

NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT – IN SEARCH FOR NATO STRATEGIC CULTURE

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RESUME

The article aims at presenting the evolution of the NATO strategic concept. Changes in the global security environment as well as in the global order, force introduction of certain changes. During last few years, NATO was enlarged by the accession of new countries which had been in the zone of the former Soviet Union's influence. The territory covered by collective defence according to art. 5 of the Washington Treaty¹ were broadened. Moreover, in 1999, NATO, in trying to adapt to the new political situation, agreed upon a strategy oriented at wide cooperation with other countries with respect to security and peace in the world, however nowadays, it is not facing the challenges of the XXI century. NATO has to adapt to the new political situation, radically changing spectrum of threats and growing globalization. The current debate on a new strategic concept of the Alliance evokes many discussions, as there is a great number of contradictions between the member states according to the document's shape.

Key words: NATO, alliance, challenges, threats to international security, crisis response operations, strategic concept, evolution of the NATO strategic concept, new tasks for the NATO, future of the organization

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¹ "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security." – *The Washington Treaty*, Washington, 4 April 1949, art. 5.

The North Atlantic Alliance is now facing new challenges which are different from the ones from the past. One of the most important factors is the fact that NATO has had to come across asymmetric threats in political and military dimension which are generated mainly by terrorism and regional conflicts of various types. It is also worth noticing that the number of new non-military threats is growing. During last few years, NATO was enlarged by the accession of new countries which had been in the zone of the former Soviet Union influence. The territory covered by collective defence according to art. 5 of the Washington Treaty² was broadened. Moreover, in 1999, NATO, trying to adapt to a new political situation, agreed upon a strategy oriented towards wide cooperation with other countries with respect to security and peace in the world, however nowadays, it is not facing the challenges of the XXI century. In the new political situation, at a radically changing spectrum of threats and growing globalization, NATO is still the only organization of political-military character capable of reacting to threats on regional and global scale (Tomaszewski, 2005). Nevertheless, there arises a question if such a situation can last long without introducing significant changes to the organization's strategic document?

Dangers connected with the Cold War have given way to more promising, but also challenging prospects, to new opportunities and risks. *The Alliance has an indispensable role to play in consolidating and preserving the positive changes of the recent past, and in meeting current and future security challenges. It must safeguard common security interests in an environment of further, often unpredictable change. It must maintain collective defence and reinforce the transatlantic link and ensure a balance that allows the European Allies to assume greater responsibility. (...) This new Strategic Concept will guide the Alliance as it pursues this agenda. It expresses NATO's enduring purpose*

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and nature and its fundamental security tasks, identifies the central features of the new security environment, specifies the elements of the Alliance's broad approach to security, and provides guidelines for the further adaptation of its military forces (The Alliance's Strategic Concept, 1999, art. 4, 5).

NATO, from the very beginning, uses a supreme strategic document which presents threats it has to face as well as ways how to overcome them. The initial formulation of NATO strategy was known as *The Strategic Concept for Defense of the North Atlantic Area*, and was approved in 1950³. The NATO strategic concept serves as a broad political frame for the organization's actions and its frequent updates reflected the necessity of plans and tasks adaptation to changes of the security environment. Due to the combination of two ideas – deterrence and dialogue, NATO became an important element in reaching peaceful termination of East-West confrontation. Significant changes in NATO's strategic environment caused by the end of the Cold War were reflected in a NATO strategic concept in 1991. New challenges and threats could be divided into four main areas (Zięba, 2001):

- nationalisms and ethnic conflicts;
- military (including weapon trade and proliferation of weapon of mass destruction);
- organized transnational crime (especially international terrorism);
- ecological (air and water pollution, soil degradation, storage of waste, urbanization and infrastructure development, radioactive threat).

The above mentioned elements and insufficient operational capabilities of the United Nations in Europe as well as transformations in the Central Europe (i.e. the collapse of the Soviet Union, liquidation of the Warsaw Pack, Germany unification), contributed to the change of the international situation and NATO participation in the process of overcoming crises on international scale. Its consequence was undertaking actions aiming at determining NATO's possible input within the UN operations. According to the above, NATO underwent reform aiming at preparation to fulfil a new type of tasks.

The reform was initiated by the London Declaration of 6 July 1990, which included NATO's declaration on readiness to conduct non-Article 5 of the Washington Treaty operations, including peace operations and humanitarian

³ The document was updated in 1957, 1968, 1991 and 1999.

actions to the range of cooperation within the Partnership for Peace and helping the UN in realization of the peace operation mandate in the former Yugoslavia (London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance, 1990). The final point of the changes was approving of a strategic concept (during the Rome Summit in 1991), which traced new direction of NATO's activities, emphasizing five highly important areas:

- international dialogue;
- international cooperation;
- collective defence;
- crisis response;
- conflict prevention.

This was the period when consultations over the project and implementation of documents regulating NATO forces engagement in non-Article 5 operations started. Partnership for Peace Program, approved in 1997, allowed for non-NATO countries' participation in earlier declared NATO task areas. New concept of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) was also approved, which enabled practical realization of non-Article 5 operations on the condition that they will be led by such organizations as the UN or OSCE. Till 1998, conducting non-Article 5 operations had been dictated by humanitarian aid and supporting peace process in a given region as well as conflict spreading in neighbouring countries prevention.

A final result of NATO position concerning international security in the XXI century transformation was new NATO strategic concept announced in 1999 during the Washington Summit, which pointed out direction for future actions (The Alliance's Strategic..., 1999, art. 5). It reflected NATO's strategy towards new challenges at that time. It maintained Article 5 of the Washington Treaty guarantee, but it also claimed that efficient collective defence requires different means than the ones used during the Cold War and in the period straight after. The new strategic concept was designed before such tragic events as terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001. Even though, since that time, NATO formulated important documents, i.e. NATO's military concept for defence against terrorism, Partnership Action Plan against Terrorism, and NATO–Russia Action Plan on Terrorism, overall evaluation of threats as well as capabilities and strategies have to be continuously updated to enable NATO to counter them effectively.

The new strategic concept⁴ formulates the following task areas for the Alliance (The Alliance's Strategic..., 1999, art. 10):

- security: ensure solid fundamentals of Euro-Atlantic security stabilization based on democratic institutions development, will of peaceful conflict solutions in which no country will threaten another one by the danger of force or pressure employment;
- consultations: serve as a basic transatlantic forum of inter-allies consultations in any case which concerns its vital interests (according to art. 4 of the Washington Treaty), including events dangerous for security of its members as well as aiming at proper coordination of their actions in common interest matters;
- deterrence and defence: to deter and defend against all threats of aggression against any NATO member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington Treaty.

In order to strengthen security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic region, it was necessary for the Alliance to fulfill task within the following areas:

- response to crises: maintain readiness, depending on a situation and based on consensus, in accordance to Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, prevent conflicts and actively engage in crisis management;
- partnership: promote peaceful and friendly international relations and support democratic institutions (The Alliance's Strategic..., 1999, art. 11).

A new NATO Strategic Concept, as for the previous one from 1991, makes the assumption that in Europe, the possibility of traditional war outbreak on a big scale is minimal. In 1991, the Alliance declared and in 1999 confirmed its multidimensional approach towards security matters, including not only military aspects and factors, but also political and economic ones. In consequence, taking into consideration experience taken from the war in the former Yugoslavia and conflicts in the former Soviet Union's territory, the concept emphasizes new threats to security and stability. *The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks include uncertainty and instability in and around the Euro-Atlantic area and the possibility of regional*

⁴ The authors have in mind the one from 1999, as that is how it was commonly called.

crises at the periphery of the Alliance, which could evolve rapidly. (...) Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even regional instability (The Alliance's Strategic..., 1999, art. 20). An important element of this document is emphasizing the transatlantic integrity of the Alliance, maintaining the collective defence principle and treating the Euro-Atlantic area with its peripheries, as a whole. NATO's task is maintaining stability in this region aiming at ensuring security to its members, which means broadening the area of responsibility. In accordance to these assumptions, the Alliance should engage itself to solve all kinds of crises in the region, even if they do not concern its members directly.

The strategic concept from 1999 unified NATO military policy: *the Alliance's forces will have to deal with a complex and diverse range of actors, risks, situations and demands, including humanitarian emergencies. (...) Well-trained and well-equipped forces at adequate levels of readiness and in sufficient strength to meet the full range of contingencies as well as the appropriate support structures, planning tools and command and control capabilities are essential in providing efficient military contributions* (The Alliance's Strategic..., 1999, art. 49). It is crucial to cooperate with non-NATO countries, including Russia. *An important aim of the Alliance and its forces is to keep risks at a distance by dealing with potential crises at an early stage. In the event of crises which jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of Alliance members, the Alliance's military forces may be called upon to conduct crisis response operations. They may also be called upon to contribute to the preservation of international peace and security by conducting operations in support of other international organizations, complementing and reinforcing political actions within a broad approach to security* (The Alliance's Strategic..., 1999, art. 48). Military capabilities and the level of forces and means preparation have to enable NATO facing all current and future challenges.

New concept defines rules of conflict prevention and efficient ways of solving them. Decisions must be based on the analysis of a concrete situation, reaching common agreement by the member states and accordance of the approved solutions with the United Nations Charter and international law. NATO's actions do not necessarily have to be based on forces engagement, but *the Alliance's political authorities also have to choose and co-ordinate appropriate responses from a range of both political and military measures and*

to exercise close political control at all stages (The Alliance's Strategic..., 1999, art. 32). An example of such actions is crisis in Kosovo, where force employment was preceded by political efforts of pacific settlement of the conflict and stopping combat actions by Serbian and Alban troops in this province at the same.

Security of NATO members (broadly understood) as well as of the whole Euro-Atlantic area, is to be ensured not only by military confrontation, but also by cooperation within the UN as well as European and Euro-Atlantic organizations. NATO declares aiming at broadening cooperation with partner countries within the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace programme, which emphasizes significant importance of NATO-Russia relations for security and peace of the Euro-Atlantic region. An example of international cooperation in solving crises were NATO and Russian efforts during conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo.

The new NATO strategic concept, as well as documents which are based on it, reflects NATO paradigm and confirm its capability of adapting to a changing international situation. The evidence for this thesis is permanent introduction to NATO terminology the expression of *crisis response operations*, which concerns the whole spectrum of non-Article 5 allied operations. In order to maintain peace, prevent war and strengthen security and stability according to NATO's main tasks in the area of security, the Alliance will prevent conflicts in consultations with other organizations. If the crisis appears, NATO will also react to it efficiently basing on international law, including possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response operations, if the crises threaten the Alliance's members security or stability at its borders.

The Military Concept for NATO Peace Support Operations (MC-327/1), drafted by the NATO Military Committee, introduced unified terminology concerning NATO engagement in peace operations. Till that moment, NATO used the UN terminology or the term *non-Article 5 operations* were applied. The document launched a new expression, namely, *Peace Support Operations*, which refers to different kinds of multifunctional military and non-military NATO-led actions that are supported and accepted by international organizations such as the UN or OSCE, aiming at gaining agreement between the sides of the conflict. Peace support operations can be as follows (Bi-MNC Directive for Peace Support Operations and Allied Joint Publication-3.4.1. Peace Support Operations, 1998):

- conflict prevention;
- peacemaking;
- peacekeeping;
- peace enforcement;
- peacebuilding;
- humanitarian operations.

Conflict prevention operations are based on chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations and they include the whole spectrum of actions – from diplomatic to precautionary forces location aiming at preventing transformation of the dispute into combat conflict or its possible spreading. Conflict prevention may be based on determining facts, consultations, warnings, inspections, supervision, and observation (Tomaszewski, 2005). It serves to settle the dispute or prevent conflict spreading using peaceful methods. Military means are applied only when it is absolutely necessary to support diplomatic actions.

Peacemaking pushes the sides of the conflict to stop combat actions and, using diplomatic tools, to negotiate pacific settlement of the dispute. Such actions may include mediation and conciliation as well diplomatic pressure, e.g. isolation or sanctions. Peacemaking is realized through diplomatic tools at first, and military activity may have an advisory function and help in mediation between the sides of the conflict, aiming at its settlement or cease-fire.

Peacekeeping limits, mitigates or stop combat actions by a neutral intervention of the third party. Such operation is organized and conducted by international society with the use of armed forces and civilian component, aiming at completing the political process of conflict settlement as well as peace re-establishing and peacekeeping. It is most often conducted in accordance with chapter VI of the UN Charter.

Peace enforcement operations are based on chapter VII of the UN Charter⁵ and deal with using military means to re-establish peace in the region of discord or in a country of the conflict. Such type of operations may be conducted, when there appears international or internal conflict, especially in humanitarian dimension when national institutions failed and people or country's security is in real danger. Peace enforcement may be realized towards countries

⁵ It entitles the UN Security Council to conduct efficient collective actions to keep peace and all acts of aggression and constitutes the right to take combat interventions by the UN forces against aggression.

in which the sovereignty aggressor is defined as well as in case of its indetermination. Peace enforcement is an ultimate means during crisis response operations, so it has to be a result of a conscious political decision transformed into a clear and precise UN mandate for competent military forces.

Peacebuilding – political, economic and military activities after termination of the conflict, aiming at preserving peace conditions and avoiding reestablishing of the dispute. Peacebuilding intends to identify the reasons of the disagreement and crisis, and eliminate them to prevent or diminish the risk of its reestablishment.

Humanitarian operations are conducted in order to help civilians. They can be managed only by military component or in cooperation with specialized civilian organizations in a situation when authorities responsible for aid rendering are not able or willing to do it. Humanitarian operations aim at helping civilians in case of breaking human rights, disasters or epidemics. They include a whole spectrum of tasks for the military component, and there are two types of humanitarian operations: humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.

Taking the above into consideration, it is possible to draw a conclusion that the strategic concept directs the Alliance at fulfilling tasks aiming at conflicts prevention. NATO's role in countering international terrorism and weapon of mass destruction proliferation gradually rises. The concept of 1999 made an assumption that separate use of military, diplomatic, financial, and legal means does not meet the requirements of contemporary challenges. Nowadays, it is crucial to integrate civil and military operations and formulate new requirements for the national and international security structures, also for the Alliance. NATO forces constitute almost purely military potential and are based on national armed forces detached for common disposal by the member states. During the Cold War, NATO's mission was to deter and defend against aggression. Nowadays, NATO is still adapting to new conditions, which are shaped by threats other than war, and it makes it necessary to possess new instruments in order to cope with the challenges.

NATO strategic concept approved in 1999 reflected the Alliance's strategy in relation to new reality at that time. The strategy maintained the guarantee of the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, but it also emphasized that collective defence requires different approach than the one designed for the bipolar structure of the world. It included threats made by so called ruffian and fallen countries and other supranational dangers. It does not, however, include quick

development terrorist threats, which is why the concept is permanently updated, according to threat evaluation and to operation strategy modernization as well as NATO's capabilities.

Nowadays, NATO deals with three transformation programs approved at subsequent summits. The first one is so called the "Prague Agenda", approved in Prague in 2002. It was initiated by the NATO Secretary General at that time, Lord George Robertson, and concerns changes within capabilities, missions and structures. The second one is the "Norfolk Agenda" – an idea of the present NATO Secretary General, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, approved at the Allied Command Transformation session in April 2004. The agenda concerns mainly defence planning, generating forces and common financing. The third one – the "Munich Agenda", initiated by the former chancellor of Germany, Gerhard Schroeder in 2005, concentrates on strengthening NATO's role as a real forum of strategic consultations and a decisive body in terms of security between Europe and North America.

The Prague summit of 21 November 2002 concentrated mainly on enlarging NATO by seven new members as well as approving of reforms concerning this issue in the structure of the Headquarters and procedures, which was inevitable to ensure efficient functioning of the North Atlantic Council with 26 member states. Moreover, many key decisions were made, being an important step towards further transformations in organization, lasting since the end of the Cold War. NATO Response Force (NRF) was created, strategic commands were reorganized and modernization programs approved during the Prague Capabilities Commitments (PCC).

During the Prague Summit, NATO announced i.e. a new Defence Capability Initiative (DCI), updated by the PCC. This initiative is different from the previous one from 1999⁶ in three main areas. It is clearly formulated and based on commitments and national engagement. Greater pressure was put on international cooperation, which is connected with specialization prescribed to a given NATO member state as well as mutual support in terms of NATO and the EU efforts in establishing military capabilities. There were also discussions

⁶ The Defence Capability Initiative was approved mainly because of American pressures during the NATO Washington summit in 1999. Its aim is to preserve allied forces capabilities to conduct efficiently joint operations. It is concentrated on the following areas: interoperability, capability of forces transfer and their maintenance in the area of operations, efficient operations conducting and modern C2 systems.

about defence against attacks with the use of weapon of mass destruction, ensuring superiority in terms of C3 and information, raising the level of interoperability, and ensuring greater mobility and capability of independent functioning of the armed forces (Buckley, 2002).

An important change within NATO capabilities gained in Prague was agreement on the NRF establishment, which enables NATO to react quickly and efficiently to new threats. It is an additional impulse for the necessary organizational and structural transformations in armed forces of all allied countries. The decision on the NRF establishment constitutes one of the most important elements of NATO military capabilities transformation adapting to contemporary needs in the security area. The NRF establishing was accompanied by two equal goals: attempt to enlarge NATO operational capabilities for quick and joint response through creating high readiness task force, as well as fastening modernization and transformation processes in the allied countries' armies, especially in Europe.

According to agreements (worked out in June 2003), the NRF is permanently accessible, technologically advanced, mobile and multinational high readiness force⁷ which is independent⁸ and composed of land force, navy and air force units as well as special force, if necessary. The range of tasks conducted independently or within greater formation, includes Article 5 operations. Moreover, it should be ready to conduct antiterrorist and expeditionary operations, such as stabilization, humanitarian, evacuation, peacekeeping and conflict escalation prevention missions.

The NRF use has no geographic limitations, thus, it has to be ready to operate everywhere the North Atlantic Council perceives it necessary. Due to the variety of tasks, the NRF is very flexible, which enables adapting its final composition and number to concrete circumstances and the mission's mandate (Madej, 2006). The NRF's main tasks reflect requirements concerning immediate reaction, especially in the initial phase of the crisis during peace support operations, humanitarian operations and crisis response, counter terrorism, reducing the effects of weapons of mass destruction radiation operations, as well as those aiming at supervising observance of the enforced embargo and preparation of the region for the Alliance's main forces deployment and other according to the threats (Jones, 2004).

⁷ Time of its deployment to the area of operation is from 5 to 30 days – depending on an element.

⁸ The force is supposed to function independently for a month, i.e. without additional support.

The first NRF rotation started its activity in October 2003. Starting from January 2004 and the second rotation, the NRF functions in a rotation forces mechanism in a 6-month cycle and the composition is approved a year before the training starts, during so called NRF generation conference, based on the NRF needs' analysis and member states' declarations. Initial NRF operational capability was announced in October 2004, and there was an assumption that when it achieves full combat capability, the Alliance should have approximately 25 thousand soldiers in permanent disposal, which will be organized in land component (of the brigade size – not more than 9500 soldiers), naval task force (including amphibian forces) and an air component capable of realizing up to 200 flights a day.

Until now, NATO decided to use the NRF twice, but on a quite limited scale. In September 2005, airlift units participated in humanitarian operation on a territory destroyed by Katrina hurricane, and from November 2005 till February 2006, approximately 1200 soldiers of the V rotation (mainly engineering and medical units) participated in humanitarian relief operation in Pakistan after the earth quake (Madej, 2006). Some elements of the NRF helped ensuring security during the Olympic Games in Athens in 2004 and supported presidential elections in Afghanistan in September 2004. The analysis of the NRF's development and activities allows to draw a conclusion that despite continuous progress and success of the program (e.g. the above mentioned "Swift Relief" operation in Pakistan), it still faces difficulties which may significantly lower its real value, especially as a motion for the NATO transformation. There are uncertainties according to the NRF employment practice, showing gradual concentration of its activity on a limited scale actions and low intensity of *stricte* combat operations.

Within the "Norfolk Agenda", in November 2004, for the first time in its history, NATO organized a conference on "Global Force Generation" in order to try to reconcile obligations of each country with respect to different rotations in the NRF with their commitments connected with operations in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. There were intensified discussions within the Executive Working Group on the improvement of a given country's input in creating NATO forces predictability. Another suggestion concerning force generation discussed within the Norfolk Agenda assumed that there will be presented options concerning defence planning, and member states would express their would to detach concrete capabilities before the Alliance makes a

political commitment to begin intervention with reference to a given crisis or conflict. As far as the common financing reform is concerned, NATO Secretary General initiated discussion on enlarging common military budgets – NATO Security Investment Programme (NSIP) and military budget, and on the issue of spending the money on operational aspects of current NATO missions connected with forces deployment (Bell, 2005).

The change of NATO security concept assumptions was an effect of deep transformation of the international situation after the termination of the Cold War. NATO had to find its new position in the reality of institutional pluralism and complementing security systems. Termination of East-West confrontation and lowering the risk of great scale military conflicts made the Alliance have a debate on a new security strategy. With the disappearance of “homogenous”, condensed and potential direct threat (Zięba, 2001), there appeared new challenges of indirect and local character. Due to that, it was necessary to work out a new NATO strategic concept. One of the factors stimulating the debate about NATO internal transformation was civil war in Yugoslavia, when there appeared a necessity to support CSCE peace mission. Initially, NATO declared it was ready to support peace operations under the authority of the UN Security Council (NATO, NAC Final Communiqué, 1992), and then approved conducting joint peace operations which were UN or CSCE-led (NATO Press *Communiqué*, 1992). In such a way, NATO agreed to broaden its military activity by allowing for conducting peace support, humanitarian and rescue operations outside the member states' territory, which meant modification of the strategic doctrine and participating in non-Article 5 operations (Barett, 1996). Decisive bodies realized that crises of the new type can develop and spread quickly, thus require quick reaction. It resulted in shaping a three-dimensional NATO security policy which includes such elements as dialogue, cooperation and maintaining collective defence capabilities (Zięba, 2001). The new NATO strategic concept assumptions define exactly what types of crisis response operations armed forces will participate in and that they are supposed to prevent conflicts and crises and counter them (The Alliance's Strategic..., 1999, art. 31).

Previous updates of NATO strategic documents were in a way forced by significant changes in the international security environment which influenced the distribution of power in the world and its geopolitical shape. It seems that nowadays, in the first decade of the XXI century, the reality rushed far ahead the strategic doctrine which became irrelevant to the actual needs. It is crucial to

determine a new hierarchy of tasks which are to be realized by NATO and prioritize challenges and threats of paramilitary character that would fit the reality of the XXI century. Moreover, there is a need to clearly state the range, scope and direction of military transformation of the Alliance as well as its internal reform. The third equally important issue is further broadening of the organization and its relations with the third countries (Górka-Winter, Madej, 2010).

Current debate on a new strategic concept of the Alliance evokes many discussions, as there is a great number of contradictions between the member states according to the document's shape. Much attention is paid to the issue of deterrence in the XXI century as well as new capabilities to prevent attack on NATO member states (combination of conventional and nuclear capabilities). There has been a significant shift in understanding of the concept of territorial defence. If the greatest threat nowadays is terrorism, it must be fought at its roots, which means far away from the NATO territory. This in turn requires increase in NATO military activity. Static and heavy forces do not correspond with current challenges and threats, while the Alliance needs flexible, mobile and deployable armed forces (expeditionary forces) on the one hand, and effective missile defence on the other. Countering terrorism is closely linked with cyber security which constitutes another area of NATO's interest where new measures have to be undertaken. (Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders ..., 2010)

NATO should guarantee security of all its members. However, it is worth wondering whether this is the case. As envisaged in the strategic concept of the Alliance, member states can help the endangered NATO country in accordance with their capabilities, but they do not have to. Nowadays, it is obvious that only a few countries are able to conduct war on their own and win it. Furthermore, for many years there has been a tendency to reduce the armed forces, which ultimately leads to a small but modern army. But will it be enough, given the recent war between Russia and Georgia?

Current cooperation between the members of the Alliance illustrates conducted peacekeeping operations, peace enforcement or humanitarian operations. For instance, in the ISAF operation in Afghanistan can be observed considerable variation of NATO countries involvement in solving the crisis. Only the good will of countries or desire to arise in the international arena decides about the participation in the operation as well as about the size of military

contingents deployed. However, given the hypothetical situation of war between a NATO member state and another country, we should consider the role NATO would play then. Would it be only a theoretical role of deterrence or a real role of political and military assistance. That is why, while working on a new strategic document, it is so important to consider the procedures and tools (the whole mechanism) of a real and immediate assistance for a threatened NATO member state. It will provide a sense of security for citizens of NATO countries and will increase the credibility of the Alliance. Arrangements which are currently in force guarantee to providing assistance for the attacked state, but not immediately, and only with certain forces.

Apart from external issues, equally important are NATO internal affairs. There is a strong need for closer cooperation between the member states in order to achieve greater capabilities and more efficient use of resources and funding for operations (especially strategic lift). Broadening of NATO and intensification of political and security consultations with less bureaucracy and better intelligence data sharing are key elements of a new quality in NATO. Moreover, consolidation of Europe as a whole is a *conditio sine qua non* for improvement of the global security level. It has to include the NATO Open Door Policy continuation and new quality in relationships with Russia. (Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders ..., 2010)

Finally, the NATO Strategic Concept Expert Group chaired by **Madeleine Albright** is faced with certain problematic issues. It has to define NATO characteristics for the future, with the question of whether it is a transatlantic or global organization being the most fundamental one. Interpretation of article 5 of the Washington Treaty as a basic rule for the whole Alliance also has to be discussed in the perspective of NATO's main tasks – territorial defence or reaction to new threats outside its territory. This issue is in turned linked with the general character of the organization – military or also political, economic and social. Apart from the above mentioned search for a new strategy towards Russia, NATO will also have to determine its way of action – whether it wants to act autonomously or in cooperation with the UN, EU and OSCE (Rotfeld, 2010).

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