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HOW CARL SCHMITT AND THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL ARE STILL RELEVANT FOR UNDERSTANDING TURKEY: THE PRESIDENTIAL SYSTEM EXPLAINED THROUGH A SECURITY NARRATIVE

Srđan Mladenov Jovanović – Ajdin Đidić*

ABSTRACT

Much was said on Turkey’s modes of governance, especially during the ever-changing policies and discourses promoted by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Nevertheless, the post-2016 rhetoric promulgated primarily by Erdoğan, which saw securitisation as the hub of the discourse, still has not functioned as a point of scholarly analysis. Filling that gap, we propose to look at Turkey’s recent securitisation narrative and the insistence on the change to a presidential system through the lens of the Copenhagen School’s thought, as well as the work of Carl Schmitt. As the Copenhagen School defines ‘security’ in broad terms such as ‘survival’, it is not a huge step to make the connection between this theoretical position and Erdoğan’s hyperbolised security rhetoric. Similarly, Schmitt’s concept of sovereignty, and his insistence that the sovereign cannot be constrained by standard norms and regulations, serve well to explain Erdoğan’s insistence on attaining more political power. The article shows a change in policy towards increased securitisation.

Key words: Carl Schmitt, the Copenhagen school, Turkey, presidential system, securitisation

Introduction

The violent and futile coup attempt in 2016 brought about significant changes for Turkey, and potentially even opened a ‘Pandora’s box’ of sorts, allowing for a more intense ‘securitisation’ approach by the state elites. Some of

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those changes were best seen through the successful attempts to amend the constitution and increase the president’s role and power. The main pretext for such a bold move by the initiatives’ main proponent, president Erdoğan, occurred in the security context under the ‘real and present danger’. Even Erdoğan himself proclaimed that the main goals of the new system were security and stability (Sabah, 2017), as ‘the notion of national security as understood and interpreted in a traditional context continues to be a central variable in Turkish policy-making’ (Drorian, 2005). While the issue of the new presidential system, along with constitutional amendments, was a point of controversy for many critics, others supported it wholeheartedly. The presidential system proposed, among other points, to extend the duration of the presidency, virtually abolish the post of prime minister (while at the same time allowing the president to maintain his membership in the political party), to make impeachment almost impossible, to allow the president greater control over the Parliament (which could also be dissolved by him), and to change judicial institutions (Canan and Akçali, 2017).

Previously, it has been argued that Turkey was a country with weak institutions (Selçuk, 2016). Why was the presidential system in Turkey not developed before the coup? We argue that Erdoğan’s strong political domination, coupled with references to imminent security concerns, which reached their high point after the failed coup attempt, contributed to this institutional shift. Thus, in order to analyse the recent changes in Turkey, we propose to use the securitisation approach of the Copenhagen School, as well as Carl Schmitt’s insights upon which the broader literature on securitisation rests (Williams, 2003). Erdoğan’s increasingly stern rhetoric, which arguably started after Turkey’s 2011 unilateral involvement in Syria, cannot be analysed separately from the security framework which has been often utilised throughout his speeches and policy justifications. Thus, we will pay particular attention to his speech-acts, which take particularly important place in Copenhagen School’s theorizing.

Firstly, we will shortly outline the history behind presidentialism in Turkey and how it relates to Erdoğan. We shall then proceed to discuss the Schmittian legacy and related securitisation approaches, which can be traced back to him. We will also explain how these insights relate to Erdoğan, and show how much of the Copenhagen School’s thought can be used to form a coherent picture of Turkey’s constitutional and institutional changes through the use of some key concepts which are well-entrenched in the School’s framework. Furthermore, we will explain how Schmitt’s idea of sovereignty delegates its power in a
security environment, which ultimately helped Erdoğan prevail and establish the presidential system. Towards this, we shall employ the process-tracing method as seen through the dozens of texts, news articles, and official statements pertaining to Erdoğan pre and post-2011, and see which instance has more references to the existential security threat against Turkey, its people, political establishment or outside countries. Although our analysis will be mostly focused on the post-2016 context, this does not mean that the securitisation rhetoric started at that particular point in time. It just means that the context when it culminated was after 2016 and the failed coup, on which we shall concentrate within this work. The securitisation rhetoric indeed started appearing after 2011 and Turkey taking a more unilateral security role in the region. Finally, we will conclude with some remarks about the future of Turkey’s political system, and whether it can prove to be durable or not.

Turkey’s security issues and securitisation politics have already figured as hubs of scholarly interest (though not in view of the recent 2016 coup), from Turkey’s westernisation agenda (Tarik Oğuzlu and Güngör, 2006) to a more international/global structure level view of security and changing security issues (Bilgin, 2005). In this work, however, we shall take an intra-state look on the securitisation narrative as a means of attaining more presidential power via the change to a presidential system, via engaging the narrative/discourse purported primarily by Erdoğan himself in a content analytical fashion (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013, Reicher and Hopkins, 1996), through the lens of the Copenhagen School’s thoughts, as well as the work of Carl Schmitt.

1 Turkey and its presidential system: the context

In order to analyse the role of institutions in general and the presidential system in particular in the Turkish case, it is of relevance to understand the very nature of the Turkish state itself. The modern Republic of Turkey originated within the revolutionary struggle for independence led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the early 20th Century, when the Sultan Mohammed IV was deposed, including the ancient imperial order, and the state of Turkey was formed (D’Elia, 2016). The country itself was envisioned as a parliamentary democracy at the time (Gerhard et al., 2012). Nonetheless, the whole power and control of the state remained in the hands of the president, i.e. Atatürk himself (Zürcher, 2004). After Atatürk’s period, the nature of the state could have been understood as tutelary democracy (see: Rabkin, 1992, Taş, 2015):
the military, as the protectors of the secular Kemalist legacy, would often intervene through the instrument of coup into the democratic workings of the state (Kadercan and Kadercan, 2016). The military itself, an important instrument of the struggle for independence, had thus had an important role in the Turkish social and political system. We can see such a stance of the military as directly or indirectly putting salience and importance of domestic institutions into jeopardy. A most striking example of this was the military amending or directly changing the constitution, as was the case after the 1980 coup (see: Sakallioğlu, 1997, Karabelias, 1999). The politicians who found themselves operating under such circumstances could not help but wonder how to strengthen those institutions and make them less subject to change. Thus, the recent debates on the presidential system in Turkey can be at least extended back to the late 1980s and 1990s during the time of Özal and Demirel (Içener, 2015). But the root of these debates on the nature of government goes back even further to the 1960s (Tosun, 2016).

Be that as it may, Erdoğan sided with Demirel on the issue of presidency, and argued (even back in 2003) that Turkey would benefit from having an American-styled presidential arrangement (Hürriyet, 2016). However, this debate was not rekindled until 2007 and later again in 2014. According to the constitutional referendum held in 2007, the presidential candidate was able to run and be popularly elected. This removed the precedent where the president was to be elected by the members of the parliament. Therefore, 2014 was the year when we witnessed the popularly elected president of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, for the first time as a key political figure. Following this, Erdoğan took incremental steps favouring a transition to the presidential system, which culminated with the unsuccessful coup attempt in 2016, when Erdoğan’s discourse in support of it increased. Hence, we can see how the debate over the presidential system in Turkey was mostly influenced by the weakness of institutions and lack of their consolidation. This weakness in turn ensured that coalitional governments would be especially weak, and that entire decision-making process and its execution would be mired in ineffectiveness and deadlocks. This is a crucial issue, especially when the debate moves from questions of everyday politics to the security sphere. As we will see, the public could not tolerate political ineffectiveness. In 2016, Turkey was already mired in Syria, had problems with Kurds, domestic terrorism and coup attempts. The question of security returned to the fore, and with it the debate on presidentialism, yet this time, it was more than just a debate.
2 Carl Schmitt and the securitisation theory

We now proceed to argue that the securitisation approach, as proposed by the Copenhagen School, has strong roots not only in apparent constructivist thinking, but also in realism and Carl Schmitt’s thought. We shall consecutively utilise this understanding of the Copenhagen School and apply its main insights to the understanding of Erdoğan’s securitisation approach, while Schmitt’s insights will shed light on the quest for sovereignty and ultimately the transition to the presidential system.

The fact that securitisation approaches take inspiration from Schmitt is nothing novel; namely Williams already showed this connection (Williams, 2003). Both of them consider the existence of the ultimate locus of power, which determines the existence of an existential threat. Famously, the securitisation approach does this through the concept of ‘speech-act’. The importance of the speech-act can be explained by the school’s relative position in academic debates. The Copenhagen School originated as a reaction to the US trend to relegate their security theories to policy agenda considerations, which does not leave enough room for intellectual and critical developments; the question of security was reduced to the intratheoretical debate between the branches of realism, while other approaches, like constructivism, needed to adapt to that overarching paradigm (Wæver, 2003). In such an intellectual context, widening and deepening of security was seen as paramount; threats needed to be expanded beyond the military ones, and referent objects of security had to move away from states (Paris, 2001). At this juncture, consolidated and systematic European approaches to security started appearing—Copenhagen School being one of them. It took this already established ‘constructivist’ concept of speech-act as its starting point. The speech-act as defined by Austin is a type of ‘performative utterance’, the main goal of which is to create reality rather than simply describe it, through intersubjective action and understanding (Austin, 1975). The controversy emerges when one attempts to apply these insights to the political realm, or even still, above it. Due to its literal focus on the speech-act itself, the Copenhagen School leaves almost endless manoeuvrability for the size and scope of issues which can be subsumed under the concept of security. The Copenhagen School defines security in the context of survival; as an existential threat which requires ‘extraordinary’ measures of response (Buzan et al., 1998). As long as the speech-act can present an issue as an extreme and extraordinary emergency directed against the survival, the
threat will exist. Furthermore, the literature also explains when the speech-act will be successful; when the internal and external conditions of act itself are satisfied, meaning, when it is represented as consistent in an internal grammatical and an external contextual sense (Buzan et al., 1998). In that vein, the Copenhagen School divides security in sectors (economic, societal, environmental, political, military), while taking regions as sub-units of the global system as its units of analysis (Buzan et al., 1998).

All of these explanations further echo **Carl Schmitt**’s understanding of the political in general, and security in particular. For **Schmitt**, the existence of the political is tightly conflated with the question of sovereignty. The political cannot exist if the possibility to go outside of normal, every-day precepts of politics and law is not present. This is perhaps best reflected in the opening sentence of his work *Political Theology*: ‘Sovereign is he who decides on the exception’ (Schmitt, 1985). For **Schmitt**, the possible existence of the exception is the reason why the sovereign can never be fully bound by ‘normal’ rules, as the exception needs to be answered outside of them; the whole issue when one needs to think who will respond when the political system fails to provide measures of competence thus arises (Schmitt, 1985). By saying this, **Schmitt** tried to justify the article 48 of the Weimar constitution via which the president had the ability to take emergency measures without prior consent of the Parliament. In a similar vein, **Waever** argues that the question of security necessarily needs to go beyond the sphere of established rules of politics into more extreme forms of politicisation (Waever, 2003). In order to further elucidate this point, he further divided areas of possible threats into sectors and regions (Buzan et al., 1998). What was exactly the nature of this emergency of **Schmitt**’s which presupposed the existence of the sovereign defined as such? It was an ability to make a distinction between friend and enemy; the enemy being defined precisely as the threat in Copenhagen School’s thinking, that is, a real threat which endangered existence and survival (Schmitt, 1985). What connects the Copenhagen School with Schmittian thinking even further is this act of construction, where the ‘emergency’ is not to be found in issues themselves, but in way they are approached. This is precisely what we mean by the concept of the speech-act. As long as we have any issue that presupposes emergency, which is expressed in the terms of ‘survival’, we have engaged the speech-act theory and, consequently, the friend-enemy distinction. This is furthermore in lieu with current theories on political discourse, wherein political discourse is ‘primarily seen as a form of political action, and as pan of the
political process. Such a view is perfectly compatible with the dominant paradigm in most social approaches to discourse, viz., that discourse is a form of social action and interaction’ (Van Dijk, 1997). Similar notions have been stressed in analyses of presidential rhetoric (Stuckey, 1988, Hart, 1984). Hence, through the Copenhagen School, we can better understand the security context and the specific threats, which Erdoğan found salient enough to express through his speech-acts. On the other hand, through understanding Carl Schmitt and his political theory’s normativity, we can better understand Erdoğan’s quest for sovereignty and thus, ultimately, the shift to the presidential system.

3 The Turkish securitisation rhetoric

Drawing on the above written, we now proceed to analyse relevant texts that pertain to post-2011 international unilateralism. We shall explain how such a context was presented as a threat to the survival and existence of sovereignty and legitimacy of the ruling party, the state, and the Turkish people themselves, as the rhetoric took a securitisation colouring, expressed through the speech-acts found in the analysed texts. Hence, we will utilise relevant parts of Erdoğan’s discourse as corresponding to the securitisation of various sectors as defined by Waever. By and large, we will focus on the FETÖ threat and the relevant securitisation attempts which perceived it as an existential menace over all of the above-stipulated sectors, as it has shown itself to be the most salient of issues.

Shortly after the coup, the vast majority of the government-leaning Turkish media wanted to show that hidden terrorist elements belonging to the terrorist group FETÖ (which contained plans against Erdoğan’s life) were within the Turkish military (Mynet, 2017). In Weaver’s understanding, the political would be the sector in this case, and the state would be the referent object, since its security and survival was allegedly jeopardised (Wæver, 2003). Moreover, Erdoğan, vowing to remove terrorist elements from the military, proclaimed that Turkish military is not the military of coup-makers who wanted to capture the state for themselves, implying their obvious illegitimacy (Posta, 2017). Going further, by conflating Gülen’s money-making schemes with political and societal security, one can also notice how the question of economy can be securitised as well in the post-2016 Turkish discourse (Amsterdam, 2017). Turkey perceived Gülen’s private preparatory schools in Turkey and abroad as
financing his subversive activities against the state and society (Brletich, 2015). Erdoğan himself did not shy away from framing Fetullah Gülen’s organisation as the ‘world’s most prevalent terrorist organisation whose main goal was occupation’ (Türk, 2016) in a hyperbolised discourse. This was going against the regional complex security theory of Waever and Buzan, where Erdoğan expanded the scope of his speech-act beyond the regional focus to system itself and thus moved away from the sole focus on security threats emanating from nation states with immovable societal/political/military units (Buzan et al., 1998). By doing this, he effectively conceptualized national and economic sectors (national and economic units) as mobile, which posed threats to other actors on regional and global levels (Mouritzen, 1997). What more, if allowed to operate abroad, Gülen’s economic endeavours as mobile cross-state units would prove detrimental for Turkish and other countries’ security interests, regardless of the region. This speech-act and other similar to it had a task of emphasizing seriousness of the terrorist threat beyond typical state-centred threats that traditional studies of terrorism would take as their unit of analysis. Similarly, on the commemoration of the Victory Day in 2016, Erdoğan proclaimed again that FETÖ’s main goal was control of the world itself (Cumhuriyet, 2016). On the opening of the Turkey-African Economy and Business Forum, Erdoğan warned African countries that FETÖ posed imminent threat to them as well, further hyperbolising the threat. Implying the legitimacy of his government against the terrorist organisation which wanted to destroy it, Erdoğan also proclaimed that the USA, whose citizenship was held by Gülen, will have to choose between a legitimate, democratic Turkey, or the terrorist organisation which wanted to destroy it (BBC, 2016). The fact that Erdoğan went beyond a regional security focus is obvious in his blaming the USA over their apparent support for Gülen (Fikret, 2018). Here, Erdoğan wanted to securitise the economic sector due to the USA’s prosecution of the Turkish banking executive who was found guilty of breaking restraints against doing economic cooperation with Iran and present it as a threat against the country’s sovereignty (Fikret, 2018). However, FETÖ was not the only ‘container’ of the existential threat directed against Turkey. Erdoğan further hyperbolised his rhetoric against ISIS, PKK, and FETÖ, simultaneously calling for national mobilisation for the sake of state survival (Deutsche Welle Türkçe, 2016). In his critique of the USA for supporting Kurds in Northern Syria, Erdoğan said how Turkey would not tolerate it, since the existence of YPG/PKK in Syria was a direct terrorist threat for Turkish security: ‘We will not leave the separatist
organisation in peace in both Iraq and Syria’ (Evans and Coskun, 2017). Referring to his crackdown against journalists in his interview with Bloomberg, Erdoğan proclaimed that most of the arrested journalists were in fact terrorists bent on bombing incidents and burglary (Micklethwait, 2017). Erdoğan further securitised societal cleavages by claiming that only Sunni Arabs, Sunni Turkmens, and Sunni Kurds should be allowed to live in Mosul after cleansing it from the Islamic State (News, 2016). This finds strong resonance with his previous statements condemning Shias of being ‘liars, slanderers, and instigators’, which shows Turkish Shia communities, most notably Aleviws, as the societal ‘Other’ (Taştekin, 2014). Furthermore, after breakdown of peace process with Kurds in 2015, many saw Erdoğan’s actions as wanting to appease the nationalist elements of Turkey by waging war on the Kurdish elements of society in favour of greater societal unity and cohesion: This is all a part of Turkey’s war against the Kurds’ (Bohn, 2015). Thus, throughout his speech-acts so far, we can deduce that not only was the legitimacy and survival of the state in question, but also the survival of societal sector, which has nation itself as its referent object. Discursively, most of the fearmongering was conducted via extreme hyperbolism and constant appearance in the media.

On 13 June 2013, Erdoğan proclaimed that ‘those who call themselves journalists, artists, politicians, have, in a very irresponsible way, opened the way for hatred, discrimination and provocation’ (News, 2013), shifting the blame for a row of issues onto the victims, i.e. journalists. Since then, and especially since the coup, media freedom has been severely stifled. We can notice that in the post-coup attempt context, all previously held threats now perceived new salience and importance. While terrorist organisations such as the PKK and ISIS were securitised in the manner, which posed threat mostly to the political sector, FETÖ was perceived as a much broader threat. Hence, we can deduct from the rhetoric analysis that FETÖ posed threat to all sectors, as conceptualized by Waever et al., except for perhaps the environmental one. FETÖ’s existential threat was expounded as existing in the military, political, economic, and societal sectors. It is also important to note how each of these sectors was not securitised in isolation, and all of them had crosscutting effects on each other. Therefore, for example, FETÖ’s threat in the military/political sector was not only pertinent to that sphere of activity, but also to the much broader societal sector and national survival.
4 Turkish de-securitisation rhetoric

Before Turkey got mired in Syria and abandoned its ‘zero problems with neighbours policy’, there was not nearly as much talk of security. Rather, the wisdom of the day was de-securitisation and the return of pertinent issues to their political frames, indicating that the post-coup ‘re-securitisation’ was useful to Erdoğan on a practical level. The most pertinent and immediate security issue on the mind of Turkish policy makers during the early years of the JDP government was the Kurdish issue. The modern Kurdish issue arguably traces its roots back to 1984 and the initiation of the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party) guerrilla war against the state of Turkey (Beriker-Atiyas, 1997). The conflicts were abating and escalating over the years; in 2004, the violence was continued due to the previous governments’ penchant to misrepresent and underestimate the PKK’s capability and determination (Gunter, 2013a). The JDP government certainly brought novelty to the scene: in 2009, the then prime minister Erdoğan and president Gül announced the peace process known as the ‘Kurdish Opening’ (Gunter, 2013b). Erdoğan proclaimed: ‘If Turkey had not spent its energy, budget, peace and young people on terrorism, if Turkey had not spent the last twenty five years in conflict, where would we be? (Yonca and Ercan, 2009). Here we see a clear trend of moving away from the security rhetoric into one of de-securitisation. Similarly, Erdoğan was remembered to have criticised the ban of Kurdish political parties: ‘Our position against the closure of the DTP is clear ... We are against the closure of parties. We think individuals should be punished, not a (party) identity’ (Çalışkan, 2009). Turkey’s commitment to this policy of rapprochement was further echoed in Erdoğan’s 2011 apology over the Turkish state’s killing of over 13,000 Kurds during the 1930s (BBC, 2011). This statement came after Turkey’s initiative to resolve the Turkish-Kurdish conflict through the 2010-2011 government-PKK talks (Hess, 2013).

These attempts at de-securitisation can be viewed as a consequence of a broader political and ideological framework of the ruling party. Ahmet Davutoğlu, the chief architect of Turkey’s foreign policy orientation, developed his multilateral vision for Turkey in 2007; Turkey should be seen as a central regional actor due to its historical and cultural connection with peoples as widespread as the ones in the Caucasus and the Balkans all the way to Africa (Davutoğlu, 2008). Pınar Bilgin explains this multilateralism as the policy of ‘civilisational geopolitics’, which was based on mutual acceptance, the
promotion of economic relationships, and policy interdependence in the region based on shared cultural ties (Bilgin, 2004). Therefore, regional and domestic security issues needed to be sidelined.

For example, in 2010, Turkey, Iran, and Brazil tried to broker a deal over Iran’s nuclear program and help in lifting Western sanctions against Iran; the joint declaration signed by these countries is a testimony to this (Borger, 2010). The dealings with Russia at that time were also mostly revolving around the issues of ‘low politics’. Saluting the progress of the work being done through Turkish-Russian cooperation over the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, Erdoğan stated: ‘Our shores are under severe danger during the passage of the oil tankers through the straits. Once we complete the Samsun-Ceyhan pipeline, we would have the opportunity to reach out to the world from Ceyhan’ (Arsu, 2010). Furthermore, not only focusing on Iran, Turkey attempted to solve its long-standing regional issues such as the water problem with Syria; it attempted to achieve visa liberalisation with Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon, as well as to reconcile Arab states with Israel (Omait, 2014). The relations with Europe were fairly cordial as well; Davutoğlu stated that Turkish membership in the EU is one of the country’s top priorities (Davutoğlu, 2009). Referring to constitutional amendments, Erdoğan proclaimed that he wanted to bring Turkey in accordance with the EU norms and distance it from the ones of the 1982 militarily-imposed constitution (Welle, 2010).

Rather than security, domestic institutional and normative changes were advanced through greater multilateral involvement of all segments of Turkish society. Internationally, Turkey was looking to multilaterally solve long-standing regional issues. These changes in foreign policy thinking can be seen as a consequence of genuine democratisation attempts back home.

5 Erdoğan’s quest for the presidential system

Explaining sovereignty through securitisation is not a novel thing in academia. For example, in his explanation of the liberal apprehension of Islam as the radical ‘Other’, Pasa argued that ‘liberty can never be absolute in the face of sovereign demands’ (Pasa, 2006), thus revealing the liberal order’s underbelly in the process; ‘The ability to distinguish friend from enemy lies at the base of sovereign power’ (Pasa, 2006). Since its formation, Turkey had a penchant for idealizing a strong state that is the purest reflection of its modern independence. This was a product of the ‘Sevres syndrome’ thinking and ‘siege
mentality’, where modern Turkey irrationally perceived foreign and domestic threats as directed towards its potential dismemberment, and hence against its existence (Guida, 2008). As stated above, through the examination of Turkish history, we can conclude that since their formation, Turkish institutions were weak, while emphasis was put on the strong state and strong personalities. Kagitcibasi discovered that two social norms were prevalent and internalised in the Turkish society: a respect for authority and patriotism (Kagitcibasi, 1970). This can be understood as stemming from a fear of dismemberment and loss of independence, as well as from broader cultural and historic norms. In such a context, it was only a matter of time when a shift to presidentialism would happen. In other words, when the socio-political circumstances allowed (the accumulation and consolidation of power by Erdoğan and the JDP to the detriment of military), a shift was expected. Nonetheless, as we argued, this was indeed a sufficient reason but it was far from enough. A complete institutional shift could only have been accomplished under the rhetoric of securitisation, where popular and charismatic norms met. While indeed Turkey had strong presidents (the coup-maker Kenan Evren is a case in point), a full institutional shift to presidentialism could not have been done due to lack of popular acquiescence. Erdoğan and the JDP were garnering public support since 2002, which gave them ample time to reach broader segments of the society. In the Copenhagen School’s thinking, external, contextual, and social requirements have to be met before the securitisation through the speech-act could be achieved (Buzan et al., 1998). Through understanding the psychological and normative propensities of Turkey and its immediate post-2011 context, conditions for securitisation-based speech-acts were present. Stipulated circumstances were ripe for the emergence of the sovereign as a locus of power, and thus the ability to distinguish between friend and enemy. Popular acceptance of the securitisation act in a Schmittian perspective also presupposes the existence of political grouping. According to him, ‘this grouping is therefore always the decisive human grouping, the political entity. If such an entity exists at all, it is always the decisive entity, and it is sovereign in the sense that the decision about the critical situation, even if it is the exception, must always necessarily reside there’ (Schmitt, 1996). Thus, sovereign order is only possible where the sovereign, who decides on the friend-enemy distinction, exists. This presupposes an acceptance of a sovereign emergency decision by the public, which would then constitute the aforementioned sovereign order. Only when Erdoğan was sure that he could manipulate public opinion into
supporting him, did he opt to securitise varying sectors of Turkish public life. The failed coup attempt expressed a threat to Turkish state most clearly and unambiguously, and that is precisely when we see the beginnings of an institutional shift, which is supposed to be fully completed in 2019.

Conclusion

Turkey’s internal and external policies, in lieu with the government’s actions, have been changing drastically since the coming of the JDP and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan into power. Once hailed as a reformed state devoted to democracy, Turkey has gradually been changing into a state ruled by one person. After the failed coup attempt in 2016 (once referred to by Erdoğan as a ‘gift from God’), a broad securitisation discourse was strengthened to the extreme. Erdoğan’s rhetoric became even more drenched with internal and external security, enemies were seen everywhere, and the Otherisation of opposing voices and opinions became natural. In D’Elia’s words, ‘Turkey’s democracy is in crisis. Limited improvements in media laws have been trumped by the government’s continued use of broad antiterrorism and criminal defamation laws that allow the government wide leeway in punishing dissent’ (D’Elia, 2016).

A Schmittian perspective, coupled with the political understandings of the Copenhagen school, in accordance with theories on political discourse, was useful in explaining this rhetorical shift. Without the perceived threat – which could not exist if it had not been put forth in the public discourse via constant hyperbolising – it would have been significantly more difficult for Erdoğan to justify his want for more political and social power. The coup seemed to indeed have been a gift for him; without it, the securitisation rhetoric would perhaps not have been as easy to promote. Ever since its inception, ‘Turkey’s most important security interest since the foundation of the Republic has been to gain Western identity’ (Tarik Oğuzlu and Güngör, 2006); this time is now long gone, and securitisation took primacy.

On a broader level, we would like to point out that perceived and alleged threats – be they towards the nation, the state, national security, the ‘people’ – have been used as excuses for amassing power since the dawn of time. Nowadays, there are ample examples of discursive positioning of the Enemy as the great ‘Other’ in order to foster and promote policy. The Visegrad countries, as but a single example, have during the last several years been promoting anti-Islamic and xenophobic notions and policies, even though none of them have
accepted more than a negligible number of refugees, who certainly cannot pose a threat, especially if they are not within the country’s borders. Since 2012, the Serbian government has, via its media, promoted a vast array of alleged threats to Serbia itself, from Kosovar Albanians, via the undefined ‘West’, to George Soros. Soros was also the key Enemy figure for the now fallen Macedonian government of Nikola Gruevski, while Russia’s strongman, Vladimir Putin, tends to blame the still undefined ‘West’ on many of Russia’s problems consistently. Perhaps it is time to rethink both internal and external policies (and discourses) in a Schimittian perspective for a vast array of states, together with the Copenhagen’s school of thought.

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