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RELATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND NATO AFTER THE DISSOLUTION OF THE SOVIET UNION

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RESUME
The aim of this contribution is to introduce relations between Russia and NATO after the collapse of the Soviet Union. With the creation of an independent Russian state and the demise of the Warsaw Pact as a military-political organisation of the communist states it became necessary to define relations between NATO and Russia on a new, qualitatively higher level, so as it would reflect changes in the political and security map of the world that took place after 1991. The need for a new arrangement of mutual relations resulted also from the fact that Russia as the USSR successor state remained not only global, but particularly also regional security actor, which could not be possibly (or desirably) excluded from the processes in Euro-Atlantic security space. During the 1990s of the 20th Century relations between Russia and NATO were very significantly affected by issues related to NATO’s enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe, to which Russia has voiced a strong disapproval. After 9/11, in the context of the global war against terrorism, a new perspective and dimension of mutual political and military relations has been opened. Its intensity, however, fluctuated due to the influence of number of various events (such as the war in Iraq in 2003 or the Russian-Georgian conflict in August 2008).

Key words: security policy, Russian Federation, NATO, security framework, Euro-Atlantic space

Introduction
The disintegration of the Soviet Union in late 1991 marked a fundamental change in political and security map of the world. The disappearance of the bipolar structure of international relations, characterised by a strong sense of nationality belonging of individual states of the Euro-Atlantic area and the communist part of Europe, opened in particular quantitative and qualitative perspectives and new possibilities for shaping regional, and broader international (global) security framework. Throughout that period, the Russian Federation as the successor state to the former Soviet Union tried to enter actively the process of global institutional

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arrangements and in particular the Euro-Atlantic security space – attempts we continue to witness also nowadays.\(^1\) It should be noted that Russia’s approach has always been extensively limited by internal resources and capabilities, which was directly reflected in the practical foreign policy and security decisions. Within this broader context this contribution seeks to describe contemporary relations between Russia and NATO, focusing on specific key issues that constitute substantial part of the agenda of mutual (bilateral) relations. The content and purpose of this paper is to briefly outline the development of the official security and foreign policy of the Russian Federation toward NATO, formed after the collapse of the USSR in a complex, domestic, political, but in particular the international-political and security environment. Concomitantly, this paper also seeks to outline the perspectives on further development of relations and cooperation between the Russian Federation and NATO in political and military-security realm. Such cooperation, in terms of formation of a stable Euro-Atlantic security space, as well as in the broader sense of international (global) security, seems to be the only logical explanation of previous trends and direction of possible developments of mutual relations in the future.

1991 - 2000: NATO’s expansion and the search for a new framework of mutual relations

At the emergence of an independent Russian state, the security policy of the Russian Federation did not emerge out of the blue, but historically embedded experiences and realities that have long been present during the Soviet period became to varying degrees and intensity an integral part of it. Given the fact that the official Soviet ideology and security policy defined NATO as “an aggressive, imperialist organisation” whose aim was to attack the Soviet-led socialist block it was not easy to start creating a new level of mutual relations. By 1991, the relationship between the USSR and NATO was determined by the level of relations between the USSR and the United States and the development of interactions with NATO reflected the current political climate of the 20\(^{th}\) Century. NATO has been perceived as the second largest security threat after the United States. The Soviet Union regarded NATO as an illegitimate instrument of security policy of Western countries. (Baran, Iždinský, 2010, p. 35) Years-long indoctrination of the Russian population and Soviet society had created the image of NATO as an arch-enemy and a main security threat. It undoubtedly had an impact on public opinion in early years of the

\(^1\) For example, President D. Medvedev's initiative presented as a draft Treaty on European Security.
formation of a new framework of mutual relations. It should also be noted that the negative perception of NATO by the Russian citizens should not to be underestimated even after twenty years, for it resonates very strong and continues to have negative connotations even today. Moreover, the negative mood is amplified by the effects of specific foreign, political and military-security incidents (NATO’s military intervention against Yugoslavia, NATO’s eastward expansion), to which the Russian Federation took diametrically different position than NATO.

The first half of the 1990s has been for the vast majority of Russian political circles dominated by enthusiasm to continue the changes of political system brought about by the collapse of the communist regime. At the same time, due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the USSR, a strong belief was created that NATO could lose its justification in the system of Euro-Atlantic security as a relic of the Cold War. This general belief shared by Russian political, professional and also general public was reinforced by the fact that after the collapse of the Soviet Union the independent Russia has chosen the democratic path, not only in political, but also economic realm, with consequent implications for its behaviour in international politics and international relations. After 1992, the Russian foreign policy was dominated by a group called “Atlanticists”. It was a relatively small but influential group of senior government officials and academics who supported the pro-Western orientation of the international strategy of Russia. This group was spearheaded by then Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation A. Kozyrev (1991-1996), who argued that “Russia belongs to the club of large states, and our Eurasian position does not weaken this.” (Kozyrev, 1993, p. 5)² The “Atlanticists” held the opinion that, historically, Russia is part of Europe and belongs to the Western (European) civilisation. The “Atlanticists” believed that the main task of Russian foreign policy and international strategy should be building partnerships with the West and connect to the Western economic, political and military institutions (EU, IMF, WB, OECD, G7, and even NATO). (Sergunin, 2000, p. 28-29) The above-mentioned priorities in foreign and security policy were also included in the official policy document produced by the Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs in December 1992, entitled “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation”. This document also states that “it’s a problem to find a new political identity. Along with the prevailing tendency toward the West, it tries to obtain security guarantees

² The supporters of Atlanticism were then Prime Minister J. Gaidar, the first Deputy Prime Minister G. Burbulis, Minister for Communications M. Poltoranin and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V. Curkin, G. Kunadze a F. Selov-Kovedajev.
and join as a full or associated party the Western European integration structures. It will be necessary to restore relations with Russia, the interruption of which, particularly in the economic field, would increase the difficulties arising from the crisis, on a new basis, setting the market mechanisms and economic modernisation". (Koncepcia vnešnej..., 1992, p. 3) The impact of Atlanticism was magnified by some Western countries (especially by the United States), which wanted to establish a stable, democratic and political system in Russia with expected positive effect on the entire post-Soviet territory, which at that time was torn by various local military and ethnic-nationalist conflicts. However, Russia's so-called “Flirtation” with the West was relatively quickly replaced by a realistic power politics. The reason for the change in Russia's foreign policy orientation was particularly profound disillusionment of the Russian political establishment, but also the reinforced view of a large part of the public that the Western states’ approach to Russia inadvertently (or purposely?) overlooked some specific features of Russian history and mentality. In addition, it has relatively quickly showed that the West is not really inclined to accede to Russia's requirements of extensive economic aid and its efforts to participate in Western economic, politico-military and security institutions. Moreover, Western countries often ignored Moscow’s position on a number of important security issues, (Sergunin, 2000, p. 29) mainly regarding the territory of the former USSR, or expressed outright and explicit refusal to acknowledge and recognise Russia’s geopolitical identity in post-Soviet area. During 1993, there were numerous statements by President B. Yeltsin and the Foreign Minister A. Kozyrev, conveying the core message of Russia’s determination to assume special responsibility for ensuring stability and security in the area of the former USSR. Therefore, the UN and CSCE (OSCE since 1994) should give Russia a corresponding mandate. This idea soon received a “sticker” (jarlyk) and was labelled a Russian “Monroe Doctrine”. Following the events during the period spanning from October to December 1993 and early 1994, this position has become the official policy of Moscow. (Arbatov, 1994, p. 8) Russia’s new military doctrine (adopted during the political crisis in autumn 1993), together with the Concept of Foreign Policy from December 1992, became commonly referred to as Kozyrev’s doctrine. Its most important part consisted of an indirect statement that from Russian geopolitical perspective the post-Soviet area represents Russia’s highest priority and it constitutes an exclusive area of Russian national security interests. In the event that Russia would be considered at risk, it has the right to take any steps to ensure its defence. It was natural and understandable that the key international and regional institutions, including NATO, could not accept the
principles formulated by the following argument, and thus de facto accepted a new division of European continent in terms of spheres of influence and interests.

Although the Atlanticists came up with so called “new political thinking” and their foreign policy was dominated by pro-Western inclination, in its essence the group categorically opposed the NATO’s further expansion, which provoked an intense debate after the constitutional and political crisis during September and October 1993. Political crisis in autumn 1993 precipitated not only the shift towards constitutional political system based on strong presidential powers (so called super-presidential system), but also brought to the fore U.S. and Western European concerns about further development of democracy in Russia. During this period the debate on the enlargement of NATO entered new stage, leading to the approval of the Partnership for Peace Program (in January 1994 at the NATO Brussels Summit). The Partnership for Peace should allow for creating a basic framework for the anticipated military-political and security dialogue between the North Atlantic Alliance and the Central and Eastern European countries bidding for membership. NATO-conducted analysis about the enlargement from September 1995 definitely agreed with Moscow that NATO’s enlargement toward Central and Eastern Europe is becoming a geopolitical reality. It was considered that the question is no longer whether the enlargement of NATO will occur, but when it will occur.³

In early 1996 J. Primakov, realistic and pragmatic figure (of the so-called “Realists” group) has become the Minister of Foreign Affairs. J. Primakov’s foreign policy and its objectives were clearly defined, contrary to his predecessor A. Kozyrev’s foreign policy that put emphasis on building strategic partnership with the United States by the creation of a multipolar system of international relations arrangements (as opposed to unipolar system where the United States holds a dominant position). The means through which to implement the layout of multipolar international political system has become active multi-vector diplomacy with focus on key countries in the international, political, security and economic system, but particularly the new regional powers (China, India). The essential component of J. Primakov’s foreign policy has been also emphasis on a decisive defence of national interests of the Russian Federation, not only in post-Soviet area, but also in regions where the Soviet Union has been actively engaged (the Middle East and Southeast Asian countries). Strategic goals defined in such way required that Russia, in the

³ The points in question were, in particular, the revision of provisions and obligations under START I and START II Treaty; suspension of the removal of tactical missiles from Belarus and their redeployment, and unilateral revision of the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE).
process of forming a multipolar system, would become an active player in international political and security affairs. The principles and opinions implemented after 1996 found practical reflection in the Concept of National Security from 17 December 1997 (also known as the “Primakov’s Doctrine”). With some variation, the Doctrine is valid to this day.

In relation to NATO, J. Primakov had to negotiate terms of NATO’s enlargement acceptable for Russia. Right from the beginning the Russian Federation was fully aware of her external as well as internal weaknesses, respectively she soon realised that it is not in her power to prevent NATO’s enlargement. For this reason, the Russian foreign and security policy focused on negotiation of certain key provisions which were confirmed in the Founding Act between the Russian Federation and NATO. One of the key priorities was to review the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), taking into account the new security situation in Europe and also address the future NATO enlargement. In the process of negotiation, Russia has consistently insisted on reviewing the levels of conventional forces resulting from the CFE; otherwise she threatened to revise its obligations under this contract if they do not take into account the requirements for amending the limits of conventional forces in her favour. This Russian demand has been met in June 1995, when the reviewed CFE reflected the changes since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and set not only the group limits but also new national limits. It should be added that the above-mentioned analysis of NATO’s Enlargement from 1995 indicated the possibility of NATO agreeing with this requirement. In April 1997, Russia again requested an extensive revision of the CFE, where it gave a conditional consent to the enlargement of NATO (in the first wave) (Duleba, 1999, p. 55). This common commitment to proceed to a thorough revision of the CFE raised the greatest satisfaction on the Russian side. This commitment also found its reflection in the Constitutive Act, which states: “NATO Member Countries and Russia have stressed that States Parties to the CFE must maintain only such military capabilities, individually or in conjunction with others, that adequately match their security requirements, taking into account their international obligations, including the CFE Treaty.” NATO signed to this commitment in Madrid’s Declaration on 8 July 1997. In accordance with the Russia – NATO agreement, the revised CFE has been signed into force at the Istanbul Summit in November 1999. (Duleba, 2009, p. 14) It should be noted that the Russian team managed to negotiate that NATO will not install nuclear weapons in the new Member States. Russia has not achieved the right to veto NATO’s decisions or the right to participate in the NATO decision-making
process. On the other hand, Russia was able to consult some of the issues of mutual interest defined in the Constitutive Act, a common platform for a permanent council.

NATO’s enlargement to include former Communist countries represented a key turning point in Russia – NATO relations, formally completed by signing the Founding Act between the two parties. Russia understood this move as its “defeat” and a foreign policy failure due to the fact that from the beginning she categorically opposed to any expansion of NATO, but in fact failed to prevent it from occurring. This failure was highlighted by the fact that Russia has also failed to enforce the idea of strengthening the OSCE as an essential political and security-military institution in the Euro-Atlantic area. If successful, it would not only be the alternative to NATO (and its expansion), but would include also Russia, all the states of the European continent, the United States and Canada. It should also be noted that foreign-policy failure caused severe frustration within Russian society, which, combined with the political situation and strong support of nationalist and communist forces in the public, rightly created more concern. Russian analysts in connection with the expansion of NATO warned of geopolitical encirclement of Russia, the creation of NATO’s North-South arc, stretching from Norway and the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea. Confronted with these developments Moscow often pointed to the possibility of irreversible changes in Russian security thinking, which could result in a bad reaction and isolationism. A. Dugin, an influential Russian geopolitician presented quite a radical view in his book “Osnovy geopolitiki. Geopolitičeskoe buduščee Rossii”(1997), stressing that in connection with military reform and build-up of the Russian Federation Armed Forces of continental importance, “the Armed Forces must be oriented in such a way that the ‘potential enemy’ of the Russian Federation appears to be the Atlantic block. This automatically brings about the continental orientation of the military doctrine, unconditional strategic priority of all types of weapons and focus on a global conflict on a world-wide scale.” (Dugin, 1997, p. 299) Unfortunately, we have to say that this kind of assessment, giving emphasis on the old concept of thinking in the field of security (large armed forces, emphasis on nuclear factor, marginalisation of non-military security threats and risks) was still strongly present in Russia during the 1990s. Partially (and correctly) it stemmed from the fact that NATO as a military-political institution in the first half of the 1990s did not undergo a structural reform and transformation, thus creating sufficient number of concerns and, in principle, a distrust of Russia.

At the end of the last decade of the 20th Century relations between Russia and NATO were strongly marked by the “Kosovo crisis”. On 24 March 1999, NATO launched a military operation against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), aimed
at stopping the ethnic cleansing of Albanian minority population carried out by Serbian military (half-military) forces in the Yugoslav province of Kosovo. In addition, during the Washington Summit in April 1999 (accompanied by formal accession of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary to the Alliance) NATO has approved the new Strategic Concept, which enabled the Alliance to carry out military operations outside the NATO member states and in situations not falling under the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. The main goal of such expansion was to deal with international crises threatening the security of the member countries. The military intervention against the FRY without the mandate of the UN Security Council and irrespectively of the position and attitude of Russia (traditionally supporting the policy of Serbia in the Balkans) meant a significant cooling of relations (Russia broke relations with NATO and recalled its representative from the Joint Permanent Council). Russia has taken many lessons from this military operation, political but military as well. During the year 2000 (after V. Putin took the office) Russia has responded to these events by revision of its doctrinal and conceptual documents in the Foreign and Security Policy (updated Concept of National Security, Concept of Foreign Policy and Military Doctrine revision).

NATO in the Russian security and doctrinal documents

The Russian Federation adopted several doctrinal documents in the realm of foreign and security policy after 1992, which in varying degrees and in different ways reflected the existence of NATO. In the following section we will mention basic doctrinal documents, as well as specific key provisions, which largely characterise the current Russian perception of NATO. The above-mentioned foreign policy of the Russian Federation from 1992 and related military doctrine from 1993 were rather vague towards NATO. The Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept from 1992 considered the national security interests of the country as a basic priority. The security policy stated that Russia does not consider any state to be either hostile or friendly. But its efforts were to establish good and mutually beneficial relations, to achieve settlement of disputes and conflicts by political means. The Concept states that the optimal way to achieve set goals, i.e. shaping the area of security and fostering good neighbourhood relations, is to stabilise the situation in the Russian geopolitical area to create the zones of constructive regional cooperation. (Koncepcia..., 1992, p. 24) While in the Russian Federation Military Doctrine from 1993 military blocs and alliances approaching to the Russian border were considered a
military threat, in the Russian Federation Military Doctrine from April 2000 such a threat (approach, respectively expansion) was considered to be only one of the major military threats, acknowledging that such an expansion would clearly be to the detriment of Russia’s military security.

The Concept of National Security (CNS) from 17th December 1997 drafted under the leadership of J. Primakov represented a significant shift of opinion on foreign and security policy which should be implemented primarily in a multipolar system of international relations. In relation to the Alliance, the CNS from 1997 specifically mentions its expansion to the East, which together with its transformation into a dominant military-political force in Europe will create a new threat of the division of the Continent. (Koncepcia..., 2002, p. 60) Changes that have occurred in the revised CNS from 10 January 2000 are the immediate reflection of the international-political situation of the period 1997-1999, particularly events related to NATO’s unilateral military intervention in the FRY, considered by the Russian Federation to be a violation of International Law. Therefore, it is no wonder that in the “amended” CNS from 2000 we may find the statement that increasing threats in the military sphere require necessary and adequate response. These threats originated mainly from military operations carried out outside the area of responsibility of the Alliance (according to the 1999 NATO Strategic Concept) and without the mandate of the UN Security Council, which according to Russia destabilised the strategic situation in the world. (Koncepcia..., 2000, p. 6) The Russian Federation Military Doctrine from April 2000 and the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept from June 2000 responded in a similar way to this international, political and security incident, putting special emphasis on the formation of a multipolar system of international relations. The OSCE and the UN formed the basic political and security institutions in creating a European and global security.

The Russian security planning responded to the adoption of the U.S. National Security Strategy in 2002 and the events in Iraq in spring 2003 by adopting the document “Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation”. This document was presented to the representative Assembly of the Russian Political and Military Leadership of the Ministry of Defence on 2 October 2003, which included the president’s personal involvement. The document confirmed stronger rejection of the assessment by NATO compared to the valid CNS from the year 2000. (Balabán, 2004, p. 25) Noteworthy in this document is a passage which states that “if NATO remains an alliance with an offensive military doctrine, this will require a fundamental
reconstruction of the Russian military planning and principles of construction of the Russian Armed Forces, including changes in Russian nuclear strategy.” (Aktualnie zadači..., 2003, p. 40)

Among the recent doctrinal documents we may mention: the Russian Federation Foreign Policy Concept from June 2008, the Russian Federation National Security Strategy from May 2009 and the Russian Federation Military Doctrine from February 2010. All these documents are critical about the role of NATO in the international and regional security systems. The Russian Federation National Security Strategy highlights the inadequacy of existing global and regional architecture that is in the Euro-Atlantic region specifically oriented solely on NATO (the proposal to overcome the so-called “NATO-centrism” has been presented by the Russian President D. Medvedev during the years 2008-2009 in his concept of the new European security architecture). The Russian Federation Military Doctrine openly criticises NATO for its attempts to grant itself power potential and global functions, which is realised through violations of International Law. The Doctrine also criticises the approach of military infrastructure of NATO Member States to the borders of the Russian Federation, including the possible further expansion. In addition, both documents hold a negative position on the issue of building missile defence systems in the Euro-Atlantic area.

Russia and NATO after 2001

After the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Russian Federation was one of the first states that have offered its assistance to the President G.W. Bush, and it also officially declared its readiness to support the fight against terrorism. This helpful and instrumental step has met with a positive response in the United States. This brought about a new start in the relations between Russia and NATO. Russia offered the United States a specific support in the fight against terrorism (in the military operation in Afghanistan). This support consisted especially in providing communication intelligence, in approving the use of its airspace, and, last but not least, “agreed” with the use of land and military infrastructure in some Central Asian states. The turning point in relations between Russia and the U.S. has been marked by the visit of the President V. Putin in the United States in November 2001. This visit brought about not only appreciation by the United States for Russia’s help at critical times for the U.S. national security, but especially more active involvement of
Russia in the European and international security system. Subsequently, in December 2001, NATO’s Ministerial Meeting proposed the creation of a new permanent body (NATO-Russia Council) to replace the then operation Joint Council, and also identified areas for joint decision making (fight against terrorism, crisis management, control of weapons of mass destruction, arms control, building mutual trust, missile defence, rescue operations at sea, military cooperation, exceptional civilian situations and new threats and challenges). This institutional process formally concluded during NATO Rome Summit in May 2002. One of the points that the United States and Russia disagreed on was building of a national missile defence (NMD), respectively the ABM Treaty. The United States justified the withdrawal from this Treaty by attacks on 9/11 and by the need to build NMD to guard against the so-called “rogue states” supporting terrorism. But not even this fact did prevent the signing of further disarming agreement between the Russian Federation and the United States in May 2002, also known as SORT.

In early 2003, the period of “high standard” of the Russian-American relations ended as a result of U.S. military action in Iraq without the UN mandate, and in the opinion of Russia (and other states) in violation of International Law. In this regard, Russia has used its skilful diplomacy and together with France and Germany, who have become the strongest critics of the U.S. unilateral approach (and the so-called preemptive war) in Europe, tried to take advantage of the different opinions expressed by the NATO Member States on this issue. This situation has not been eased with the further expansion of NATO to Central and Eastern Europe, including, among others, also the Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia). It is no surprise that the accession of the Baltic States to the Alliance in March 2004 met with sharp disapproval by Russia, even though it was a formal act (the decision to admit seven new Member States had been already made in 2002 at the Prague Summit in November).\(^4\) Disagreement also led to the decision of Estonia, Latvia

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\(^4\) On March 6, 2004, the Russian Defence Minister S. Ivanov said that he calls upon NATO to be reluctant to build the cornerstones of the Baltic republics which should become members of NATO. Even before the official entry of the Baltic States into NATO, the spokesman of Ministry of Foreign Affairs A. Jakovenko said that Russia intends to “respond” to NATO’s military aircraft patrol around its borders after the accessions of three Baltic republics to the NATO. For example, Moscow has threatened to review Russia’s participation in international treaties on conventional weapons and strengthen Russia’s nuclear potential if NATO disregards Moscow’s concerns regarding NATO Eastward expansion. The Duma adopted a resolution condemning the NATO enlargement and recommended to the President to consider the necessary steps in this regard. These reactions must
and Lithuania to ask NATO to provide air protection of their airspace because they did not have such capacity before they entered the Alliance. Denmark immediately promised to provide her air squadron as assistance to the Baltic republics, and this decision was announced on 18 March by NATO’s Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during his visit to the Baltic States. V. Putin, to all matters related to NATO’s enlargement, kept discretion and even said that NATO is not a threat. On 4 April 2004, the Russian Federation Foreign Ministry spokesman said that it was necessary to cooperate with NATO on the issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction. The real importance should be attached to the response by Russia’s Foreign Ministry, which said that it is concerned that the Baltic States are not members of the CFE. In this context, it was stated that Russia will require new members of NATO to undertake commitments regarding compliance with the CFE. This requirement indirectly resulted from the reviewed text of the CFE containing guidelines that the national limit for the respective country would be derived from its membership in a military bloc, which means that any potential accession by another country to NATO would also mean re-assessment of its national limit on conventional forces.

The opposition to the U.S. military action in Iraq in 2003 and further expansion of NATO towards former communist states (including post-Soviet states) was at the beginning of a gradual deterioration of the U.S. – Russia relations, culminating in August 2008 with a war in two secessionist regions of Georgia (South Ossetia and Abkhazia). The deterioration in U.S. – Russia relations was reflected also in the development of NATO – Russia relations. Russia responded particularly sensitively to the so-called “Colour revolutions” (at the end of 2003 in Georgia and one year later in Ukraine), which took place in the most important geopolitical region in terms of Russian national interests (the so-called “near abroad”). Russia accused the United States and some European countries of supporting anti-Russian political forces in those republics. On the other hand, increased Russian military spending enabled by constantly rising oil and gas prices on world markets, provoked concerns in NATO and also European countries. Another anticipated controversy was related to the U.S. plans to build NMD and locate its components in Europe (radar base in Czech Republic and an installation of missiles in Poland).
Throughout the debate Russia countered these threats by strengthening the Baltic fleet and deployment of tactical nuclear missiles in the Kaliningrad enclave. The return to the period of the “Cold War” was characterised by the statements of V. Putin at the Munich Security Conference in February 2007, but also by restoring patrols and training flights of the Russian strategic bombers. In summer of 2007 Russia declared a moratorium on the application of the CFE. Russia has also stiffened on the field of energy diplomacy, where it clearly and unambiguously indicated its foreign policy interests – in the gas crisis with Ukraine (in early 2006, and later in January 2009) and in the case of customs duty on crude oil to Belarus (January 2007 and in early 2010). The relations between Russia and NATO reached a freezing point in August 2008 during Russia’s military intervention in Georgia’s secessionist regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The rising tensions in Caucasus have become noticeable after the election of the President M. Saakashvili, who openly supported Georgia’s accession to NATO. He openly stated that his foreign policy orientation would be towards the United States. The key development of events in Georgia have become especially: NATO decision to offer Georgia (and also Ukraine) the Action Plan Membership at NATO Bucharest Summit (April 2008), and also the Russian perception of the international legal status settlement on Kosovo. Although, as a result of Russian military intervention in Georgia, NATO froze all contacts with Russia, both sides were aware that in addition to topics on which they have a different views and opinions, there are many areas which unite them and where both parties benefit now, but in particular, could cooperate in the future. For this reason, and also because of the awareness of sharing a common responsibility for the security not only in Euro-Atlantic area, there was a rapid resumption of relations (in June 2009 during the NATO – Russia meeting on the Greek island of Corfu).

Conclusion

At the recent NATO Lisbon Summit (November 2010) in addition to the adoption of a new Strategic Concept also a significant breakthrough in relations between Russia and the Alliance was expected. Despite some analysts’ optimism, expectations in the realm of NATO – Russia relations did not materialise. One of the real results and achievements of the Lisbon Summit, however, was the agreement that Russia would cooperate with NATO on a new missile system protecting the territory of all NATO member states. It should be
noted that the agreement is political and all other details (including technical) will need to be negotiated by the expert teams. Russia fully recognises and understands that in terms of ongoing security processes in the Euro-Atlantic space it cannot afford to remain “standing” outside of this process, specifically because it remains a region of crucial importance. In this respect, A. Duleba states that “Russia must avoid international isolation. This isolation can be avoided only in a way that it will come as close as possible to the parallel security structures of the West.” (Duleba, 2009, p. 10) In terms of mid-term, respectively long-term future the reshaping of contemporary forms of mutual relations into a strong “strategic alliance” or the prospective Russia accession to NATO cannot be ruled out.

According to A. Arbatov, the likelihood of a war with NATO will disappear in the future. But he warns that if NATO acts as a military-political bloc, has strong collective forces, extends to the East and does not invite Russia to join, the pragmatic military view of things simply does not allow images that NATO does not exist or blindly rely only on declarative assurances of friendliness. (Arbatov, 2003, p. 9) These words reveal one of the biggest current problems, i.e. the problem of a mutual trust which still marks the relations between Russia and NATO. To overcome mistrust will require a long time, the decisive factor will be whether both sides will be willing to reach a jointly defined objective in the field of security, and it will also address any real or potential security issues and problems. A former NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer during his visit to Moscow on April 8 2004 summed up properly that “NATO needs Russia and Russia needs NATO.”

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