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PARTY GOVERNMENT IN POLITICAL PRACTICE:
PARTICIPATION INDICES

Tomáš Jarmara

Abstract
The article is based on the theory of Richard Katz, who due to strong institutionalization of political parties and the role which they play in the legislative and executive processes defines contemporary European democracy as „partitocracy“ and, as used in this context, the notion of „party government“. It is a model of democracy when the filling cabinet positions are decided by the political parties that received strongest support in elections. This paper aims to capture the government parties in the political practice according to participation in the so-called indices, which can empirically measure the contribution of individual political parties in coalition governments, which are characteristic of multiparty system with proportional electoral system. Participation index is supplemented by an index measuring the responsibility of political parties according to the occupation of the Prime Minister position and the index measuring strength and negotiating ability of the coalition parties, according to the occupation of government seats. Indices are applied to the Czech political system in the time span from 1992 to 2010.

Key Words: political parties, party government, parliamentary democracy, participation index

Introduction
Political parties in contemporary modern democracies more or less successfully provide a sort of a circulatory set of political systems. It concerns those political parties which provide staffing of the key positions in governments and parliaments to the extent that Richard Katz, a classic of the branch, regards party government as a synonym for parliamentary democracies (Katz, 1987, pp. 12).

The aim of this single-case study is the analysis of a political party share in governments of the Czech Republic in the years 1992 to 2010 that is exactly recorded in the so called participation index supplemented by secondary indices depicting occupation of Prime Minister position and the number of

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ministerial seats occupied by individual parties of the government coalition. The predictive value of participation indices is especially based on the ability to record the alternation of the political power in an exact way as one of the key criteria when evaluating democratic character of the political system. At the same time it depicts the form of the Czech governments with regard to the degree of individual political party participation, which is an indicator that more likely gives evidence about a tendency towards the consensual model of democracy (Lijphart, 1999).

The study is methodologically based on the statistical data of the Government Office that depict the length of functioning of individual government executives and their coalition (personnel) composition. It is further based on the concept and implementation of mathematical formulas that depict particular criteria of political party participation in the government. The final measurements are analysed by the form of induction followed by individual political features descriptions that affect the origin of individual coalition governments, their stability or instability resulting in their fall.

The introduction deals with a theoretical approach to the role and functioning of political parties in modern democracies. This is followed by the main part with the results of participation indices measurements that are analysed continuously with regard to development specifics of the Czech party and political systems after 1992. In conclusion, the relevance of achieved measurements is evaluated given the interpretation of political features and the possibility of using participation indices in regional and communal politics is discussed as well.

Party Government in Political Practice

European democracies are very often designated as partitocracies because of a strong institutionalization of political parties and their role which they play in legislative and executive processes. According to another opinion the existence of strong and disciplined political parties is a typical feature or one of the main features of European parliamentary democracies (Gallagher et al., 2001, pp. 29). Decisive factors of this state are based on the fact that European constituents primarily vote for political parties and only secondarily for individual candidates, in other words, candidates themselves are not of such an importance as for example in the USA. And, to the contrary in regard to the American parties, the European political parties are very strongly disciplined. (In

The European model of parliamentary democracy that is designated by Richard Katz as a party government has the following characteristic attributes:

1. All important political decisions are made by people elected in the elections in which political parties took part, or people who were appointed to their positions by people elected in parliamentary elections and are responsible to parliament;
2. Political decisions were made within a political party (in case this political party governs alone) or as a result of negotiations of several parties (in case the government is of a coalition character);
3. High-positioned officials, especially the Prime Minister and Ministers were chosen by people from their party and they are responsible to their constituents (Katz, 1986, pp. 42)

Quite concisely, Katz points at domineering position of European political parties that are in charge of controlling the system of power formation and distribution. The European model of democracy with a strong party position surpasses in comparison with a political practice in the USA. In the American politics it is very difficult to apply the second Katz’s condition because division in American Congress does not strictly proceed according to a party line. American congressmen do not usually follow their party discipline and their decisions are more motivated with respect to constituents rather than to their political parties. As the example we can mention the existence of the so called Conservative coalition in the American Congress that has been characterized by common division of the members of Republican Party and a group of Conservative Democrats in some political issues in the last fifty years (Jagielski, 2000, pp. 205).

As far as the third condition is concerned, the American President is less dependent on his political party because his nomination was already decided in a fairly complicated system of primary elections. For example, in some states primary elections of Democrats are in the form of public assembly where citizens choose their candidate by means of public vote (Jagielski, 2000, pp. 205–220). A strong position of the President as a head of state and government is supported by a direct vote, as well as by fact that President can choose members of his cabinet and government is not responsible to Congress. On the other hand, a Prime Minister in the European model of democracy is dependent on keeping the majority in parliament that can be ensured only by his own
parliamentarians. The position of a political party in the European model, therefore, is absolutely decisive in relation to the person of Prime Minister and individual members of the government.

A strong position of a political party is illustrated in the British practice where the change in the position of a political party leader automatically means the change of a Prime Minister. Moreover, the decision is not made according to the laws resulting from the political system but it is made by a political party itself. When Margaret Thatcher demitted due to loss of trust, she was replaced by John Major in the position of a political party leader as well as of a Prime Minister. A similar change as in Conservatives was made in Labour Party where Tony Blair was replaced by Gordon Brown in both positions. An opposite process is absolutely unique in the European model. There is one exception confirming the rule – Jerzy Buzek – who was firstly the Prime Minister of the Polish government and thanks to this position he became the leader of AWS (Solidarity). It distantly resembles American practices where a candidate for president becomes a party leader, more or less symbolically.

It is therefore apparent that the European model of parliamentary democracy creates appropriate conditions for political party government. Whereas a stronger variation of the party government can hypothetically occur in the case of one-chamber parliament, where the power is focused in the hands of political parties independent on the second chamber’s will. The second chamber of the parliament can dispose of a different composition based e.g. on federalism or there can be representatives of independent candidates when applying the majority system.

**Participation Indices**

If we take into consideration Katz’s hypothesis about political party government in the model of parliamentary democracy, the question arises how important the role of individual political parties is when forming the government. While the share of political parties on government in a two-party system with one-colour governments is very well-arranged, a different situation is in a system with more parties and coalition government where the share is divided among more political parties.

The participation of individual political parties can be empirically measured according to the participation index which can be modified for three observed criteria. The first criterion is based on the recording of the political party
participation in governmental cabinets in a set time period (one or more electoral cycles). The second criterion is based on the occupation of a Prime Minister position that illustrates the position of a political party in a governmental cabinet. The last criterion in view is a number of ministerial seats occupied by a political party that shows the power and negotiating abilities of individual parties in government coalition.

**Participation Index of a Political Party**

The first criterion is a percentage recording of a political party participation in government in a set time period. Participation index indicates time share (in %) of individual political parties in the government. The index can be calculated according to the formula:

\[
i_{pps} = \frac{100 \cdot t_{ps(m)}}{t_{cel(m)}}
\]

\(i_{pps}\) is the participation index of a political party, \(t_{ps(m)}\) is the total time in which a particular political party participated in government (in months), \(t_{cel(m)}\) is the total time of the observed period in months.

If the result of a participation index is 100, it means that a political party participated in the government for the entire time period. The participation index can be used for measuring the Czech political party participation in government cabinets in the period from 2\(^{nd}\) July, 1992 when the coalition government of Václav Klaus, the Prime Minister, was formed, to 25\(^{th}\) June, 2010 when Jan Fischer's interim government resigned (Table No1). The length of an observed time period was 216 months. Total time \(t_{ps(m)}\) includes every month a political party entered in its existence in government, or more precisely, when a party started to participate in government, the following month was the first one that was included in the total time.

The Czech Republic had 10 government cabinets in total subjected to a Prime Minister in the observed time period. In the electoral period in 2002 to 2006 three Prime Ministers from the Social Democratic Party appeared in the position of a Prime Minister; the government, however, kept its original coalition character during the entire electoral time. The government consisted of 18 members with the seat ratio (ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, US-DEU) 12 : 3 : 3. Participation index includes also the “interim government” of Josef Tošovský (1998). The government can be designated as half-political because it was
Josef Lux, KDU-ČSL leader who was charged with negotiations about Tošovský’s government formation. The government consisted of ministers belonging to Christian Democrats (KDU-ČSL), Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and the Freedom Union (US) and because these parties participated in the government as well as in the cabinet in the observed time period, both participations are included in the index. Fischer’s interim government of “non-party deputy ministers” who were appointed by ODS, ČSSD and the Green Party is also included in the participation index.

According to Participation Index measurements it is not surprising that the share of the biggest political parties is nearly balanced: ODS (51, 85 %) and ČSSD (51, 30 %). The Social Democrats had three months longer stay in the government in 2006 because according to the Constitution of the Czech Republic (article 62, letter d) Jiří Paroubek’s government was provisionally charged with execution of duty after elections in June. It was not until September when basically unicolour government of Mirek Topolánek was formed; however, Chamber of Deputies of the Parliament of the Czech Republic did not provide its support. Nevertheless, this government was also provisionally charged with the execution of duty according to stated article of the constitution and that is why participation index of Civic Democrats includes also four months of electoral period until the second Topolánek’s government formation in January 2007.

Table 1 Participation Index of Political Parties Contribution to the Governments of the Czech Republic and the Occupation of the Prime Minister Position in 1992 – 2010. Indices are given in per cents.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Observed period: 2nd July, 1992–25th June, 2010</th>
<th>Participation Index of a political party (I_pps)</th>
<th>Number of Government Cabinets with a Political Party Contribution</th>
<th>Participation Index of the Occupation of the Prime Minister Position (I_ppv)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ODS (Civic Democratic Party)</td>
<td>51,85</td>
<td>4/5*</td>
<td>48,76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ČSSD (Social Democrats)</td>
<td>51,30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>48,27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDU-ČSL (Christian Democratic Union)</td>
<td>69,90</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance) 33,79 3 -
US-DEU (Freedom Union) 25,92 2 -
SZ (Green Party) 18,98 1 -

* This note is connected with the total number of 7 government cabinets. In the case of ODS, participation in the government as well as in Topolánek’s cabinet is included. (Cabinet ruled in demission from 4th September, 2006 to 9th January, 2007).

Thanks to the participation in five government cabinets KDU-ČSL got the biggest share amounting to 69,9%. The Czech Republic in such a case would approach the state which Gregory M. Luebbert designates as a “democracy with one domineering party” (Luebbert, 1984: 229–264). According to Luebbert, a domineering party is not the one with the highest number of mandates but a party set in the political centre which is essential present in majority government formations and which factually decides about the selection of the coalition partner, therefore even about the type of government coalition. KDU-ČSL always fulfils at least the first part of the condition. If we did not include Jan Fischer’s government lasting 16 months into the index (where this party did not appear), participation index of KDU-ČSL would even reach 74,38 %. The example documenting a domineering position of KDU-ČSL in the last years can be Josef Lux’s authorization received from the President Václav Havel to form an interim-political government. Josef Lux was the contemporary leader of KDU-ČSL and Josef Tošovský, a governor of the Czech National Bank (ČNB) became the Prime Minister of that newly formed government in 1998. Basically it was a minority coalition government of KDU-ČSL with disintegrating ODA and newly forming US that was supported by ČSSD on a short-term basis. It resulted in dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies and writ of early election for the year of 1998.

Relatively high participation indices of ODA, US-DEU and Green Party illustrate a high coalition potential of right-centred parties and confirm a generally accepted hypothesis in the Czech political sciences that it was very difficult to enforce the alternation of government executives in the past. In fact, the alternation was never perfect and it could never be achieved without right-centred parties that would form coalitions with Social as well as Civic Democrats.
Participation Index: the Occupation of a Prime Minister Position

Participation Index can be modified by an additional qualitative criterion reflecting a degree of political party responsibility in a longer period, according to the occupation of a Prime Minister position. The index can be calculated according to the following formula:

\[ i_{ppv} = \frac{100 \cdot t_{ppv(m)}}{t_{cel(m)}} \]

\( i_{ppv} \) is the participation index of a political party occupying the Prime Minister position (the index of Prime Minister participation), \( t_{ppv} \) (m) is the total time in which a particular political party occupied the Prime Minister position (time in months), \( t_{cel} \) (m) is the total time of an observed period in months.

Participation Index according to the occupation of a Prime Minister position can measure political party responsibility in unstable “rainbow coalitions”. For instance it may be used in shorter time interval of one electoral period in which a Prime Minister can be hypothetically replaced by a representative from a different coalition party. In the case of a longer period the index shows the ability of a political party (or its Prime Minister) to maintain coalition government stability (Table No1). While ČSSD managed to maintain the Prime Minister position for the whole time of their both government cabinets (1998–2002 a 2002–2006), ODS lost this position twice when Václav Klaus’s government resigned (30th November, 1997) a Mirek Topolánek’s government did not get the confidence vote by the Parliament of the Czech Republic (24th March, 2009). However, it is important to note that Social-Democratic government of Miloš Zeman (1998–2002) was a minority government tolerated by Civic Democrats thanks to the so called “Opposition Agreement”. During the electoral period of 2002–2006 Social Democrats changed the Prime Minister position three times (Vladimír Špidla, Stanislav Gross, Jiří Paroubek), which illustrates a low degree of party institutionalization regardless of political circumstances (Panebianco, 1988).

\[ \text{1 The official name of so called “Opposition Agreement” was “The Agreement on Creating Stable Political Environment in the Czech Republic”. This agreement was signed by ČSSD and ODS after early election to the Chamber of Parliamentarians of PCR in 1998 (9th July, 1998). This agreement enabled formation of the minority government of ČSSD in 1998–2002.} \]
Participation Index According to the Number of Ministerial Seats

Another qualitative criterion is the number of ministerial seats occupied by a political party in the government cabinet or during particular time period. The index can be calculated according to the following formula:

\[ i_{ppm} = \frac{100 \cdot P_{mp(t)}}{P_{celm(t)}} \]

\( i_{ppm} \) is the participation index of a political party according to the number of ministerial seats (participation index by a number of ministers), \( P_{mp(t)} \) is the number of ministers of a political party in the observed period, \( P_{celm(t)} \) is the total number of ministers in the observed time, while \( (t) \) can be one electoral period or longer time.

The index can theoretically measure the position of individual political parties in coalition in a particular electoral period when the coalition partner can increase or decrease its power in relation to the number of Ministries. In a long-term period the index shows a degree of participation by the number of occupied ministerial seats by a political party and indirectly it points at negotiating abilities of individual political parties in a long-term period.

Table 2  Participation Index/participation of political parties in the governments of the Czech Republic according to the number of ministerial seats

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prime Minister/ Observed period</th>
<th>Parties of government coalition</th>
<th>Particip. Index According to the number of Ministerial Seats (( i_{ppm} )) in per cents.</th>
<th>Number of Ministerial Seats Occupied by a Political Party</th>
<th>Total number of Government members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Václav Klaus 1992–1996</td>
<td>ODS* (Civic Democratic Party)</td>
<td>63,15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KDU-ČSL (Christian Democratic Union)</td>
<td>21,05</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance)</td>
<td>15,80</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Václav Klaus</td>
<td>ODS (Civic Democratic Party)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KDU-ČSL (Christian Democratic Union)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>ODA (Civic Democratic Alliance)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vladimír Špidla Stanislav Gross Jiří Paroubek</td>
<td>ČSSD (Social Democrats)</td>
<td>66,66</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KDU-ČSL (Christian Democratic Union)</td>
<td>16,66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US-DEU (Freedom Union)</td>
<td>16,66</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mirek Topolánek</td>
<td>ODS (Civic Democratic Party)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>KDU-ČSL (Christian Democratic Union)</td>
<td>27,78</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SZ (Green Party)</td>
<td>22,22</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petr Nečas</td>
<td>ODS (Civic Democratic Party)</td>
<td>39,99</td>
<td>6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>TOP 09</td>
<td>33,33</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>VV (Public Affairs)</td>
<td>26,66</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Ministers of ODS include also Ministers of KDS (Christian-Democratic Party) that formed a coalition with ODS for election in 1992 and in 1996 they merged with ODS.

The weaker part of the index is its disability to recognize the importance of individual Ministries because there is an obvious difference between Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Industry and Trade on one hand, and Ministry of Culture, Environment, etc. on the other. Hypothetically, another possible qualitative criterion could be the budget of the Ministry, i.e. the financial volume the Minister has at his or her disposal, which abstracts from the political meaning of ministries with a lower budget but with a prestigious or other socially important agenda. Moreover, individual parties have their own programme preferences which can also be of some importance when assigning
individual ministries. For example, in April 2005 Jiří Paroubek could not form his government for long because ČSSD and US-DEU struggled to occupy Ministry for Regional Development. The less prestigious this resort for regional development seemed to be, the higher potential of economic lucrativeness it had; that is why ČSSD secured this Ministry. US-DEU had to settle for prestigious but less economically interesting Ministry of Justice.

Table No2 shows the results of participation index measurements according to the number of ministerial seats in five coalition cabinets. The comparison offers many interpretations including a new fact which shows that in a new Petr Nečas’s government the strongest party of the government coalition has historically the lowest participation index against their coalition partners.

If we have a look at previous coalition governments, a division of ministerial positions in the governments led by ČSSD (2002–2006) and by ODS (1992–1996, 1996–1998, 2007–2009) is definitely worth seeing. ČSSD was in a much stronger position against their smaller coalition partners (KDU-ČSL, US-DEU) and it reached the participation index of 66,66 %. At the same time, however, it had only a very close majority of 101 parliamentarians in the Parliament.

On the other hand, ODS had the strongest position against their smaller coalition partners in the years of 1992–1996 (63, 15 %), when the coalition government was supported by the votes of 105 parliamentarians. ODS had participation index 50% against their smaller coalition partners twice (1996–1998, 2007–2009), which symbolized their weaker position in the government, in both cases resulting in the early termination of government responsibility by a forced demission (1998), or a censure (2009) by the Chamber of Parliamentarians of the PCR. Whereas in the case of the second Klaus’s government (1996–1998) the participation index of 50 % was the result of an agreement among smaller coalition parties. KDU-ČSL and ODA, having experienced the first Klaus’s government (1992–1996), in which their ministers were out-voted very easily in the case of some conflicts, required to have one half of the ministerial seats together when entering the government.

As far as Topolánek’s government is concerned, in respect to the liberal orientation of the Green Party it was the Minimal Connected Winning Coalition and Klaus’s second government (Minority Coalition) resembled it at least in the ideological level (but it did not have the majority in the Parliament). Ideologically winning coalition is characterized by a higher rivalry among its members, which paradoxically leads to a stronger position of smaller coalition.
parties (Axelrod, 1970, pp. 174). **Axelrod** works with the hypothesis of a dependent position of political parties in the ideologically winning coalition for which the success of their coalition rivals is a condition for forming the coalition of ideologically similar parties in the following electoral period too. Relatively stronger position of smaller coalition partners (ODA, KDU-ČSL) in the governments led by ODS supports **Axelrod's** hypothesis. The government coalition of ČSSD, KDU-ČSL and US-DEU in the years of 2002–2006 can be designated as a Minimal Winning Coalition with respect to (even if theoretical) position of the Freedom Union on the right-left scale. **Axelrod's** hypothesis was confirmed even in this case, it means that in this type of a coalition the winning party acts more in its favour without respect to priorities of coalition partners' who are able to accept the offered conditions. ČSSD with participation index of 67% reached the strongest position against their coalition partners out of all coalition governments after 1992.

The table also shows that with respect to the number of own parliamentarians historically the most successful party is the Green Party, whose Parliamentary Group had 6 members with the participation index according to the number of Ministers of 22,22% (4 ministerial seats), which is a better result in comparison with the Freedom Union that had 8 parliamentarians and reached the index of 16,66% (3 ministerial seats).²

Division of ministerial seats in contemporary government of **Petr Nečas** is based on the fact that it was representative of the second strongest party (not the winning one) who became the Prime Minister; it happened for the first time in history of the Czech Republic. Moreover, the party system that appeared after parliamentary elections for in 2010 has changed. As the ideological character of the new parliamentary parties (TOP 09 and Public Affairs) is not clear yet (they resemble parties of an electoral type more than standard political parties), it is very difficult to apply qualitative (ideological) criteria in combination with the number of parties in the system when defining the Czech party system (Sartori, Duverger, Blondel). If we take only quantitative criteria into consideration for the time being, then the Czech party system would correspond with a diffused party system as defined by **Gordon Smith**. It is a system with a bigger number

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² Parliamentary Group of US-DEU had 10 members in the years of 2002–2006 even though just 8 parliamentarians were originally elected. However, as the parliamentary law of PCR prescribed minimum number of 10 parliamentarians for a parliamentary group creation in this electoral period, two parliamentarians (Taťána Fischerová, Svatopluk Karásek), that stood on the common slate of the Coalition (KDU-ČSL, US-DEU) were included into the group.
of political parties but none of them has a dominant position and some of them obtain similar electoral support (Smith, 1986, pp. 116–117). Eventually, we can use party system classification according to Petr Mair who primarily takes into account the electoral support of the political parties. He divides parties into small with 1–15% support and big with a support over 15%. The Czech system could, therefore, be defined as a middle party system in which small parties get around 30% and big political parties around 60% of the votes (Mair, 1991, pp. 47).

Conclusion

If we ask a question what the relevance of the final measurements of participation indices is like with respect to their ability to clarify selected political features, it is important to stress that these methods are only complementary and they can only “visualise” some of the intuitive judgements of the political features, especially in the cases with exact statistic data. However, the final measurements have to be interpreted with respect to the historical period of the political or party system development and following creation of the government coalitions. This is the reason why Mayer’s Aggregation Index ($I_a$) measuring

$$I_a = \frac{n}{p_i}$$

The higher is the index, the higher is stability and cohesion of a party system and, consequently, the stability of government cabinets. For example, according to Mayer’s measurements in the 1960s and 1970s (1960 – 1974) Great Britain had the index of 18 when the average per cent of the locations occupied by the winning party was 54% with 3 political parties. For example, Austria had the average index 16, 80; Germany 15, 80; and Italy 4, 40 in the same years (Mayer 1980, pp. 335–347).

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3 Party system classification according to Petr Mair takes into account the electoral support of the political parties in the system. In his study he follows the profits of the small and big parties in the years of 1947–1966 a 1967–1987. Peter Mair further distinguishes:

- **big party systems**: in Austria, Ireland, Germany and Great Britain, where big parties together gain more than 80% of votes in the election;
- **small party systems**: in Denmark or Sweden where small parties gain more than 50% of votes;
- **middle party systems**: in Norway, Finland or the Netherlands where small parties gain more than 30% in average and big parties more than 60% of votes;
- **temporary party systems**: these are in motion between elections when one system is transformed into another one.

4 When analysing party system with respect to stability of government coalitions, we can use Mayer’s Aggregation Index $I_a$, as a complementary method where n represents a per cent of the locations controlled by the strongest political party and $p_i$ the number of political parties in the Parliament (Mair, 1991, pp. 47).
the stability of government coalitions is not used at all in the Czech professional literature.

The actual political situation can also be of a great importance when interpreting the results of measurements indices. For example, the participation index according to the number of ministerial seats was the most advantageous for smaller coalition parties, such as KDU-ČSL or ODA in the second Klaus's government (see Table No1). With respect to general political situation, however, this could not prevent smaller parties from leaving “advantageous” position, causing the fall of the government. In the case of KDU-ČSL it concerned a shift towards political centre and an effort to increase coalition potential with respect to ČSSD strengthening as a potential winner of the following election. In the case of ODA, affected by the same corruption scandal as ODS, it is worth mentioning that they were able to gain 3 ministerial seats in the interim government of Josef Tošovský.

On the contrary, smaller coalition parties, such as KDU-ČSL and US-DEU, had the lowest participation index in the social-democratic government (2002–2006), and even in spite of this fact this government was able to endure over the whole electoral period. Presumably, it was caused by the fact that participation of KDU-ČSL together with Social Democrats in the government did not lower their electoral preference and in the case of unionists it was apparent that this party did not have high chances to gain parliamentary seats again and that is why the party elite focused on office-seeking (and its benefits) and not on policy-seeking5.

If we used Mayer's Aggregation Index for the Czech government cabinets and did not take into consideration development specifics of the Czech political and party systems, its predicative value would not be very high. Paradoxically, one of the most stable governments (government of Václav Klaus in the years of 1992-1996) had the lowest aggregation index. On the other hand, the highest index (8,1) was reached during Mirek Topolánek's government (2007–2009), however, this government did not receive the confidence of the Parliament. Following are the aggregation indices of other governments: Václav Klaus's government (1996–1998), index 5,66. Miloš Zeman's government (1998–2002), index 7,4. Sociodemocratic Prime Ministers and their governments (2002–2006), index 7,0. Petr Nečas's government (2010), index 5,3. For index calculation we use the per cent of locations controlled by the strongest party (ODS) and not by the winning political party (ČSSD).

5 In the American tradition of political sciences developed from Riker's theory of political coalitions (Riker 1962) the post-electoral struggle is primarily understood as the struggle for seats in government (an office-seeking theory) and not as a political programme enforcement (a policy-seeking theory).
Finally, let us repeat again that used examples of participation indices belong only to complementary methods that can be used for the political analysis of a political party role and influence in the process of government formation, especially government coalitions, but also in the process of regional and communal coalition formation, including their mutual comparison.

References:


