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Turbulences, European Neighbourhood Policy and European Identity
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ABSTRACT
Since 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy has established cooperation instruments similar to those of the pre-accession policy, which has contributed to a major misunderstanding, because the countries concerned, i.e. new neighbouring partners, were not intended to fully integrate with the EU. But now, this policy created in a context of relative stability in partner countries must change radically its contours. The Arab Springs and the Georgian and Ukrainian revolutions, the political developments in Russia, in particular, the overcoming of opposition between deepening and enlargement while European citizens withdraw into a national level, induce a radical change of the choices in matter of EU foreign policy. The construction of EU is in progress both inside and outside, because our neighbours are like our mirrors and our relationships contribute to the evolution of our European feeling. In this context, it is very important to propose selected elements about the European neighbourhood. What is new?

Key words: European Neighbourhood Policy, European Identity, European Citizenship, Europeanity

Introduction – European Neighbourhood Policy, short history and assessment
The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was established in 2004. At the time, its purpose was to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU with 10 new members and their neighbour countries and, instead, to strengthen prosperity, stability and security (Commission of the European Communities, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007). This ambitious policy relies on values shared within the EU, and it was hoped to extend these to the EU’s vicinity: democracy, rule of law, and the respect for human rights. The ENP applies to 16 neighbouring countries more or less close to the EU: Algeria,
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Egypt, Georgia, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Moldova, the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, and Ukraine. This policy is bilateral in nature, but it is a particular bilateralism as it is planned to conclude a special partnership between the EU and respective neighbouring countries (Rošteková, 2009). Some regional cooperation initiatives complement this policy, such as the Eastern Partnership initiated mainly by the countries of Visegrád, and the Union for the Mediterranean initiated chiefly by France (Commission of the European Communities, 2008; Council of the European Union, 2009, 2011; European Commission, 2012).

It was Romano Prodi who in December 2002 introduced this new approach – “Proximity Policy as the key to stability” (Prodi, 2002). In his speech of 3,300 words, the word “neighbour” appears 23 times. This terminology is now widespread; the “neighbours” would thus be countries and also their citizens at the “border” of the European Union. The European construction, consequently, induces several categories of countries: Member States (which are not “equal”, but they share citizenship, and a large part of them shares also a currency – the Euro, and enjoys the disappearance of the constraint of physical borders in the Schengen area); States on the path to EU integration; potential candidates; official candidates or declared candidates; and States “neighbours”, sort of first circle around the EU: border neighbours, or more distant ... and others. But things are not so simple due to the fact that the semantics and communication strategies blur the messages.

This “European Neighbourhood” is a recent invention, and these two terms “neighbour” and “neighbourhood” were gradually imposed since the beginning of this century. Yet, even now, there is still a doubt when “European neighbours are evoked”: are they neighbours inside EU or non-members of EU? Are they the EU neighbours or others neighbours that claim belonging to Europe... The confusions are very frequent in Eastern Europe in particular, and sometimes they are, perhaps, even maintained. For instance, a French who, at first, considers his nationality, the European neighbours are either Belgian or German... but it would be Ukrainian if he recognised himself as a European citizen... no, to be exact, if he recognised himself as a citizen of the European Union. In the south, such confusions seem to be rarer: it is not common for citizens of the Member States of the EU to consider Moroccans or Tunisians as “Europeans”. But in the east, the situation is quite different. Belarusians and Ukrainians or Georgians can both see themselves as Europeans and be treated as such by the citizens of the European Union.
The changing contexts of the countries concerned, on the one hand, and the financial, economic and monetary crisis, on the other hand, have made necessary a reassessment of the ENP. This policy was well reoriented to reflect the new context created by the Arab Spring. Since 2011, the EU enforces the principle of “more for more”: more democracy followed by more EU support, in opposition to the principle “less for less” for countries with dictatorial governments such as Syria or Belarus. However, it is difficult to assess the added value of the ENP since its launch. The reports are based on partnership agreements or on the use of financial instruments. In March 2013, the Commission carried out a general assessment. Four elements predominate: political, economic, migration, and budget (European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2013).

In 2011, the “democratic requirement” became very clearly a fundamental factor that determines the development of partnership relations. A few years later, it is quite easy to blame the EU for an excessive optimism. However, it was fairly easy to predict that it takes time for a democratic culture to settle in a country, especially if this country has never experienced one. So far, even if the results are fragile and seem still reversible, the assessment is not so negative. The countries seem to have been particularly interested in the contributions of the ENP to improve the daily lives of their citizens and the evolution towards a democratic regime have not necessarily been listed in the first place, at least implicitly, in their priorities. But international assessments do not rank very positively the ENP countries and many of them are still considered as poor performers in terms of corruption.

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<td>Morocco</td>
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In 2013, the revision of the ENP takes into account (finally) the civil society, to circumvent the reluctance of governments of countries. NGOs, consequently, became partners and program beneficiaries (such eligibility has been established in some internal programs from the previous period).

A rapid budgetary summary: during the period of 2007-2012, the EU has allocated 10.5 billion Euros of financial assistance to the 16 eligible countries, which correspond to about 5 Euros per capita per year, an amount only slightly higher than the one allocated in the previous period. But this average hides significant differences, linked to political priorities, absorptive capacities and differences in living standards. Thus, every Palestinian is rated 85.6 Euros per year while Algerian each received 1.5 Euros per capita and every Israeli 0.24 Euros per capita! Globally, the countries of the South receive more than those in the East but this statistical result changes when Palestine is removed from the total. In such case, the average for the Eastern Partnership is 4.4 Euros per capita and per year, and for the South it is the average of 3.2 Euros per capita and per year.

A budget analysis shows that the ENP feeds mainly on good intentions, even if the amounts cannot be neglected. One might expect that the principle of "more for more" could be more interesting to the most "deserving" countries. But

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<td>Ukraine</td>
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<td>Moldova</td>
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<td>Belorussia</td>
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Table n° 1: Democratic performance of ENP countries
this is not the case because the difference between countries undertaking real democratic reforms and the others does not exceed 10%.

1 Neighbours, Borders and European Identity

Now the neighbour is recognised, with a status – he is no more an “Other”, more or less unknown. You can never meet him, but we know he is there and we know where. We have to take him into account, like in the case of condominiums when it comes to changing the front door of a building, for example.

This recognition is fundamental and should encourage all European citizens (and other residents) to take an interest in what is happening in these countries... and the last few years have been rich in events: after the velvet revolution, orange or roses, after the Arab Springs, all at the EU doorstep, there were radical changes in political, social and economic situations.

Is this a contamination? Certainly it is. At the time of the Iron Curtain, Germans, Czechs or Hungarians, i.e. neighbours of the Western block, tried to listen to the radio stations of the “other side”, and absorbed the news, the daily life. Some jamming and control devices tried to reduce these forays into the daily lives of class enemies... and now some governments do not allow any connection or develop a specific administration to control the Internet. But it is quite futile. The digital communications are becoming easier and faster and digital boundaries are difficult to close. The middle class, the educated people, the young people that could or could not pursue higher education, are, in particular, susceptible to European developments, crisis or not. But how is it within the European Union?
Map n° 1: Do you see yourself as More European than National,
Source: Eurobarometer 80, European Citizenship, autumn 2013, pp. 153-154, in %.

The context does not contribute to a change of semantics and uses. The Eurobarometer n° 80 (November 2013) shows a 4% increase of the rate of citizens of the European Union who consider themselves only as "national" (UE28 average 42%), while only 5% consider themselves as “European only”... so, the crisis and the national contexts drive 10% of Irish, 14% of Greeks, 13% of Italians, 7% of the Portuguese to change their mind and to join the citizens who do not consider themselves as “Europeans”. 60% of the British and the Irish are in this case, as half of Bulgarians and Portuguese, or 55% of Greeks... The map n° 1 shows the distribution of citizens who consider themselves more "European" than “national”. For the EU, only 7% of people feel that way, while 89% of them feel more national than Europeans.
The appreciation of the neighbour is thus linked to the appreciation of the European Union itself. Such “secondary Europeanness” of the vast majority of the European Union citizens does not encourage considering the external relations of the European Union and jeopardizes these partnerships between the entire EU and partner countries.

Indeed, this new means for partnerships available for the European Union must be legitimised by its citizens. While the citizenship of the European Union is still a project and while the feeling of belonging deteriorates, this project that allows building a neighbourhood, to recognise the neighbour, both internally and externally, seems down. Any thoughts about the neighbours, the neighbourhood and its borders can therefore only refer to the problems of citizenship of the European Union and of European identity.

In “Some reflections on the sociological meaning of the concept of neighbourhood”, Thierry Leterre (2006) considers that it is a "curious choice" to use this topic of neighbourhood within a foreign policy. The very concept of “neighbour” is linked with the proximity. That is the starting point of the approach outlined in 2002 by Romano Prodi. The neighbour is someone who lives “next”, without anyone really knowing where this neighbourhood begins: in the district, the street, the building? It is difficult to define this concept in the space, neighbour across the street or neighbour at a lunch, because it is “close proximity”, but a closeness that is only partially defined by geography or by spatialisation, but of course also carries the representation of what it is that is close.

For Émile Littré, in 1876, the neighbour “is near... remains near”, citing Berenice from Racine: “To make your States more neighbours one another. The Euphrates will confine his empire and yours”. The neighbour is also defined by proximity if not undergone: who chooses its neighbours? Of course, the logic of urbanisation, such as the logic of populating the territories, induces some historical and sociological determinations to the installation of neighbourhoods and creates neighbourhoods actually quite fortuitous.

But across the Europe, the logic of the conceptual choice is clear: however, while the fall of the Berlin Wall ushered in the obviousness of the German reunification and of a reorganisation to the East, the new neighbours of the Union, still farther to East, the choice was not obvious, but rather imposed by the circumstances of the enlargement or of the insecurity in the world, as in the case of the Mediterranean neighbourhood.

The term “neighbour” is complex because it has several entries, but more
importantly, because it induces logic of inside, of outside and of proximity, it allows to surpass the economic and to install the politics in a European project (Smith, 2005). It is no longer only flow of capital, goods, services or persons.

This proximity of the “new” neighbours is both a threat and an opportunity that has been established very quickly at European level: first as a threat, especially since September 11, 2001, and after the Balkan crisis; secondly as the opportunity, following the effects of enlargement. It is clear that the management of the eastern borders, notably with Ukraine and Belarus, is complicated by the problem of migration, such as the relations in the Mediterranean are complicated by the problem of diffusion of international terrorism.

It is important to reconcile security imperative and neighbourhood policy (Council of European Union, 2003; Wilkins, 2012). The approach is clear: by contributing to the economic and social developments of neighbouring countries, some new conditions are created for the security of Europe, with greater economic integration, more cultural and social exchanges, shared democratic values, joint institutional changes. In the text of 2003 about “European Security Strategy”, Javier Solana clearly described both the problems that the EU can no longer ignore and the method that is to “promote, to East of EU and to the Mediterranean frontiers, a whole of well-governed countries” (see also Solana, 2007). The security of the Union, therefore, goes right through the democratic, economic and social development of neighbours.

Such threat-induced definition of a political project of the European Union is obviously very questionable and simplistic, while the EU has installed an ENP that could emancipated from this origin, and if the objectives remain, the implemented means could lead to results that lead, in fact, to a redefinition of the European political project. In 2007, during the first meeting of EU ministers about the European Neighbourhood, it is reported that the ENP “was implemented in order to strengthen the prosperity, stability and mutual security of the EU and its neighbouring countries” (IP/07/1263, Brussels, 30.8.2007). These three concepts are now installed in a “mutual” fundamental logic: it is to convince of the win-win character of the strategy to create genuine partnerships. But the current context and the turbulence prevent the achievement of this objective, obviously.
The EU borders changed a lot in recent years: both geographically and conceptually. With this insertion of limits of the EU in landscapes, the new borders create both distance and proximity. Distance, because habits are jostled, the exchanges are necessarily more difficult and the situations are more problematic. It is very schematic to simplify the situation of the new integrated countries in 2004, 2007 and 2013, by just reversing the attraction pole, from East to West. This could be legitimate at the political level, but not at social or cultural level. Moldova and Ukraine, for example, are now at the same time more distant, for Romanians and Slovaks, and less for citizens from the West. And this situation has worsened with the entry of Slovakia at the end of December 2007 in the Schengen area. The border is a limit for the social sphere and imposes the “otherness”; however, it is one of the difficulties of the European Union to maintain boundaries and, conversely, one of the great promises of the Schengen area, beyond the facilitation of the economic activity, an area that Bulgarians and Romanians also aspire to join.

A spatial continuity follows from the continuity of Schengen policy, even at the landscape level in the case of unnatural borders. The extension of Schengen area strengthens the binding characteristic of other external borders; while a large part of European citizens goes through some invisible borders, the others who continue to stop to be controlled would like to transgress the frontiers. The exclusion of the Schengen zone creates a sort of European second-class citizenship. The evolution of polymorphic areas of the EU does not encourage recognition and a massive legitimisation. The citizens of the EU are struggling to understand it, and, above all, they do not all share the same symbols. The end of physical boundaries such as the introduction of the Euro is indeed concrete evidence of the existence of the EU. It is necessary to read the map upon taking into account these elements.

The role of cross-border cooperation takes on another meaning with this development. The territories may be defined in other way than from borders and the neighbourly relations then could be settled in a real proximity. So these border areas do not become buffer zones, but mediation zones, and precisely this positioning may set the border in a role accepted by all.

However, the ENP obviously needs borders to delimitate its “new” neighbours. But what borders? Those of Europe defined in 1994 by resolution n° 1247 of the Council of Europe which comprises now 47 countries, including Russia, Turkey or Azerbaijan? Thus, Kazakhstan is not included in the ENP, but is subject to a special cooperation. For several years, the President Nazerbaiev
multiplies elsewhere numerous information campaigns on the theme “Kazakhstan is in Europe”.

The question of the accession of Turkey has revived the debate (in 1987, Morocco’s candidacy was rejected by application of geographical criteria). Is it because the project of the European Union is not the Council of Europe’s project that the two spaces are not identical? Yet, is it not legitimate, for many countries of this region, to try to integrate the EU, at least in regard to this geographical criterion? Nevertheless, the evolution of debates about the Lisbon Treaty has led to a relativisation of a difficult argument to support: history as geography has failed to provide criteria accepted by all, no more than the shared roots (Christian). Now the EU tries to carry on its integration with another criterion: the shared values, and as we have mentioned, the EU implements them in its external policies.

Between federalism, integrationism and sovereignism, between political project and economic project, it is difficult for the EU to define its project, and therefore its limits. The current institutional development, the negotiations with the official candidates, except Turkey, that have an European “vocation” to integrate, after the adhesion of a 28th member, are arguments for a combination of the deepening and the widening of the integration. The first logic could be considered as a “pause” to allow the Union to consolidate its political project and to get time to be legitimatated by its citizens. But the consolidation and the legitimisation have not occurred. The ENP was meant to provide a temporary answer: the countries included in this policy could not be considered as candidates for membership, but as privileged partners. This logic is coherent in a stable environment. But after the Arab Spring (Galabov, Sayah, 2012), internal disorders (Rouet, 2013) and regarding the Ukrainian situation, we must challenge this simplistic approach.

Between 2004 and 2013, the eastward enlargement was crucial for enhancing the economic and political relations with neighbouring countries and the action plans were inspired heavily by pre-accession programs implemented for the enlargement in 2004, 2007 and 2013, and whose evaluation was very positive (European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 2011; European Commission, 2010). These similarities, a priori pragmatic, since the followed objectives were often similar, have contributed to a political ambiguity: a specific neighbourhood partnership, but no membership immediately, not really integration, yet “more” than a simple association.
2 Europe and Europeanness

The “neighbour” induces proximity, spatial with boundaries that are similar to a common ownership, but also historical and cultural: the neighbours who become or may become special partners (including those in the South) can be part of multiple proximities and not of a simple centre-periphery relationship.

So this neighbourhood logic is often mobilised to participate in a particular schematisation of the European Union in concentric circles: a centre (the “Old Europe” of the founding countries expanded to a part of the West); a first circle of countries (consisting of countries recently integrated, still in transition for access to Schengen or to the Euro); the “candidate” countries (and whose application has been accepted formally or informally); the “neighbours”, directly with terrestrial borders (in the East) or with maritime borders (South)... and the rest of the world in an obviously multipolar vision.

Our Europe of circles is complex and the situation could be explained by the very history of the European construction, with developments at different speeds and on several levels simultaneously. In principle, the agreements between States must take precedence over political construction, which explains the acquired configuration. However, it is also possible to analyse these changes as the result of a pragmatic approach to build a Federal Europe.

For citizens, this institutional complexity remains difficult to understand and does not favour the readability of the European project and the legitimacy of the European institutions. It may even encourage them to doubt the existence of a real project! The national withdrawal is certainly also related to this problem: in each country, the institutions, especially in the West, are better explained within education systems and therefore more familiar.
The issue of the integration of European dimensions in education programs is crucial, but it is important to provide an effective education in relation to such complexity.

Another point: the overall architecture cannot be understood clearly without the articulations between the different European circles. In particular, one of the main current challenges linked to the management of the economic and financial crisis remains the relationship between the Euro area and the entire European Union.

It is not just a problem of governance (which is based on the triad Council, Commission and Parliament). European citizens have little understanding (did they really have time for that? The EU institutions are quite new...) about these three institutions that operate simultaneously and their
respective prerogatives.

The issue of democratic legitimisation is therefore also a complex construction, both at the level of the Member States involved or not in different circles, but also at the level of the European institutions. It is always easy to highlight the supposed incoherence of the Member States who subscribed to common rules but does not really enforce them. The question of sovereignty, central within each country in the context of internal political debates, is also very complicated and cannot be easily understood even regarding the European construction.

It will be difficult, probably, to simplify the European architecture at least in the short term but it is possible to continue with the efforts to teach Europe to explain the articulations, to highlight advances in democratic terms since the last treaty.

In a vision of spatial differentiation, the outposts of the EU are de facto resettled, anachronistically, reversing the negative and disruptive effect of the new frontiers in the East or, indeed, approaching the European Union to Central Africa via a new area with a controlled progress. This Eurocentric simplistic mapping does not include the political reality of Europe of 28, while institutions evolve and the European politics, finally, tries to bring out the “common” in this complex set of neighbours; however, without much success.

Now the neighbour is no more completely a stranger, he is at the same time near and different, and, if we abandon the practical centre-periphery logic, the neighbour is none other than the European citizen itself, in mirror, in this neighbourhood citizenship and not of common references: cultural, political or historical.

Indeed, the European Union, from an economic and political project, made close distant populations, and has transformed strangers in neighbours, who cultivate their identity while building a European identity that is composed, precisely, from this neighbourhood. The countries of the East and South can be now “new neighbours”, but the enlargement countries are not some “old neighbours”! The neighbourhood is renewed both with the evolution of proximity and the representation of the “Other”.

Hubert Vedrine recalls in 2007 that there are “many ways to be European”. But it is much easier to declare that some countries are “European” and other countries not than to attempt to define what a European, an indefinable entity, is nor with respect to space, to history, to culture, to language or to religion. Europe is not a Nation or a State, which does not prevent the
European citizenship to exist, that is to say that of the European Union, to have a sense. “The more we move away from 1989, the more we confuse Europe with the European Union”, which, in effect, disrupts the debate (Reszler, 2004, p. 40).

The external neighbours in the European Union may well consider themselves as European and even pushing this logic: if this new citizenship is settled permanently, it can be decoupled from the European problem itself and some citizens of the EU could – why not? – do not consider themselves as Europeans!

It is obvious that the political problem of the EU does not overlap with that of citizens. For the latter, in fact, it is not the nationality of the inhabitants of the Member States that conditions the European identity (Frank, 2004). For the EU, in the context of globalisation and multipolar economy, the question is to know how to build a relevant political project, legitimate and effective, how to overcome the management of an economic space, now widely undersized.

The European Union, enlarged since the fall of the Berlin Wall, between the two centres of the world, during this period did not consider the problem of its relations with its neighbours in the East and the South, for different reasons, and neither the problem of citizenship.

The ENP, interpreted as a defensive mechanism that limits or delays future enlargement of the EU (Verluise, 2013), is thus not seen as an indirect tool of mobilisation for a new European identity (Lannon, 2011). The context of crisis has revived internal tensions, inside the EU taken as a whole, but also within each Member State, and while trade and mobility increase, the identities are constructed at national or local level. The EU has not really succeeded in mobilising about the close neighbourhood. The turbulences within the countries of the South as well as in Ukraine could even encourage recognising that the ENP is something in this turbulence... which is certainly partly true. Based on shared values, the ENP constitutes an instrument to promote a model of society, far more difficult to build up than a global economic leader...

Despite this mixed record, and when waiting for a stabilisation of the South and the East, it is possible to consider that the ENP, defensive mechanism that limits or delays future enlargements of the EU, may indirectly constitute a mobilising tool for a new European identity (Tonra, 2010), oriented on the EU, an opportunity to extend the national dimension. Indeed, a new Citizenship “between neighbours” and “with external neighbours” can appear from the emergence of a public space, or rather from the connection between
public spaces that is possible, necessary and legitimate with the integration of new limitations and new partnerships (Rouet, 2009). Some neighbours more or less nearby can be part of a new integrative project, related to Citizenship. The return of the institutions and of politic, consequence of the financial, economic and political crises is, from this point of view, an obvious opportunity to link the European project to partnerships with the “neighbours”. The essential requirement for this positive outlook: the sharing of a project, the development of pedagogy of this project, the development of a conscious Europeanness.

The Europeanness, attitude born from European identification, is based on the surpassing the tradition: innovation is following the exchange and the differences. And as this recognition of differences allows promoting democracy and human rights, the European project is to use the balance of power rather than deny or minimise it; to provide the basis and the very foundations of a new civic construction (Youngs, 2010).

**Conclusion – Enlargements and deepening (no further enlargement or deepening)**

As we have seen before, the definition of the boundaries allow setting the institutional framework of Europe. This Europe so far built in concentric circles and with successive accessions cannot easily get out of a centre-periphery model, explicitly or implicitly challenged by many citizens. The issue of absorptive capacity is crucial but not final because the European Union is not, and seems never become the Europe: the political structure can be based on identification logic but the reverse is difficult to conceptualise. The question of neighbours is therefore essential not only in regard to the delimitation of the EU but also to try to understand the mechanisms of identification in a turbulent and unstable world.

Reduce violence, improve security, establish the rule of the law is matters of values and are policy objectives that we must try to reach not only in the context of the political union of the EU but also in relation to neighbours (and the rest of the world). It is a matter of selfish protection at the same time as it is adherence to values.

The political EU has not fundamentally reformed the principle of qualified majority which partly explains the complexity of its construction, and its relative political impotence. The more the EU enlarges, the more it seems difficult to obtain a qualified majority and, consequently, a greater European integration.
Moreover, it is easy to see that the differences between the different social models persist or worsen and that the political cultures stay very different. Our shared history is relative and although the European citizen needs symbol and, perhaps, a mythology that exceeds an inventory of "great men" who have made Europe, the heritage of the nations, the Empires, the States, the Nation-states is strong, firmly anchored in the daily lives.

Thus, the possibilities for agreement on priority areas seem difficult to obtain and the Member States seem reluctant to continue the transfer of sovereignty to the EU level.

The political dynamic of the enlargement process seems to be slowed down. In particular, the question of Turkey's accession remains central. The country's size, its internal differences, the weight of its agriculture, its geopolitical positioning, and its cultural disparity are arguments mobilised to stop any further accession negotiations (Rouet, Terem, 2011). Yet, Turkey's accession, apart from economic aspects, could promote a policy shift, particularly regarding priorities for funding and reforms of governance. If cultural diversity is now part of the values of the EU, then the accession of Turkey is in line with this logic.

The situation of the Balkan countries remains difficult especially because of security and institutional aspects. Accession to the EU is seen as a factor of stability and, again, it is to reconcile the objective of internal security, in the borders of the EU, and externally inside neighbours. But institutional reforms will take much time.

The link between enlargement and deepening should evolve, avoiding adding to the complexity of European architecture commented above.

Several scenarios are possible; the first is to focus on cohesion and integration and avoid any new membership. In this way, the territory retains its economic and political multipolarity, without any questioning, but the demographic prospects will involve recourse to immigration, especially from outside the EU. In addition, maladaptive responses, in terms of partnership, can reduce the attractiveness of the EU for the neighbours. This is already happening in the public opinion in Turkey.

Another scenario is to leave the status quo institutionally within the EU and to install especially some economic partnerships with neighbouring Turkey, the Balkans, some countries of Mediterranean area, or Ukraine. For instance, Moldovans are no longer subject to a visa requirement. Then, the objective would be to build a larger market without political and civic integration.
A final assumption allows us to imagine a mixed policy: the pursuit of internal integration and institutional reforms and the integration of new members. The second approach makes it possible to improve the features of the first and, most importantly, this scenario is not an extension of an economic vision often denounced, but allows for politically considering a European architecture nearest to its citizens... and perhaps neighbours too!

References:


