a new European Union initiative. The CIS is a loose association of states. The CIS was alliance of several ex-Soviet republics, not a real integration unit, until the *CIS Free Trade Area* (CISFTA) creation. Russia's strategic goal was evidently to reintegrate this disintegrated former

Soviet “national economy” (of course, excluding three Baltic states). Russian policymakers left the door open at an early stage for the CIS to become a *basic building block for regional integration*. The *CIS Charter*, which replaced the original Creation Agreement in January 1993, foresaw the need for a common economic order that permitted the free movement of goods, services and people, and the harmonisation of economic policies to create favourable direct production links between member states.

Although the CIS has few supranational powers, it aims at being more than a purely symbolic organisation, nominally possessing coordinating powers in the realm of trade, finance, law-making, and security. It has also promoted cooperation on cross-border crime prevention. Furthermore, eight of the nine CIS member states participate in the *CIS Free Trade Area*, and five of these form the *Eurasian Economic Union*, a customs union and single market of over 180 million people (Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan).<sup>19</sup> In addition, six member states participate in a mutual defence alliance: the *Collective Security Treaty Organization*. UA had a very specific relationships to the CIS from the very beginning. UA never ratified the CIS Charter. Thus, it does not regard itself as a member of the CIS. Nevertheless, UA took part in all important summits of the CIS and was considered as a *CIS participating country but not the member*. Nine full members were left in the CIS - Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. However, simultaneously, thanks to free trade regime motivating factor, UA had a very specific *flexible exogenous integration to CIS*. Although Russia did not succeed to coerce or entice UA into the EEU, it finally succeeded in signing a CIS-wide FTA on 18 October 2011 with most of the post-Soviet countries including UA. This *2011 CISFTA* replaced the 1994 CISFTA, which in fact has never worked. The 2011 CISFTA entered into force on 20 September 2012 for Russia, Belarus and Ukraine, on 17 October 2012 for Armenia, on 8 December 2012 for Kazakhstan and on 9 December for Moldova (Loo, 2016, p. 135).

---

<sup>19</sup> Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) was established on 29 May 2014 in Astana and the treaty establishing this new integration unit came into force on 1 January 2015. On 2 January 2015 Armenia joined EEU and on 6 August 2015 Kyrgyzstan, too.

## 2.1 Low efficiency of the Ukraine's flexible exogenous integration to the Commonwealth of Independent States since CISFTA creation

Ukraine was one of three founders of the *Commonwealth of Independent States* (CIS), together with the Russian Federation and Belarus, in 1991. Instead, it was a club whose members merely exchanged views. This alliance, a future integration unit *CISFTA* (not very well functioning, too), replaced the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR or Soviet Union). Although UA was one of the founding countries and ratified the Creation Agreement in December 1991, UA chose *not to ratify the CIS Charter* as it disagrees with Russia being the only legal successor to the Soviet Union. In 1993 UA became an "Associate Member" of CIS (D'Anieri, 1999). For an increasing part of Ukrainian politicians, parties, experts as well as population, the CIS was not a platform for effective and mutually beneficial cooperation. The CIS was considered as virtually moribund and more as a *political organisation*. Only a tiny percentage of the agreements its members have signed since its inception in late 1991 have been implemented. On 20 August 2008, Foreign Minister of Ukraine **Vladimir Ogryzko** said "*The name of CIS envisages unity, friendship, but it should be analyzed whether this friendship is real or a curtain*", said the minister and mentioned that Ukraine was not the member of CIS. "*Ukraine is not the member of CIS Economic Court, has not ratified the Statute of CIS, that's why Ukraine can not be considered member of CIS in terms of international law. Ukraine is only a participating country, but not the member*", he said. (Commonwealth of Independent States, 2014) By contrast, subsidiary organisations and integration projects such as the *CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization*, which numbered only six members, and the *Single Economic Space* (being considered as a *common market* integration stage) have proven more effective in promoting specific interests.

On March 14, 2014, a bill was introduced to UA's parliament to denounce their ratification of the 1991 *Agreement Establishing the CIS*, following the Russian military intervention in UA and annexation of Crimea, but was never approved. (Bill introduced..., 2014) Following the 2014 parliamentary election, a new bill to denounce the CIS agreement was introduced. (Proekt Zakonu pro zupynennya..., 2014) Later, in September 2015 the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs confirmed UA would continue taking part in CIS "*on a selective basis*". Since that month, UA has no representatives in the CIS Executive

Committee building. (Ukraine to selectively..., 2015)

UA shares some similarities with the CIS non-member states, but also some dissimilarities, mainly linked to the sheer fact that the country is “sandwiched” between Russia and the EU. Costs and benefits for UA trade is very important. International trading and namely UA’s export success is one of key factors influencing the country’s economic and social development. The openness index for it – as measured by the sum of exports and imports over UA’s GDP – exceeds 100 percent (Vinhas – Havrylyshyn, 2006, p. 165). Moreover, there were many traditional trade and production linkages with the national economies of the CIS countries – ex-Soviet republics. That is why Ukraine supported this *flexible exogenous integration to the CIS* through CISFTA since 20 September 2012 until DCFTA with European Union came into force on 1 January 2016.

Efficiency of this more than 3 years UA-CIS flexible exogenous integration was not very high. Ukraine was permanently in a very special situation: a traditional predominant economic cooperation continuing within the post-Soviet economic space without any important needed reforms on one side, in parallel with a state of CIS non-membership – a participating member or associate member only. In addition: the CIS free trade area was built in two steps, only the second one was successful.

The parallel internal economic factors development (characterised by stagnations or crisis), an oligarchic structure of UA national economy as well as tensions with Russian neighbour were not very supportive to the efficiency increasing of this UA-CIS flexible exogenous integration during the last several years, too.

## **2.2 Efficiency potential of the Ukraine’s flexible exogenous integration to the European Union since 2016**


According to the Ukrainian president **Petro Poroshenko**’s assessment of this 27 June 2014 *"It is one of the most historic days since reaching the independence"*. (Rozširi sa EÚ? 2014) EU party described this as UA's *"first but most decisive step"* towards EU membership. (Pifer, 2014)

This AA lacks a membership perspective; nevertheless, it is sweeping. In a private meeting in 2013, the foreign minister of one Central European member of the EU said that if Ukraine fully implements the AA, it would be *"more ready for membership than my country was when it joined in 2004."* (Pifer, 2014)

Of course, it is necessary to be very realistic: a new president of European Commission **Jean-Claude Juncker** declared the pause in the EU enlargement at the beginning of his first term for his mandate period. He told the Members of European Parliament: "Over the next five years, there won't be any new member states acceding to the European Union". (Scottish independence..., 2014)

Nevertheless, the *association agreement (AA)* can be a game-changer for Ukraine. It included the DCFTA that will open much of the EU internal market, this famous integrated **Béla Balassa's common market**, to Ukrainian exports (Balassa, 1966, pp. 25-26, 235-256).

**Figure 3 EU flexible exogenous integration forms**



**Legend:** EU 28 is representing existing developing integration unit. Although now in a deep crisis, it is still the most recognised integration unit within the world economy. Turkey, as well as a parallel wave of European integration – EFTA (without Switzerland), Switzerland itself, Israel as well as Ukraine – they are representing EU partners being with this mainstream European integration unit in the flexible exogenous integration: on a *free trade area level* (Israel, in the framework of Barcelona process after 1995 on the basis of EU-Israel Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreement, ratified in 1995, and now this process of EU-UA FTA integration level implementation starting by Ukraine after EU-UA DCFTA came into force on 1 January 2016), on a *customs union level* (Turkey since the end of 1995, before it was free trade area integration with then European Communities according the 1970 Protocol to the Ankara Association Agreement of 1963) and on a *free trade area as well as common market levels* (EFTA 3 – without Switzerland, forming with EU 28 nowadays European Economic Area (EEA) of 31 member countries, and in the framework of a special Swiss model of integration based namely on 17 bilateral sectoral agreements (BSAs) with European Union – Switzerland (CH) itself. The first EU-CH bilateral sectoral agreement was EU-CH FTA of 1972, coming into force at the beginning of 1973, later in 2002 the additional 7 BSAs were negotiated and approved and in 2004 other 9 BSAs, too. In 2005, one partial Swiss

referendum approved it. In 2008, Switzerland joined the EU Schengen area, too.) European Union started its integration effort as European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958 by building the custom union integration level immediately on a basis of several years customs union functioning experience of trilateral integration unit of BENELUX since 1948. EEC had six members at the beginning: BENELUX member countries (Belgium, Luxembourg - then BELUX together - and the Netherlands) as well as three large European economies: France, Federal Republic of Germany (then Western Germany) and Italy. FTA = *Free Trade Area*, the first or basic integration stage (level), CU means *Customs Union* integration level, CM = **Balassa's Common Market** integration level of 4 basic economic integration freedoms, SM – the same but in a new version used during **Jacques Delors's** golden decade period (1985 – 1995, **Delors** was then president of the *Commission of European Communities*, later during the last two years: of *European Union = European Commission* now): *Single Market*, EU – only in this figure and in the highest level of presented integration columns: **Béla Balassa's Economic Union** integration level covering all parts of economies of member countries including monetary part (EU is now well known namely as European Union, of course), EMU = the same, but in a new form after several years internal theoretical debate in European Communities about a division of this IEI stage into two: *Economic Union* and *Monetary Union*, and after a reached compromise: the both, together, under the new name: *Economic and Monetary Union* (EMU). This category is now used in European Union for the highest (theoretically the 4<sup>th</sup> stage) level of IEI. The higher level of IEI does not exist, this *Complete Economic Integration* final level (stage), mentioned in **Béla Balassa's** book *Theory of Economic Integration* issued in U.S. Illinois in 1961, is not more used in the practice as well as in the modern IEI theory. UA – the international code for Ukraine, CH – the international code for Switzerland (from French: Confédération Helvétique), EEA = European Economic Area (EEA 31 = EU 28 + EFTA 4 - CH).

This main flexible exogenous integration goal – the *Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area* (DCFTA) created in mutual economic EU-UA relations on a basis of mentioned *Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement* (DCFTA) shall be established during several following years. But concerning UA, an implementation of this conventional integration instrument will not only bring Ukraine's trade and customs rules into conformity with EU standards since 2016, it will help the country draw closer to EU democratic norms and "Europeanize" other Ukrainian regulatory regimes. Therefore, it is very important factor of the new UA-EU flexible exogenous integration future efficiency. However, it is too early to assess it at this stage.

Comparing this **Balassa's** economic policy regime based in practice on four basic economic integration freedoms – a common market, the EU-UA DCFTA is *only about a free movement of goods* and not about other 3 freedoms fully: a free movement of capital, a free movement of services as well as a free

movement of persons. EU and UA committed to co-operate and converge economic policy, legislation, and regulation across a broad range of areas, including equal rights for workers, steps towards visa-free movement of people, the exchange of information and staff in the area of justice („acquis communautaire“ EU legal system shall serve as a benchmark for UA). EU shall assist the modernisation of UA's energy infrastructure, and access to the European Investment Bank. The EU-UA AA parties committed to regular summit meetings, and meetings among ministers, other officials, and experts.

The AA comes after more than two decades in which both parties – Ukraine as well as European Union – sought to establish closer ties with each other. On the one hand, the EU wants to ensure that its imports of grain and natural gas from UA, as well as its exports of goods to UA, are not threatened by instability in the region, believing that instability could eventually be reduced through socio-political and economic reforms in UA. Ukraine, on the other hand, wants to increase its exports by benefiting from free trade with the EU while attracting desirable external investments, as well as establishing closer ties with a socio-political entity to which many Ukrainians feel strong cultural connection. Western UA is considered to be generally more enthusiastic about European integration orientation of Ukrainian national economy and potential EU membership than Eastern UA. Ukraine wants to be more efficient internationally. The country would like to use much more the *growth function of its foreign trade*. A new bilateral EU-UA free trade regime established thanks the EU-UA DCFTA coming into force in January 2016 shall assist it very much. Many Ukrainians think joining the EU would raise living standards.

Now, according the *global competitiveness index* (GCI) UA is on the 79<sup>th</sup> place within the world economy. Its GCI 2015/2016 is 4,03. There is a comparison with several neighbours of Ukraine: Poland, EU – 41<sup>st</sup> (4,49), Russia, EEU – 45<sup>th</sup> position (4,44), Romania, EU - 53<sup>rd</sup> (4,32), Hungary, EU – 63<sup>rd</sup> (4,25), Slovakia, EU - 67<sup>th</sup> (4,22), Moldova, EU EaP - 84<sup>th</sup> (4,00) (Schwab – Sala-i-Martin 2015, p. XV).<sup>20</sup> Ukraine is more or less on the same level as Moldova, another EU partner within the EU Eastern Partnership initiative since 2009 (including AA and DCFTA signed in parallel with Ukraine and Georgia in

---

<sup>20</sup> EU = European Union, established on 1 November 1993 on a basis of then European Communities; EU EaP = EU Eastern Partnership, established in Prague on 7 May 2009 during the Czech presidency in EU Council; EEU = Eurasian Economic Union, established in Astana on 29 May 2014 on a basis of then Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) and its then trilateral Customs Union (now, there is EEU 5 including Armenia and Kyrgyzstan).



June 2014).

According *nominal GDP per capita*, calculated by International Monetary Fund (IMF), Ukraine 2015 position was 133<sup>rd</sup> place within the world economy (2,109 USD). According CIA's country comparison to the world: it was 148<sup>th</sup> place (CIA: the World Factbook 2015). A comparing with several neighbours: Slovakia: 44<sup>th</sup> (15,893 USD); Poland: 54<sup>th</sup> (12,662 USD); Hungary: 56<sup>th</sup> (12,021 USD); Romania: 68<sup>th</sup> (8,807 USD); Russia: 72<sup>nd</sup> (8,447 USD); Belarus: 80<sup>th</sup> (6,583 USD); Moldova: 139<sup>th</sup> global position (1,740 USD). (List of countries..., 2016) Ukraine reached the better level than Moldova, another EU partner within the EU Eastern Partnership initiative.

UA has played during several decades long period a role of transit country in supplying energy commodities to the EU. The country played an important role in Russia's energy trade. Not so long ago, Russia could bend Ukraine to its will by threatening to cut off natural gas supplies. Now, Russia is offering discounts, but UA is not interested because it is getting plenty of gas in Europe. This change reflects developments in the European gas market in 2015 that do not augur well for one of Russia's biggest sources of export revenue. Ukraine's GDP has shrunk around 19 percent since 2013, and its industrial sector needs less fuel. In 2015, UA doubled gas imports from Europe to 10.3 billion cubic meters, and it now gets 50 percent more from the EU than it does from Russia (Bershidsky, 2016).

That, however, is not the most important reason for the decline in Ukrainian imports from the Russian Federation. The government of UA is determined to *end its dependence on Russia* as the two countries are in a semi-official state of war. More than once, Russian threats to stop supplies or raise prices as winter approached forced Ukrainian governments to accept political concessions that slowed the country's drift toward the EU. In response, UA sought "reverse supplies" from Slovakia in 2014. Europe has been diversifying its gas supplies for many of the same reasons as UA - to deprive Russia of its energy weapon and to keep prices down. In the third quarter of 2015 - according to the most recent European Commission gas market report available - EU gas imports from Russia increased by 18 percent from a year earlier. Supplies from Norway and Algeria grew 26 percent and 35 percent, respectively (Bershidsky, 2016).

Ukraine muddled through 2015, meeting neither the exalted expectations of the country's boosters nor the malevolent hopes of its detractors. It is true that its major accomplishment for the last year sounds rather minimalist, but it is important nonetheless: the country survived. Even on the economic front,

macroeconomic stabilization of the country augurs a return to growth, albeit weak, in 2016, following years of contraction. It is very important to use now maximally the new state of *flexible exogenous integration* to the European Union based on mutual free trade regime.

## Conclusion

Ukraine as an independent state had theoretically three possibilities in its foreign economic strategy: 1) to continue a traditional economic cooperation first of all in the post-Soviet economic space and to cooperate namely with a large Russian economy supporting actively several Russia-led integration projects; 2) to create a special stable and cooperative economic regime – the bridge between the Russian Federation and European Union, and serving first of all as a transit country as well as an active supporter of the large Eurasian cooperation from Portugal to Vladivostok; and 3) to choose the EU strategic orientation and to create the conditions for fulfilling all EU accession (Maastricht) criteria of 1993.

Ukrainians decided to follow its strategic European Union orientation considering EU as not only the mainstream European integration grouping but also the most recognised integration unit within the world economy. There are two key complicating factors: 1) the Russian comprehensive factor and 2) the deep and comprehensive crisis of a functioning of European Union as an impact of global economic crisis after Lehman Brothers Wall Street September collapse in 2008, as well as several internal problems of EU policies (namely Eurozone functioning issues). The Dutch referendum result on EU-UA AA and DCFTA was another complicating factor (Wessel – Lazowski, 2016).<sup>21</sup>

For Ukraine, it is a big challenge. The most important UA-EU flexible exogenous integration efficiency factors are: a) ability of UA government to stabilise national economy (namely export activities and production acceleration) and Ukrainian society as well. b) ability to use existing practical integration experience of several neighbouring countries – EU members since 2004 or 2007, including Slovakia. A benchmark is clear: EU *acquis communautaire* legal system implementation and institutions building according EU rules. There are the most important factors of efficiency of the new flexible exogenous integration of the country.

---

<sup>21</sup> Dutch referendum on EU-UA Association Agreement including DCFTA: On 6 April 2016, 61.1 percent voted No, 38.1 percent voted Yes, and 0.8 percent chose not to pick a side. The voter turnout was 32.2 percent, just over the required threshold of 30 percent.

This scientific article was elaborated in the framework of the scientific project *Forming of organisational culture and system of management of companies with international participation in inter-cultural environment*, approved by Scientific Grant Agency of the Ministry of Education, Science, Research and Sports of the Slovak Republic and the Slovak Academy of Sciences -VEGA No. VEGA č. 1/0235/14.

### References:

- Albertville 1992 Olympic Winter Games. [online] In *Encyclopædia Britannica* 2016. [Accessed on 12.1.2016.] Available at <<http://www.britannica.com/event/Albertville-1992-Olympic-Winter-Games>>.
- BALASSA, B. 1966. *Teorie ekonomické integrace*. Praha: Svoboda. SAC 25-124-66.
- BENEŠ, O. 1988. *Všeobecná dohoda o clech a obchodu – GATT*. Praha: ČSOPK.
- BERSHIDSKY, L. 2016. *How Ukraine Weaned Itself Off Russian Gas*. [online] Bloomberg View, January 12, 2016 [Accessed on 22.2.2016.] Available at <<http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2016-01-12/how-ukraine-weaned-itself-off-russian-gas>>.
- Bill introduced to withdraw Ukraine from CIS*. [online] Kyiv: Kyiv Post, 15 March 2014. [Accessed on 11.1.2016] Available at <<http://www.kyivpost.com/article/content/politics/bill-introduced-to-withdraw-ukraine-from-cis-339433.html>>.
- CIA: The World Factbook 2015. Ukraine*. [online] [Accessed on 29.2.2016.] Available at <<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/up.html>>.
- CNN – Ukraine Crisis Poll*. [online] [Accessed on 12.11.2015.] London: ComRes, 13 May 2014. Available at <[http://www.comres.co.uk/polls/CNN\\_Ukraine\\_Crisis\\_Poll\\_May\\_2014.pdf](http://www.comres.co.uk/polls/CNN_Ukraine_Crisis_Poll_May_2014.pdf)>.
- Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)*. 2014. [Accessed on 12.1.2016.] Available at <<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/int/cis.htm>>.
- ČIDEROVÁ, D. – DIONIZI, B. 2015. EU Accession Experience and Perspectives: The Case of Slovakia and Kosovo (UNSCR 1244/1999). In KOSÍR, I. – HOTI, A. (eds.) et al. 2015. *European perspectives of the Western Balkans countries I*. In Prishtina: AAB College. pp. 45-71. ISBN 978-9951-494-53-3.
- D'ANIERI, P. J. 1999. *Economic Interdependence in Ukrainian-Russian Relations*. Albany: State University of New York Press. ISBN 0-7914-4245-4.

- EU Trade office: The trade part of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement becomes operational on 1 January 2016.* [online] [Accessed on 31.12.2015.] Brussels: trade.ec.europa.eu. Available at <<http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/press/index.cfm?id=1425>>.
- FIALA, P. – PITROVÁ, M. 2009. *Evropská unie*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. Brno: CDK. ISBN 978-80-7325-180-2.
- Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral Trading System.* Geneva: World Trade Organization 1996. [Accessed on 22.11.2015.] Available at <[https://www.wto.org/english/thewto\\_e/minist\\_e/min96\\_e/chrono.htm](https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm)>.
- GDP per capita, consumption per capita and price level indices.* [online] Brussels: Eurostat, 4 January 2016. [Accessed on 29.2.2016.] Available at <[http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/GDP\\_per\\_capita,\\_consumption\\_per\\_capita\\_and\\_price\\_level\\_indices](http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/GDP_per_capita,_consumption_per_capita_and_price_level_indices)>.
- Georgia opts out of ex-Soviet military cooperation body.* [online] Moscow: Pravda.Ru, 3 February 2006. [Accessed on 11.1.2016] Available at <<http://www.pravdareport.com/news/world/03-02-2006/75406-georgia-0/#sthash.94oNAeOA.dpuf>>.
- Georgia's quitting CIS council will not affect security.* [online] Moscow: RIA Novosti, February 3, 2006. [Accessed on 11.1.2016] Available at <<http://sputniknews.com/world/20060203/43324440.html>>.
- GRIGAS, A. 2016. *Beyond Crimea. The New Russian Empire*. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-21450-5.
- GURA, R. 2010. Le voisinage slovaco-ukrainien: Le point de vue slovaque. In *Revue d'études politiques et constitutionnelles est-européennes*. Université Montesquieu Bordeaux IV, Cereb. Bruxelles: Bruylant, N° 1-2, septembre. ISSN 1632-451X.
- GURA, R. – ROŠTEKOVÁ, M. 2011. La frontière slovaco-ukrainienne: anciens problèmes et nouveaux enjeux. In DUFOULON, Serge – ROŠTEKOVÁ, Mária (dir.): *Migrations, mobilités, frontières & voisinages*. Paris: L'Harmattan, pp. 257-276. ISBN 978-2-296-56363-6.
- HOREMUŽ, M. 2015. Economic integration of the post-Soviet space and soft power of the Russian Federation. In *Politické vedy: časopis pre politológiu, najnovšie dejiny, medzinárodné vzťahy, bezpečnostné štúdiá/Political Sciences*. Banská Bystrica: Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 8-24. ISSN 1335-2741.
- Charter Establishing the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).* [online] [Accessed on 12.1.2016.] Available at <<http://www.dipublico.org/100617/charter-establishing-the-commonwealth-of-independent-states-cis/>>.

- International Trade Statistics 2015*. Geneva: WTO 2015. ISBN 978-92-870-3988-0.
- KERIKMÄE, T. – CHOCHIA, A. (eds.), 2016. *Political and Legal Perspectives of the EU Eastern Partnership Policy*. Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland. ISBN 978-3-319-27381-5.
- KOSÍR, I. 2008. Global economic integration and economic security of countries. In: *Slovakia to Ukraine*. Banská Bystrica: EAC, pp. 241-262. ISBN 978-80-969306-4-7.
- KOSÍR, I. 2008. Intersection des intégrations: Nouvelle forme de l'intégration flexible au 21<sup>e</sup> siècle. In: ROUET, G. – TEREM, P. (eds.): *Élargissement et politique européenne de voisinage. Voisinages Européens*. Vol. 3. [Colloque international „Élargissement de l'Union européenne et politique européenne de voisinage“, FSPRI UMB Banská Bystrica et Université de Reims Champagne-Ardenne, Banská Bystrica, le 13-14 décembre 2007.] Bruxelles: Bruylant, pp. 51-59. ISBN 978-2-8027-2666-1.
- KOSÍR, I. 2010. *Medzinárodná ekonomická integrácia. Od autarkie ku globálnej ekonomickej integrácii*. Banská Bystrica: FPVMV UMB. 242 pp. ISBN 978-80-8083-942-0.
- KOSÍR, I. 2010. Ukraine and European Integration Process. In: ROUET, G. – TEREM, P. (eds.): *Ukraine, entre intégration et partenariat. Voisinages Européens*. Vol. 4. [Colloque international franco-slovaque-ukrainien „Ukraine entre l'intégration et le voisinage“, Université de Tchernihivtsi, Ukraine 11-12 June 2008.] Bruxelles: Bruylant, pp. 113-123. ISBN 978-2-8027-2867-2.
- KOSÍR, I. – KNAPIK, P. 2007. Rozvoj nových funkcií preferenčných regionálnych obchodných dohôd v ére dynamizujúcej sa globalizácie. In: *Nová ekonomika/The New Economy*, Bratislava: Vol. 6, No. 4, pp. 69-79. ISSN 1336-1732.
- KOSÍR, I. – SHEHATA, S. – SMERIGA, P. 2015. Forming the European Economic Continental Complex. In: KOSÍR, I. – HOTI, A. (eds.) et al.: *European perspectives of the Western Balkans countries I*. Prishtina: AAB College. pp. 23-63. ISBN 978-9951-494-53-3.
- KOSÍR, I. – ROSENBERG, M. 2007. *Zahraničnoobchodná politika Európskej únie*. [Vedecká recenzovaná monografia č. 8 vypracovaná v rámci grantového projektu VEGA č. 1/2640/05 (evid. č. 141) 2005-2007 Vedeckej grantovej agentúry MŠ SR a SAV]. Bratislava: Ekonóm. ISBN 978-80-225-2462-9.
- LAPYCHAK, Ch. 1991. Historic vote for independence. In *Ukraine, Russia sign interim bilateral pact*. Kyiv: Kiev Press Bureau 1 September 1991 as well as In Jersey City, New Jersey, USA: *The Ukrainian Weekly*, 1 September 1991.

- List of countries by GDP (nominal) per capita. [online] 2016. Wikipedia, 24 February 2016. [Accessed on 29.2.2016.] Available at <[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_countries\\_by\\_GDP\\_%28nominal%29\\_per\\_capita](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_%28nominal%29_per_capita)>.
- LOO, G. Van der 2016. *The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area. A New Legal Instrument of EU Integration Without Membership*. Leiden/Boston: Brill Nijhoff. ISBN 978-90-04-29864-4.
- MAGOCSI, P. R. 2010. *A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. ISBN 1442610212.
- PAJTINKA, E. 2015. *Slovník diplomacie*. Bratislava: Pamiko. ISBN 9788085660104.
- PAJTINKA, E. – ROSPUTINSKÝ P., 2014. *Diplomacia v ére globalizácie II. Aktuálne otázky teórie a praxe diplomacie*. Bratislava: Pamiko. ISBN 9788085660098.
- PIFER, S. 2014. *Poroshenko Signs EU-Ukraine Association Agreement*. [online] [Accessed on 28.6.2014.] Available at <<http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2014/06/27-poroshenko-signs-eu-ukraine-association-agreement-pifer>>.
- PLOKHY, S. 2014. *The Last Empire: The final days of the Soviet Union*. London: Oneworld. ISBN 9781780746463.
- Proekt Zakonu pro zupynennya diyi Uhody pro stvorennya Spivdruzhnosti Nezaleznykh Derzhav*. [online] Kyiv, Ukraine: Verkhovna Rada. [Accessed on 21.12.2015.] Available at <[http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4\\_1?pf3511=52644](http://w1.c1.rada.gov.ua/pls/zweb2/webproc4_1?pf3511=52644)>.
- RADZIŁOWSKI, J. 2007. *Ukrainian Americans: New immigrants*. New York City: Infobase Publishing. ISBN 978-0-7910-8789-3.
- ROTH, E. R. 2015. The impact of Europeanisation, Americanisation, and Gazpromization on the articulation of Romania's foreign policy dynamics in the wider Black sea area in the period 2005-2007. In *Politické vedy: časopis pre politológiu, najnovšie dejiny, medzinárodné vzťahy, bezpečnostné štúdiá/Political Sciences*. Banská Bystrica: Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 156-177. ISSN 1335-2741.
- ROŠTEKOVÁ, M. 2010. K otázke energetickej bezpečnosti v politikách EÚ v regióne Stredozemného mora. In: UŠIAK, J. – LASICOVÁ, J. (eds.): *Bezpečnostné fórum 2010*. [Zborník príspevkov z III. Medzinárodnej vedeckej konferencie v Banskej Bystrici 11. februára 2010.] Banská Bystrica: FPVMV UMB 2010. ISBN 978-80-8083-980-2.
- ROUET, G. 2008. Politique de voisinage et identité européenne: Quel projet et quel avenir? In ROUET, G. – TEREM, P. (eds.), 2008. *Élargissement et politique européenne de voisinage/Enlargement and European neighbourhood policy*. Bruxelles/Brussels: Bruylant 2008, pp. 27-50. ISBN 978-2-8027-2666-1.

- Rozšíri sa EÚ? Gruzínsko, Moldavsko a Ukrajina podpísali asociačné zmluvy. Rusku sa to nepáči a hrozí odvetou. [online] [Accessed on 28.6.2014.] Brusel: TASR, 27. júna 2014. Available at <[http://www.tvnoviny.sk/zahranicne/1762271\\_rozsiiri-sa-eu-gruzinsko-moldavsko-a-ukrajina-podpisali-asociacne-zmluvy](http://www.tvnoviny.sk/zahranicne/1762271_rozsiiri-sa-eu-gruzinsko-moldavsko-a-ukrajina-podpisali-asociacne-zmluvy)>.
- Russia questions further existence of the CIS post-soviet organization. [online] 19 March 2007 [Accessed on 23.1.2016] Available at <<http://www.infoniac.com/news/russia-nato.html>>.
- RUŽIČKA, F. – KARVAŠOVÁ, L. 2012. *Európska diplomacia. Pôvod, premena a príležitosti*. Bratislava: Epos. ISBN 9788080579630.
- Scottish independence: Jean-Claude Juncker 'not referring to Scotland'. [online] London: bbc.com, 15 July 2014. <<http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-28311938>>.
- SCHWAB, K. (chief ed.) – SALA-I-MARTÍN, X. 2015. *The Global Competitiveness Report 2015–2016*. Geneva: WEF. ISBN 978-92-95044-99-9.
- SHEHATA, S. – KOSÍR I. 2014. Ukraine Crisis – Roots of Crisis and Prospects of Peaceful Solution. In PETRÁŠOVÁ, V. – GREŇOVÁ, K. (eds.) 2014. *Medzinárodný vedecký zborník. Báčsky Petrovec, Serbia: SRZ*, pp. 229-254. ISBN 978-86-916257-8-8.
- SMERIGA, P. – HOLKOVÁ, A. 2010. Nastúpi západobalkánska Bosna a Hercegovina na trajektóriu európskej perspektívy? In *Interpolis 2010*. [Zborník príspevkov zo VII. vedeckej konferencie doktorandov a mladých vedeckých pracovníkov s medzinárodnou účasťou. Banská Bystrica 25. novembra 2010.] Banská Bystrica: FPVMV UMB. ISBN 978-80-557-0155-4.
- ŠÍBL, D. – ČIDEROVÁ, D. 2002. *Slovenská republika a Európska únia. Potrebujú sa navzájom? Očakávania – výhody – nevýhody*. Bratislava: CEŠ-Eurounion. ISBN 80-88984-11-4.
- TEREM, P. 2008. Globalization – Integration – Neighbourhood. In ROUET, G. – TEREM, P. (eds.), 2008: *Élargissement et politique européenne de voisinage/Enlargement and European neighbourhood policy*. Bruxelles/Brussels: Bruylant, pp. 455-468. ISBN 978-2-8027-2666-1.
- TEREM, P. – RÝSOVÁ, L. – KOSÍR, I. 2008. *Integration processes*. Banská Bystrica: FPVMV UMB. ISBN 978-80-8083-632-0.
- The EU - Ukraine DCFTA comes into force on 1 January 2016*. [online] [Accessed on 4.1.2016.] Brussels: European Council, 27 December 2015. Available at <<http://tvnewsroom.consilium.europa.eu/event/the-eu-ukraine-dcfta-comes-into-force-on-1-january-2016>>.

- The language question, the results of recent research in 2012*. [online] [Accessed on 12.11.2015.] Kyiv: Ratinggroup.ua, 25 May 2012. Available at <[http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/yazykovoy\\_vopros\\_rezultaty\\_poslednih\\_issledovaniy\\_2012.html](http://ratinggroup.ua/en/research/ukraine/yazykovoy_vopros_rezultaty_poslednih_issledovaniy_2012.html)>.
- THOMPSON, M. 2014. "Soros: Ukraine needs EU Marshall Plan". [online] Atlanta, Georgia, USA: CNN Money, 12 March 2014. Available at <<http://money.cnn.com/2014/03/12/news/economy/ukraine-europe-soros/>>.
- TINBERGEN, J. 1953. *International Economic Integration*. [online] Amsterdam: Elsevier.
- Ukrainians dream of EU future*. 2008. [online] [Accessed on 12.11.2015.] London: BBC News, 28 January 2008. Available at <<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7212672.stm>>.
- Ukraine favors Europe over Russia, new CNN poll finds*. 2015. [Accessed on 12.11.2015.] Atlanta, Georgia, USA: CNN, 13 May 2014. Available at <<http://edition.cnn.com/2014/05/12/world/europe/ukraine-cnn-poll/>>.
- Ukraine to selectively work as part of CIS*. 2015. [online] Minsk: BelTA, 21 September 2015. [Accessed on 11.12.2015] Available at <<http://m.eng.belta.by/politics/view/ukraine-to-selectively-work-as-part-of-cis-25-2015>>.
- VINER, J. 1950. *The Customs Union Issue*. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- VINHAS de SOUZA, L. – HAVRYLYSHYN, O. 2006. *Return to Growth in CIS Countries: Monetary Policy and Macroeconomic Framework*. Berlin-Heidelberg: Springer. ISBN 978-3-540-34263-2.
- WESSEL, R. A. – LAZOWSKI, A. 2016. Dutch farce on Ukraine: Is there a way out? [online] Brussels: EUobserver, 7 April 2016. [Accessed on 8.4.2016.] Available at <<https://euobserver.com/opinion/132984>>.
- ZORKÓCIOVÁ, O. et al. 2007. *Corporate identity II : (vplyv interkultúrnych rozdielov na medzinárodné dimenzie corporate identity)*. 2<sup>nd</sup> ed.. Bratislava: Ekonóm. ISBN 978-80-225-2336-3.
- ZORKÓCIOVÁ, O. – ĎURANOVÁ, L. 2014. Migrácia vysokoškolsky kvalifikovanej pracovnej sily z tretích krajín na trhy EÚ, s akcentom na pracovný trh SR. In *Zmeny v spotrebiteľských trendoch a ich odraz v modifikáciách marketingových programov: vybrané vedecké state riešiteľov projektu VEGA č. 1/1185/12*. Bratislava: Ekonóm, p. 142 - 154. ISBN 978-80-225-4001-8.